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Dissertation Abstract
This dissertation attempts to make contributions to normative ethics and to the history of
philosophy. First, it contributes to the defense of consequentialist ethics against objections
grounded upon the value of loving relationships. Secondly, it provides the first systematic
account of John M. E. McTaggart’s (1866-1925) ethical theory and its relation to his
philosophy of love.
According to (maximizing) consequentialist ethics, it is always morally wrong to
knowingly do what will make the world worse-off than it could have been (i.e., had one
chosen one of the other courses of action available to one at the time). Many
consequentialists also recognize that love is one of the most important goods worth pursing
for its own sake and so this implies a strong duty to promote love.
Recently, however, philosophers (such as Stocker, Cocking, Oakley, and Badhwar)
have outlined what I call the “love-based objection.” It argues that consequentialism ought
to be rejected on its own terms because a commitment to maximizing aggregate overall
goodness precludes forming the kinds of commitments necessary for highly valuable loving
relationships. Other philosophers (such as Railton and Mason), however, have argued that a
particular kind of consequentialist theory (i.e., “sophisticated consequentialism”) that
recognizes the intrinsic value of love and that restricts evaluations based on maximizing
goodness to only the most fundamental realms of moral evaluation and guidance overcomes
the love-based objection. While philosophers have indicated how to overcome the objection
through sophisticated consequentialism, the task of constructing a plausible version of such
a system is currently ongoing.
This dissertation argues that, more than fifty years before this contemporary debate
started, McTaggart outlined a version of consequentialism called “Ideal Utilitarianism” that
can (with some supplementation) overcome recent love-based objections in the way
suggested by Railton and Mason. McTaggart’s work in moral philosophy, therefore, has a
previously unrecognized relevance to contemporary issues in normative ethics and so his
contributions ought to be considered alongside other, currently more prominent, ethicists of
his day such as Hastings Rashdall and G. E. Moore.
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Preface
This dissertation attempts to make contributions to normative ethics and to the history of
philosophy. First, it contributes to the defense of consequentialist ethics against objections
grounded upon the value of loving relationships. Secondly, it comprises the first systematic
account of John M. E. McTaggart’s (1866-1925) ethical theory and its relation to his
philosophy of love.
According to (maximizing) consequentialist ethical theories, it is always morally
wrong to knowingly do what will make the world worse-off than it could have been (i.e., had
one chosen one of the other courses of action available to one at the time). Many
consequentialists also recognize that love is one of the most important goods worth
pursuing for its own sake and so this implies a strong duty to promote (or at least preserve)
as much love as possible in the world. Any actions or policies that could be reliably expected
to make the world worse by impeding the establishment or preservation of genuine loving
relationships (friendships, romances, or family bonds) will be immoral. Those actions which
could be reliably expected to improve the world by providing more opportunities for people
to establish and maintain loving relationships ought, morally, to be pursued whenever the
opportunity arises. All of this, of course, will be limited by considerations of other intrinsic
goods; love ought to be promoted only so long as doing so will not make the world worseoff on the whole in terms of other intrinsic goods and evils. Increasing love at the cost of
diminishing long-term health or at the cost of eroding social trust would presumably make
the world much worse-off on the whole than if we could have a world with less love but that
maintains current levels of health and social-co-operation. Nonetheless, if love is as good as
many people throughout history have reasonably claimed that it is, then a consequentialist
must take the effects of an action or policy on loving relationships (whether actual, possible,
in one’s own life, or the lives of others) as seriously as its effects on other aspects of wellbeing such as health, freedom from unnecessary suffering, or the development of a strong
moral character.
Recently, however, some philosophers (such as Michael Stocker, Dean Cocking,
Justin Oakley, and Neera Badhwar) have outlined what I call the “love-based objection.” It
argues that consequentialism ought to be rejected on its own terms because a commitment
xii

to maximizing aggregate overall goodness precludes forming the kinds of commitments
necessary for highly valuable loving relationships. If I am fundamentally committed to
making the world, on the whole, a better place, then – so it is argued – I must merely view
my relationships and the people I love either as mere means to some more important end (i.e.
making the world a better place) or I must view commitments to such relationships as
permissible only insofar as they do not get in the way of something more important to me
(i.e. making the world better). These thinkers warn ethicists against believing that one can
both genuinely love “maximizing goodness” and genuinely love individual people at the
same time. Being a consequentialist would, it seems, make the most valuable forms of
genuine love impossible, thereby making the world worse-off on the whole.
Consequentialists, therefore, ought to reject consequentialism on their own consequentialist
terms. Unless ethicists can explain why it is that these critics are wrong, this does seem to be
a decisive reason to reject consequentialism.
Is it possible for consequentialists to respond to this love-based objection? I think
that it is. Philosophers (such as Peter Railton and Elinor Mason) have argued that a
particular kind of consequentialist theory (i.e., “sophisticated consequentialism”) that
recognizes the intrinsic value of love and that restricts evaluations based on maximizing
goodness to only the most fundamental realms of moral evaluation and guidance overcomes
the love-based objection. While philosophers have indicated how to overcome the objection
through sophisticated consequentialism, the task of constructing a plausible version of such
a system is currently ongoing.
Fortunately, for consequentialists, it is not necessary to construct such a system from
nothing. This dissertation argues that, more than fifty years before this contemporary debate
started, McTaggart outlined a version of consequentialism called “Ideal Utilitarianism” that
can (with some supplementation) overcome recent love-based objections in the way
suggested by Railton and Mason. McTaggart’s work in moral philosophy, therefore, has a
previously unrecognized relevance to contemporary issues in normative ethics and so his
contributions ought to be considered alongside other, currently more prominent, ethicists of
his day such as Hastings Rashdall and G. E. Moore.
My dissertation has five chapters. The first and second outline the main features of
McTaggart’s philosophy of love. The third chapter looks at the evolution of what I call the
“love-based objection to consequentialism” (LBO) over the last forty years. In it, I compile
xiii

(in a single list) the various features scholars have argued a consequentialist theory of ethics
needs in order to overcome both versions of the LBO. The fourth chapter presents
McTaggart’s value theory with a special emphasis on McTaggart’s understanding of the
intrinsic value of love and the fifth chapter presents his moral philosophy. In the fifth
chapter I also argue that McTaggart’s moral philosophy (with some modifications) has the
features necessary to overcome the LBO.
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CHAPTER 1
1 Introduction: Psychology, Persons, and Methodology in
John M. E. McTaggart
1.1

Introductory Summary of Love

The next two chapters present a summary of McTaggart’s philosophical theory of love as it
was presented and developed over his career. William Mander and Dennis McKerlie have
recently written valuable articles meant to reintroduce McTaggart’s philosophy of love to
contemporary readers1. In what follows I present some of the details and arguments of
McTaggart’s theory of love that (understandably) could not be included in their work. In
order to present a comprehensive and coherent exegesis of his philosophy of love I will,
where appropriate, attempt to clarify his position by putting it into the context of his broader
psychological and metaphysical views, and also by looking to the broader historical and
philosophical context of his day. In certain cases I also identify nuanced changes from his
early view (primarily represented in “The Further Determination of the Absolute” [1893]
and Studies in Hegelian Cosmology [1901]) to his later view (primarily represented in his
posthumously published book: The Nature of Existence, Volume II [1925].) My exegesis takes a
sympathetic and charitable approach to constructing McTaggart’s arguments and ideas;
nonetheless, I have tried to ensure that my constructions accurately represent McTaggart’s
own views and I have tried to identify concerns about his claims or arguments where
appropriate. Before getting into the details of his theory, it will be useful to present a short
synopsis of his overall account of love in order to see where the chapter is going and to put
each section that follows into a broader perspective.
McTaggart conceives of love as an emotion. It is an intense and passionate form of
liking and is present in a broad range of relationships: erotic, friendly, and familial.
McTaggart believes that emotions are indefinable, but can be distinguished and identified

See: Dennis McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” in Underivative Duty. (Ed. T. Hurka. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), pp. 66-86; and William Mander, “On McTaggart on Love,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 13.1 (Jan.
1996): pp. 133-147. For some very brief and general summaries see: Rochelle, Gerald, The Life and Philosophy of J.
M. E. McTaggart, (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1991), pp. 130-137; and Peter Geach, Truth, Love, and
Immortality, (London: Hutchinson, 1979), pp. 165-170.
1

2
according to their causes and objects2. While we often speak of ‘loving’ various kinds of
objects (persons, animals, inanimate objects, nations, abstract ideas, etc.), McTaggart’s
investigation is exclusively concerned with love of persons; so, on his account the object of
love is always another person. A person is a being that exists both as an object in the world
and as a self-conscious subject of experiences of the world. As an object, qualities and
relations are attributable to a person, and, as a subject, the person is capable of pursuing its
own ends (in action) and is also capable of assigning qualities and relations to beings it
experiences (including itself). Love is always directed at another person as a unique and
particular experiencing subject and not merely as a bearer of particular characteristics
(‘characteristics’ is used by McTaggart to cover both ‘qualities’ and ‘relations’); nonetheless, a
person cannot exist and cannot be known independent of any particular set of
characteristics, and these characteristics can and do act as causes of love. There is only one
necessary and (if strong enough) sufficient cause of love: an awareness (of varying degrees of
intensity and certainty) of an intimate union with another self. This is described as a “bond
stronger and more intimate than any other by which two selves can be joined 3.”
Nonetheless, a number of things may be involved in causing such an awareness, and so also
indirectly cause love – aesthetic approval, moral approval, pleasure, sexual desire,
benevolence, or sympathy. McTaggart stresses that the sense of union with the other is so
strong that it approaches the sense I have of my bond with myself; however, he also insists
that love must be felt for another person and always in a way that respects each person’s
uniqueness and individuality; if love results in a blending of the two, then the relation is no
longer the union of two persons but some other relation of identity. In the early works
McTaggart also stresses that through the emotional experience of love for another we come
to regard the other as a subject and not just as a mere object or thing. This means that the
lover values the beloved’s person’s qualities and all other objects in the world for the sake of
the beloved and not only relative to these qualities’ and objects’ importance to me. As such,
we do not reduce the other to a mere means to our own ends (as we might in seeking
‘comprehension’ or ‘satisfaction’); rather, through this emotional state we are able to
appreciate the other as an intrinsically valuable unique. The emotional states of loving (and
His criteria and method of classification bears important similarities to those employed by Hume, as I will
show later in the chapter.
3 John M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. II, Ed. C. D. Broad (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1927), §464.
2
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being loved) have non-instrumental value and their value is independent of the value of
whatever causes the emotion and is also independent of any possible effects that might
follow from it (for instance, my own pleasure or satisfaction, or that of the others).
The remainder of this first chapter focuses on three introductory topics that are
necessary for understanding McTaggart’s philosophical conception of love. First I will
summarize some of the main aspects of McTaggart’s general theory of psychology, placing
special emphasis on his general theory of emotion. Next I will look at McTaggart’s
philosophical account of the ‘person’ in order to make sense of a core distinction that will
play a central role throughout his discussion of love: the distinction between a ‘person’ and
the ‘qualities of a person.’ Finally, I will outline McTaggart’s methodology for describing and
classifying different emotions, such as love. These three topics will provide the background
needed for understanding the arguments McTaggart puts forward to support his claim that
while the qualities of a person may cause love, they are never the object of love; the object of
love is a person and not a person’s qualities. These arguments will be the subject of the
second chapter.

1.2 Love is an Emotion: Love in the Context of McTaggart’s Theory of
Psychology and Emotion
In order to understand the detailed and specific description of love that he provides, it is
useful to summarize some of his main views about psychology. McTaggart’s overall views on
psychology changed over the course of his career, so it is useful to divide his views up into
what I call the ‘early works’ and the ‘later works.’

1.2.1

Love as an Emotion: The Early Works

In the early works, emotion is one of four kinds of conscious states; the other states are
knowledge, volition, and feeling4. During this period, McTaggart describes knowledge and
volition according to the relative 'disharmony' or non-correspondence between 'fact' and
'idea5.' Both knowledge-states and volition-states involve one term (fact or idea) that is
normative and the other is judged according to the degree it approaches that norm. In more
“Volition’ is meant to cover a broad range of conative terms, including ‘desire’ and ‘wishing.’
John M. E. McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1901), §278. [A
second edition was issued in 1918. The new addition only contains minor changes and some additional notes.
The section numbers are identical in both editions. I will indicate the second edition in the note if I am
referring to material only found there and not in the first edition.]
4
5

4
contemporary terms, knowledge and volition are distinguished by a kind of normative
“direction of fit” account. States of knowing are those where 'facts' (objective states of
affairs) are given priority and one's ideas (subjective representations) are 'condemned' insofar
as they are in 'disharmony' with (or fail to correspond to) those facts. Volitional states of
consciousness are those where 'ideas' are given priority and the facts about our 'environment'
are condemned insofar as they fall short of the ideals. In each case the mind posits an 'ideal'
unity between ideas and facts that is to be attained. Knowledge and volition not only report
the degree of 'disharmony' between the two terms -- fact and idea -- but also motivate
conscious agents towards resolving any existing disharmony between the two terms, as much
as possible.
In addition to knowledge and volition, there is a third kind of conscious state. These
are states of feeling. Feeling is divided into pleasure and pain. Pain is the feeling resulting
from disharmony between fact and idea (in knowledge or volition) and pleasure is the feeling
resulting from harmony between fact and idea (in knowledge or volition). Knowledge and
volition are experienced as a “struggle towards a goal” whereas feeling is experienced as the
“result” of a process.6 Every state of consciousness is accompanied by a state of pain or
pleasure (neutral states are the result of an equilibrium of pleasure and pain, but not an
absence of both).7 Feeling (considered at the conceptual level) does not refer to any object,
but is “a pure self-reference of the subject.”8 However, McTaggart asserts that all
consciousness has intentionality, and therefore we can never directly experience a pure and
objectless feeling9. Instead, what we experience is an ‘emotion’ which McTaggart describes as
“a state of consciousness tinged with feeling, or rather, since feeling is never quite absent, a
state of consciousness, insofar as it is tinged with feeling.”10 An emotion is a non-reducible
“concrete whole” constituting all three elements of consciousness: knowing, willing, and
feeling. An emotion, however, is not a mere aggregate of these three elements; instead, these
John M. E. McTaggart. “The Further Determination of the Absolute,” in Philosophical Studies (Ed. S. V>
Keeling (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1934), p. 217; McTaggart, SHC, § 267.
7 McTaggart, FDA 217.
8 McTaggart, FDA 251; McTaggart, SHC §281.
9 For McTaggart, consciousness is always a “consciousness of [intentional object].” If we did have pure feelings
we could not be aware of them. “It [feeling] has nothing to do with objects at all, but is a pure self-reference of
the subject. And this, while it makes it in some ways the most intimate and personal part of our lives, prevents
it from ever being self-subsistent, or filling consciousness by itself. For our self-consciousness only develops by
bringing itself into relation with its not-self. … Feeling therefore is only an element in states of consciousness,
not a state by itself. We are conscious of relations to an object, and in this consciousness we see an element of
pleasure or pain. But pleasure or pain by themselves can never make the content of our mind.” SHC §281.
10 McTaggart, FDA 251; McTaggart, SHC §282.
6
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elements form a concrete whole.11 In McTaggart’s technical language this means that one can
isolate one of these elements of an emotional experience in reflective thought, but these
aspects of the emotional experience cannot be adequately understood apart from the whole
experience of which they are a part. It also means that the emotion as a whole cannot be
adequately described by merely listing its parts. There is some aspect of the experience as a
whole that is not present in the parts considered as members of a set. For any emotion we
are cognizant of an object and recognize it to be more or less consistent with our desires.
Also, we are conscious of the pleasure or pain resulting from the extent to which knowledge
or volition has succeeded in establishing a harmony between fact and idea.12
When the object of awareness is another person, when we perceive that we are in
some kind of ideal harmonious relation with that person, when we experience our ideals as
fulfilled or satisfied in such harmony, and when the combination of these cognitive and
conative experiences result in a feeling of pleasure, the emotion is love. The ideal (or perfect)
form of love will result from a perfect epistemic and volitional harmony between myself and
others. All of our current experiences of love fall short of this ideal, but they all point
towards it. In the early works, love is not differentiated from or classified among other
emotions; instead, emotional love is always contrasted with states of knowledge and volition
that are related to another person. So, though the early works identify how it is that
emotions like love are distinct from other kinds of mental states, they do not help us
understand what makes love unique from other emotions. This is only addressed in the later
works.
To summarize, in the early works love is an emotion and so is a state of
consciousness involving three aspects. The first is some kind of cognition of an object that
will be the target of the loving emotion as a whole. The second will be a desire for the
continued existence of the object. Finally, there will be a pleasant feeling that accompanies
the cognitive and conative elements. Each aspect (cognition, conation, and feeling) is related
to the other two elements and all three form an emotion that is not merely reducible to a
mere aggregate of its parts. In contemporary terms this means that love has intentionality.
Love is not an objectless feeling or bare mood, but rather it is an emotion that is always
directed towards an object.
11
12

McTaggart, FDA 251; McTaggart, SHC §283.
McTaggart, FDA 251; McTaggart, SHC § 283
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1.2.2

Love as an Emotion: The Later Works

In the Nature of Existence (Vol. II), McTaggart maintains again that love is an emotion, but he
changes his understanding of human psychology. As a result, what he means by an ‘emotion’
is slightly different in this work than in his earlier works. While the details surrounding his
theory about mental states (including emotions) changed, it seems that the changes adopted
did not significantly affect his overall views about love. Nonetheless, the later account
provides a clearer and more positive description of what the experience of love involves and
it more clearly delineates love from all other emotions.
McTaggart continues to maintain that all mental states have intentionality: each kind
of mental state presents an object (in its own unique way) and each presumes a subjectobject distinction. Also, McTaggart retains his view that cognitive, volitional, emotional, and
hedonic (pleasant and painful ‘feeling’) states are basic psychic components13. Yet despite
these general similarities, how each state is described and related to the other states is very
different from what is found in the early works. One important development is that feelings
are now treated as independent forms of experience and as having intentionality; this
contrasts with earlier works where feelings are recognized as ‘objectless’ aspects of conscious
experiences (that can be conceived abstractly in thought), but that cannot be experienced
independently of cognitive or conative states having an object. Feelings are no longer merely
an aspect of emotions; instead they are a special form of consciousness analogous to
emotions (and volitions). Feelings are no longer described as a result of any other conscious
state, though experience may show that certain feelings may be discovered to be
concomitant with certain kinds of conscious states.
Another development is the much expanded account of the nature of cognitive
conscious states in the Nature of Existence. In the later work, McTaggart employs the term
‘cogitations’ to cover five kinds of cognitive states. These are14:

McTaggart, NE2, §481.
McTaggart, NE2, §§406, 420-423, 450-541; also, C. D. Broad, Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. II,
Part II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 20-21.
13
14
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1) perceptions (direct awareness of substances as having characteristics)
2) awareness of characteristics (direct awareness of some qualities of a
substance and of some relations of that substance to other substances)
3) judgements (propositions that are asserted to be true or false)
4) assumptions (propositions without any assertion about truth: it may be
either true or false)
5) imagings (direct awareness of a substance as having characteristics
without asserting that the substance exists: it may exist or not-exist).
All five kinds of cognitive states have intentionality: they are all various forms of ‘consciousness
of x.’ Cogitations cannot be ‘defined’ by reducing them to more basic components, but each
is distinguishable by the kind of object it has (a particular substance/quality or a proposition)
and as to whether or not it presents that object as affirmed or denied (existent – non-existent
or true – false), or whether it remains neutral about the existential or truth status of the
proposition. It is not necessary to go over the distinctions in detail here. The main advantage
to adding these distinctions is that it allows McTaggart to describe conscious states that have
a ‘hypothetical’ orientation and states that have non-existent or fictitious objects.
Cogitations, of any kind, form the fundamental basis for all forms of consciousness in the
later work. If a state does not ‘contain’ a cogitation (how a cogitation can be ‘contained’ will
be discussed next) it cannot be one of the elements of philosophical psychology.15
Next, McTaggart describes what he calls “volitions”16 and emotions. Like cogitations,
volitions and emotions cannot be defined but only described. Volitions cover all conative
states such as wishing, desiring, and willing, but, unlike cogitations, McTaggart does not
think that volitions can be divided into species or natural kinds.17 There are, however, a
number of species and sub-species of emotions, but he does not claim to provide a complete
account of them or their relations in this work. He presents two major species of emotions:
liking-repugnance and approval-disapproval. He also mentions at least twenty-four different
emotions.
In The Further Determination of the Absolute, McTaggart does acknowledge the possible existence of nonconscious states. It is not clear from these works whether or not he rejects or accepts the existence of nonconscious or sub-conscious mental states. In NE2, §802, he discusses unconscious states and makes reference
to Freud’s work. In NE2, §803, he ends up denying any existence to them in ultimate reality, but the question
seems to remain open for the ‘pre-final’ stages of reality.
16 McTaggart, NE2, Chapter XL, §§444-454.
17 McTaggart, NE2, §455 “The first point to be noticed is that emotion has many species. This is a marked
difference from volition, which has no such species. Cogitation, indeed, id divided into species … But there are
only five of these, and no one, as far as I know, would suggest that they do not cover the whole extent of
cogitation, or that any of them are not fundamental.”
15
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McTaggart provides an account of the nature of volition that he attributes to G. E.
Moore’s review of August Messer’s book Empfindung und Denken.18 In the review, Moore
describes Messer’s account of the relation of volitional and emotional acts to cognitive acts
(‘acts’ = mental states having intentionality). Moore observes that on Messer’s account (and
he thinks also on Brentano’s and Husserl’s views) volitional and emotional mental states do
not just simultaneously accompany cognitive acts; instead, volitional and emotional acts are
“founded upon” cognitive acts.19 Such states are not mere aggregates of cognitions and
emotions/volitions; rather volitions and emotions, though having a cognitive aspect as part
of their essence, are organic wholes that cannot be decomposed into more basic and
independent parts. Because volitions and emotions are founded upon cognitive acts, they
have intentionality: they are always an emotion towards or a desire for some object. For instance,
if we compare a pure cogitation and desire that are both directed at the same object, what is
different is the way in which the object is presented in each. What is ‘added’ to the cognitive
foundation in volitional or emotional consciousness is a qualitative aspect. It is this “quality”
that is indefinable and that makes the experience as a whole a desire or volition. C. D. Broad
describes this as “To desire x simply is to cogitate x desiringly,”20 and analogously we can say that
to have an emotion towards x is to cogitate x emotively. On McTaggart’s later view, emotions are
analogous to and independent of volitions.21
An important implication of McTaggart’s psychological theory in the later works is
that cogitations can be seen to have a kind of priority or independence that volitions and
emotions lack. Volitions and emotions cannot exist apart from cognitions, but it is possible
(at least conceptually) to have cognition of an object that does not have volitional or
emotional qualities.22 Another important implication is that whenever we have a cognitive
awareness of P, we can also simultaneously experience desires and emotions towards the
same object. For instance McTaggart observes that we can simultaneously feel hope and
NE2, §446. The works referred to by McTaggart are: G. E. Moore. “Review: Empfindung und Denken by
August Messer,” Mind 19.75 (July 1910): 395-409; August Messer. Empfindung und Denken (Leipzig: Quelle &
Meyer, 1908).
19 G. E. Moore. “Messer,” 400-401.
20 C. D. Broad. Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. II, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1938), 89-90. It is noteworthy that Broad expresses the quality adverbially. This seems to be the most
accurate formulation given that mental states are always intentional acts wherein the mind is not merely passive,
but contributes to the presentation of the object. I will also employ the adjectival form (emotional cogitation or
volitional cogitation) to describe the quality at times, but in these cases the words ‘cogitation’ or ‘cognition’
should be understood as gerunds and not as mere nouns.
21 McTaggart, NE2, Chapter XLI, §§455-481.
22 McTaggart, NE2, §446 and §456.
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desire for some imagined future event.23 We can also identify certain volitional and
emotional qualities that go together; for instance, love is often accompanied by a benevolent
desire and also sympathetic emotion.24 Such conative-cogitations or sympathetic-cogitations
would not be internally (or essentially) connected to cogitating Bob lovingly. At best the
connection of ‘desiring Bob’s good’ and ‘sympathizing with Bob’ with ‘loving Bob’ could
only be established through observation and perhaps some mechanism of association. While
all of these states would be founded upon the ‘same’ cognitive act (‘consciousness of Bob’),
each act is separate and non-reducible to the others. McTaggart strongly emphasizes that
love is distinct from sympathy and benevolence and ought not to be confused with it, even
though we often do (and perhaps ought to) experience all of three towards the same person.
Feelings are the third type of quality that can be assigned to cogitations. As
mentioned earlier, pleasure and pain are no longer conceived (even abstractly) as states that
can lack intentionality, as was the case in the early works. As qualities of cogitations, they are
presumably always feelings of x, just as emotions and volitions always have intentionality. Also,
feelings cannot be qualities attributed to emotions or volitions. They can only be applied to
cogitations. He states:
They [pleasure and pain] are not emotions, but the class of which pleasure
and pain are members – sometimes called the class of feelings – is analogous
to emotions and volitions. To be pleasurable or to be painful are qualities
which can belong to states of cogitation and only to states of cogitation.
When a state of cogitation has the quality of being pleasurable, it is a state of
pleasure; when it has the quality of being painful, it is a state of pain.25
Also, in regards to the causes of pain or pleasure, there is no mention of the existence of
harmony or disharmony between idea and fact as there was in the earlier work. A feeling
quality (pleasantness or painfulness) can be added to any cogitation regardless of whether the
cogitation of an object also already has an emotional or volitional quality. It is therefore
possible to have an experience of love for someone and this could also be experienced as
either pleasant or painful (perhaps depending on the circumstances). A feeling felt towards
an awareness of a feeling is described as sympathetic pain or sympathetic pleasure (sympathetic
McTaggart, NE2, §457: “A cogitation can have both the quality of being a volition and the quality of being
an emotion. I can simultaneously hope for and desire some future event, or love X and acquiesce in his
existence. And there seems no reason to suppose that in such a case there must be two separate cogitations of
the event, or of X.”
24 McTaggart, NE2, §460.
25 McTaggart, NE2, § 481. [My emphasis.]
23
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feeling) by McTaggart.26 Sympathetic pain can occur when contemplating the pain of another
and sympathetic pleasure can occur when contemplating the pleasure of another.
Interestingly, McTaggart claims that sympathetic feelings that take another person’s feelings
as their object are only one kind of sympathy. His more general formulation of sympathetic
feelings of pleasure and pain take the object of the feeling as the “good in others” or the “evil
in others.”27 He states:
But experience shows us that we often feel pleasure in contemplating good in
others, which is not itself pleasure, and pain in contemplating evil in others, which
is not itself pain. It is convenient to include the pleasure and pain of this latter
contemplation under the title of sympathetic pleasure and pain.28
It seems, therefore, that the object of feelings can also be the cognition of the properties of
good and evil.
In summary, under the new psychological theory we can have four different kinds of
mental states directed towards the same object ‘P’: a) cogitation of P; b) P cogitated
volitionally; c) P cogitated emotionally; and d) P cogitated feelingly (pleasurably/painfully).
Only cogitations can be experienced independently of any other mental states and the
remaining mental states (volition, emotion, and feeling) are all dependent on a cogitation of P
but independent of each other. If we have a cognition of P that also has some of these three
qualities, then there is just one experience of P and not a conscious experience for the
cogitation plus an experience for each qualified cogitation. In this sense, it seems that the
experience of P is a whole and not a mere aggregate. We can abstract the bare cogitation and
each of the qualities of the cogitation from the experience, but presumably we only have a
single unified holistic experience of P. Yet, it is important to highlight that in order to have
an emotional quality, it is not necessary that a cogitation also have a volitional quality and a
feeling quality. The independence of emotion from volition and feeling (though not from
cogitation) makes the account of emotion in the later works essentially different from that of
the earlier works. So in summary, McTaggart’s taxonomy of psychological elements in the
later works is as follows:

McTaggart, NE2, §898.
McTaggart, NE2, §898.
28 McTaggart, NE2, §898.
26
27
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Psychological Elements in McTaggart's Later Works
*McTaggart does not explicitly state that these emotions are in the category of liking-repugnance. However, they seem to be
directed towards the substances (persons or their conscious states) themselves and not in respect of any of their qualities.
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1.2.3

The Theories Compared: Advantages and Disadvantages

The psychic elements (cognitions, volitions, emotions, and feelings) are related to each other
in importantly different ways than in the earlier works. Elements are no longer described
with reference to harmony (or normative direction of fit) between idea and fact. Emotional
states are no longer described as containing volitional states and so there is no longer a direct
connection between emotion and desire. In other words, there is no longer an
internal/intrinsic connection between “having a particular emotion towards an object” and
“having certain desires towards it” because emotions no longer contain desires as one of
their elements. Overall, therefore, each kind of act must be connected externally to other
acts. Also, since feeling is not part of emotion (as it was in the earlier works), at most
pleasantness/painfulness can accompany an emotional quality as an additional sui generous
quality in a holistic awareness of an object (cogitation) having these other qualities. So too,
therefore, feelings are only externally linked to emotions in the later works (and not
internally as in the early works).
Each theory of emotions has advantages and disadvantages. The early view's
direction of fit account has the advantage of providing a clear way to distinguish different
kinds of psychic states. Also, direction-of-fit accounts have some currency in contemporary
discussions in philosophy of mind (with some reservations of course). If one believes that
emotions and desires are fundamentally different kinds of conscious states, this model will
be attractive. On the later view, however, it is very difficult to understand how emotions and
volitions are essentially different kinds of mental state. Each just appears to be a pro-attitude
towards an object and so it is difficult to understand how these are fundamentally different
ways of cogitating an object. While each particular desire or emotion is a qualitatively unique
way of cogitating certain objects, it is not clear what exactly it would be that all ways of
cogitating emotionally would have in common that no ways of cogitating desiringly would
not (and vice versa). For some theorists this is not necessarily a problem. During the late
nineteenth century some major philosophers, such as Franz Brentano, thought emotions and
desires were really just one kind of conscious state: a pro- or con- attitude taken up towards
the object's existence.29 It is not clear what McTaggart would lose by collapsing the

Franz Brentano. The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Tr. R. Chisholm and E. H. Schneewind.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), §§19-23, pp. 14-18; Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint
29
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distinction between emotions and desires in the later works; he could still distinguish
between benevolence and love, for instance, by pointing out that each has its own
qualitatively unique way (desiringly or emotionally) of taking up a pro-attitude towards an
object. McTaggart's later theory of emotions might actually be best understood as describing
desires and emotions as basically being the same kind of conscious state.
The early account also seems to provide a promising way to explain the affinity
between certain kinds of conscious states. For instance, love, sympathy, benevolence, and
pleasure all seem to be related in a non-superficial way. They are often experienced together,
and the experience of each seems to 'fit' with the experience of the others. However, this
apparent theoretical advantage may come at too high a price in terms of its coherence with
lived experience. It is clearly possible for these emotions to occur apart from each other and
even in the presence of one of the negative versions of the other states. For instance, it
(unfortunately) is possible to experience love for someone and yet still experience this love
as painful. It is also possible to feel love for someone and at the same time desire that the
other suffer. McTaggart, correctly I believe, describes such experiences as "morbid." 30
Luckily, such combinations are rare and most people would surely agree that ideally they
should not occur together; nonetheless, they are possible. On the early account it seems
impossible (or at least very difficult) to explain such combinations if love is the result of a
harmony between my desires related to the beloved and my knowledge of the beloved. The
later view, however, establishes connections between these states inductively, and so such
counter-examples to our normal experiences (or normative ideals) of combinations of
conscious states do not themselves constitute a threat to such connections.
In his recent book entitled Love, Friendship, & the Self, Bennett Helm has made what I
take to be a very convincing case for moving away from direction of fit accounts insofar as
they perpetuate a false "cognitive-conative divide" in our understanding of psychology;
instead, he proposes an account of conscious states that focuses on "rationally structured
patterns of emotion and desires" to explain caring, valuing, and loving.31 I am also
sympathetic to the idea that emotions and desires may be fundamentally more similar than

(Tr. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. McAlister. London: Routledge, 1995), Book II: Chs. VI-IX, pp. 150210.
30 McTaggart, NE2, §463.
31 Bennett Helm. Love, Friendship, & the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), passim. (See pp. 40-46 for
a synopsis of his overall argument and resulting theory.)
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different (there is something attractive about the coherence involved in thinking about desire
and emotion at pro/con-attitudes and thinking about value according to the "fitting attitude
account" for instance). These, however, are not decisive arguments in favour of one view
over the other. The good news, it seems, is that McTaggart is able to preserve the core
elements of his understanding of love on either theory of emotion, though each theory
allows him to emphasize different aspects. One advantage to McTaggart’s account of love,
therefore, is that it provides options to contemporary philosophers who are looking to
expand on various kinds of existing theories of emotions. Insofar as understanding the
context of the larger theories of emotion at play will help us to understand McTaggart’s
account of love, it was important to review them here.
One thing that is constant between both theories of emotions, however, is the
emphasis on the cognitive aspect of emotions and their structure of intentionality. Claiming
that emotions, such as love, have structures of intentionality has important implications for
understanding how emotions can be incorporated into ethics (a topic that will be explored at
length later on in the dissertation).
First, emotions, being essentially cognitive, can be influenced by our knowledge and
beliefs. This means that we are able to assess (approve or condemn) an emotional response
to a given object based on whether or not our beliefs about the nature of its object are
correct. If the nature of a particular emotion is determined by what kind of thing we believe
the object to be (or by the way the object is presented cognitively in my awareness of it), we
can say that an emotion is appropriate or not depending on whether or not the object is
what we believe it to be.32 For example, if we assume that ‘respect’ is an emotion that is
properly directed towards beings that have rational agency (have the ability to adopt ends
and select means for attaining those ends) then we can condemn any instance of respect if it
turns out that a particular object of respect is not (upon further reflection) the kind of being
that has rational agency. For instance, I might mistakenly believe that my fish has rational
agency (perhaps I believe that it planned to jump from its bowl into a nearby glass of water)
and so feel respect for it. If, however I come to realize that my belief was false (that fish
cannot make such plans), then I can condemn such an instance of ‘respect’ as inappropriate.
A second implication is that even if our beliefs about the object of our emotion are
correct, we might be able to condemn emotions that are not directed at the right kind of
32

McTaggart, NE2, §468.
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object for that emotion. This kind of emotion is not condemned as ill-founded; instead it is
condemned as inappropriate for its particular object. Perhaps, despite knowing that my fish
lacks rational agency, I still feel respect for it. While our beliefs can influence our emotions,
it is still possible that certain emotional states (especially if they have become embedded as
habits or dispositions towards certain kinds of objects) can persist even where we
know/believe that the object is inappropriate. So here, the implication is that emotions can
be condemned according to their own nature.
A third implication of this cognitive account of emotions is that emotions are not
merely private or subjective (though in terms of their ‘what it is like’-ness or qualia they may
be). Because emotions are structured intentionally towards an object and are differentiated in
terms of the way the object is presented (e.g., positively or negatively) we can describe our
emotions towards other people in terms of their objects and modes of presentation and
other people can identify emotional experiences of their own that share those features. If
emotions are understood in this way, as McTaggart does, a fourth implication is that
emotions could play a central role within an ethical theory without necessarily making the
ethical theory ‘non-cognitive’ in the contemporary sense of the term.
Now that emotions have been distinguished from and related to other kinds of
psychic elements, we are almost ready to proceed to McTaggart’s account of what makes
love a unique kind of emotional state of consciousness. In order to do this he will identify
the unique and essential causes and objects of love. He will argue that love is an emotion
that takes a pro-orientation towards a person that involves a sense of intimate union with
that person. The sense of union is arrived at by means of the lover’s awareness of certain
qualities of the beloved person (perhaps beauty, shared experiences, courage, etc.). Such
qualities however are never the object of love, but only its (proximate) causes. Before
looking at the arguments McTaggart uses to support these claims, it is useful to consider his
distinction between a ‘person’ and ‘the qualities of a person,’ since most of what follows
rests upon it.

1.3 The Core Distinction: “Person” vs. “Qualities of a Person”
McTaggart had a highly developed ontology and he also presented a number of long and
complicated arguments related to what a ‘person’ is and how we can have knowledge of
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selves (either myself or others).33 It is beyond the scope of this project to consider all of his
arguments in detail and so I will merely highlight the aspects of his theory most relevant to
this dissertation. My primary aim is to clarify for the reader what McTaggart means when he
makes a distinction between a “person” and the “qualities of a person.” He relies on this
distinction throughout all of his discussions of love and it shows up in various statements
such as the following:
And my contention is that while love may be because of qualities, it is never
in respect of qualities.34
And:
Love is for the person, and not for his qualities, nor is it for him in respect of
his qualities. It is for him.35
It is very important, therefore, to get a sense of what he means by each phrase before
continuing.
According to McTaggart, a person is a special kind of substance. He defines a
substance as that “which has qualities without being itself a quality.”36 Qualities can also be
attributed to, or predicated of, other qualities and the same quality can be attributed to more
than one substance or quality. Therefore, it is not merely ‘bearing qualities’ that makes
something a substance; it must also be something that cannot be attributed to, or predicated
of, something else. Nonetheless, substances are the primary bearers of all qualities.
Substances can be in relation with other substances and so ‘relations’ can also be attributed
to/predicated of substances.37 McTaggart calls anything that can be attributed to a substance
– whether a quality or a relation – a “characteristic.”38 One could reformulate the definition
of substance, therefore, and say ‘a substance is that which bears characteristics but is not
itself a characteristic.’ McTaggart also believed that some substances can have parts which

McTaggart, “Personality,” in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Volume IX: Mundas—Phrygians (Ed.
James Hastings, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), pp. 773-781; and, McTaggart, NE2 (§§381-404).
34 McTaggart, NE2, §465.
35 McTaggart, NE2, §468.
36 John M. E. McTaggart, The Nature of Existence, Vol. I. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), §65.
37 McTaggart, NE1, §79-80.
38 McTaggart, NE1, §87.
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are also substances. These are called “compound substances,” as opposed to “simple
substances” which have no substance-parts.39
Each substance has its own unique ‘nature,’ and the nature of a substance is the
whole containing all of the qualities, relations, and parts of a substance. McTaggart then
proposes what he calls the principle of “Dissimilarity of the Diverse.”40 The principle holds
that each substance has its own unique nature: no two substances can have identical natures.
This means that no two substances can be wholes resulting from the exact same parts and
characteristics united in the exact same way. A substance is the unique and particular kind of
whole that it is (it has the ‘nature’ that it has) because of the unique way in which its parts
and characteristics are united.41 According to McTaggart, a person is a compound substance
comprising various conscious states (each of which is also a substance). In order to
understand what exactly this means, it is useful to understand two theories about the person
that McTaggart rejects.
John Knox, Jr. understands McTaggart’s conception of the self as a rejection of two
dominant theories of the person: the “Pure Ego” Theory and the “Bundle” Theory.42 On the
Pure Ego theory, the self is considered to be some entity that unites a series of experiences,
but it also holds that none of these experiences are included in the self. The self remains
separate or transcendent from its experiences. It possesses these experiences, but the self
does not comprise experiences. In a way, one might say that the ‘ego’ is merely an
‘experience-bearer’ (though an ‘active’ bearer) and is merely externally related to its
experiences in a way analogous to how substances are externally related to their qualities
(substances possess qualities, but are not themselves qualities nor are they made up of
qualities). In other words, on the Pure Ego view, conscious states are analogous to qualities
in relation to the ego. On this theory, the self is also never directly experienced; we come to
know its existence only through inference (i.e., it is posited as a necessary condition for the
McTaggart, NE1, §127. Each compound part of a substance will have a corresponding characteristic of a
substance: if P is a part of W, then ‘contains P as a part’ will be a characteristic of W. Yet P ≠ ‘contains P as a
part.’
40 McTaggart, NE1, §§94, 99. McTaggart acknowledges that his principle is similar to, and inspired by, Leibniz’s
principle of “Identity of Indiscernible.” He rejects Leibniz’s name, however, because “the principle does not
assert that there are indiscernibles which are identical, but that there is nothing which is which is indiscernible
from anything else.” (§99)
41 McTaggart, NE1, §144.
42 John Knox, Jr. “McTaggart’s Theory of the Self” Idealistic Studies 11.1 (Jan. 1981): 151-166. The summaries
that follow are based upon Knox’s descriptions of them, but also go beyond what he says. While I think that
what he says of each theory is true, I also think that he overlooks some important aspects of each kind of
theory, aspects McTaggart distances himself from (in addition to those aspects Knox mentions).
39
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possibility of unified experience or for personal identity). Kant and Green are often thought
(accurately or not)43 to formulate this kind of theory of self. This theory has the advantage of
being able to offer a way to account for personal identity through processes of change. What
a person really is remains unaffected by change because of its ‘purity’ (it is separate from what
is changeable and therefore does not include anything changeable within it). One of the
major problems for this theory is to explain how it is that the ego is related to the changing
experiences. While one might be able to accept its unifying role, it is hard to understand how
it is that the true self merely unifies without being affected or formed by the experiences
themselves. Time and change seem to be too wrapped up with our pre-theoretical
conceptions of selfhood, personhood, or identity to be excluded by the theory so
problematically.
The alternative account, the Bundle Theory, is most famously associated with Hume,
though as McTaggart rightly points out in many of his works it is also prominent among
Eastern religious and philosophical thought such as Buddhism.44 On this account the self is a
mere collection, aggregate, or set of mental states. The mental states are ultimately real and
insofar as they are grouped according to some criteria these groups are named selves. One
common way of grouping mental states is according to some kind of psychological
connection (perhaps causal).45 On these views the self is the ‘result’ or the ‘label’ of the
group of ontologically prior mental states, but it does not have any independent existence
apart from these. If one is aware of the group (the parts and the appropriate kind of relation
they have to each other) then one has a direct and adequate experience of the self. Since the
self is nothing beyond the mere collection or bundle of states, if you know the bundle, then
there is nothing else to know. The advantage of this theory is that it does not need to posit
any problematic or mysterious metaphysical entities like the “pure ego.” The theory also
makes change an essential part of what it means to be a person. So long as from each
moment to the next there is a sufficient amount of psychological connectedness, it seems to
be able to offer a plausible account of diachronic identity. However, the debate gets murky
T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Ed. A. C. Bradley, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883), §100: Green, for
instance, seems to explicitly reject the Pure Ego view in this section.
44 McTaggart, SHC, §44. For a detailed study of the similarities between McTaggart’s arguments and
conclusions with those of Asian Religious and Philosophical traditions see: Robert Leet Patterson,
“McTaggart’s Contribution to the Philosophy of Religion,” Philosophy 6.23 (July 1931): pp. 323-335.
45 Derek Parfit endorses ‘psychological connectedness’ when outlining his contemporary version of this kind of
account. Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), Chapters 11-13. For the conclusion see:
pp. 302-304.
43
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when trying to set that minimal level of stability. Also, these theories are subject to the
problem that Green identified: if selves are derived from collections of fundamentally basic
mental states, then such states must pre-exist any self that we normally assume experiences
them; but, how can there be a mental state that does not presuppose some pre-existing
conscious subject that undergoes it?46 There is clearly something odd about ‘unattached’ or
‘subject-less’ mental states existing independently of any self that are then somehow grouped
together (by what?) to create a self, so it seems that mental states presuppose some self that
has or experiences them.47
McTaggart rejects both of these views because each ultimately posits a mere
abstraction as an ultimate existent reality. The British Idealists, as a group, were generally
wary of what they called “abstractions,” and McTaggart was no different. For these Idealists,
we can (and do) directly experience wholes upon which our minds are able (consciously or
pre-consciously) to discover or impose distinctions within the whole. These elements are
abstractions from the whole and though they can be distinguished in thought from the
whole in which they were experienced, they can never be experienced apart from the whole
nor can they exist independently of the whole. An example of such a case is the distinction
between the concave and convex sides of a curve. What is given in experience is a curve.
Upon this single experience, the mind distinguishes a side where the line curves towards
itself and a side where the line curves away from itself. According to these thinkers, the mind
does not assemble two lines (separately experienced) into one curve, but rather abstracts two
aspects of a whole single experience of the curve. Though a convex line can be distinguished
from a concave line, the idea of a convex line will always imply the idea of a concave line and
‘convex’ cannot be adequately conceived independently of ‘concave.’ A major philosophical
error that all British Idealists seek to identify and to avoid is positing abstractions as
independently existing parts. While most British Idealists tend more towards the Pure Ego
Theory over the Bundle Theory, almost all would reject either theory on its own because

Green, PE, Book I (passim): especially: §§9, 15-18, 46, 55-65; Book II, §§85-86, 116-117. Also see: David
Brink Perfectionism and the Common Good, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 8-17 (especially p. 16); W.
J. Mander, British Idealism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 89-96; Geoffrey Thomas, The Moral
Philosophy of T. H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 130-135.
47 McTaggart explicitly denies the possibility of ‘impersonal’ or subject-less mental states in “Personality,” pp.
779a-780a and NE2, §400. In the “Personality” article this assertion is considered an ‘ultimate truth’ that
cannot be proven, but it is more certain the more one comes to clearly understand what experience is.
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each takes an abstracted element of experience (the conscious ego or conscious states) and
posits it as an independently existing entity.48
Knox argues that McTaggart proposes a third view that is a kind of synthesis of
elements of both.49 He calls this view the “Substance Theory” and describes it as follows:
The remaining alternative would be for McTaggart to agree with the bundle
theorist that experiences are parts of the self which is said to ‘have’ them, but
to agree with the pure ego theorist that … [selves] – the fact of their
individuality as selves – are determined by no quality or relation or
combination of qualities and relations, but are instead ultimate. The notion of
an ultimate particularity, a particularity which is not grounded in qualitative
uniqueness… A view of the self such as that which I am proposing for
consideration could be called a ‘substance’ view; for selves are to be
distinguished from the totality of their qualities and from their separate
experiences, and furthermore are to possess ‘an individuality apart from their
qualities,’ in McTaggart’s phrase. [No reference given by the author.] But it
would not be the pure ego theory. According to that theory, the self is the
inner core which ‘has’ its experiences, but which does not include them. On
the present view, the self is the experiences – but the experiences as parts of
a whole whose unity and individuality are, as ultimate, not explicable in terms
of the fact that the whole possesses certain universal characteristics.50
The substance theory, therefore, argues that a person is a compound substance comprising
the ‘conscious self/subject’ as one part and conscious states as the remaining parts. The
‘conscious self’ is not reducible to the mere sum of experiences (the bundle) nor is it – on its
own – the person itself (pure ego). Conscious subjectivity and its conscious states can be
distinguished conceptually, but they exist as correlative aspects of a single substance: the
person. Making the “consciousness” or “subject” a part of the person-substance helps him
to avoid the problems he found in the two alternative theories. He avoids Green’s objection
Green, PE, §100: In this section Green rejects “a mysterious abstract entity which you call the self of a man
apart from all his particular feelings, desires, and thoughts – all the experiences of his inner life” (my
underlining). F. H. Bradley is an exception here insofar as he seems to have only offered criticisms of theories
of the self and denies that the self is real in any ultimate sense. See Appearance and Reality, 2nd Edition (London:
Swan Sonnenschein, 1897) Chapters IX-XII.
49 He also suggests that McTaggart tends more towards the Bundle View, than the Pure Ego view. I am not
totally convinced by Knox’s conclusions because he seems to exclusively consider the account in the Nature of
Existence and makes no mention of the two Chapters in Studies of Hegelian Cosmology that directly consider
the concept of ‘personality’ (“Chapter II: Human Immortality” and “Chapter III: The Personality of the
Absolute.” Also relevant are “Chapter VII: The Conception of Society as an Organism” and finally “Chapter
IX: The Further Determination of the Absolute.”), and also completely overlooks McTaggart’s entry on
“Personality” in Hastings Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (1917), pp. 773-781. On the whole, however, I think
that Knox sufficiently captures the general outline of McTaggart’s positive theory of the self (the so-called
“Substance Theory”) for the purposes of this section.
50 Knox, “Self,” 159-60.
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to the Bundle Theory insofar as he is not positing conscious states capable of existing
independently of a conscious self; though conscious states are parts of the self, they can only
exist in relation to the conscious subject that is also a part of the self. He avoids the problems
of the Pure Ego theory by denying the that conscious subject is a substance that merely
bears thoughts (conceived as analogous to attributes) but is not itself affected by them;
instead the conscious subject is a part of the person-substance and conscious states are also
parts of the same person-substance. The “ego” is not a transcendent unaffected entity;
instead, it is an intimately and dynamically embedded part of a whole person-substance that
is, as a whole, constantly changing. A ‘person,’ therefore, is 1) a whole compound substance
comprising conscious subjectivity and conscious states, and 2) the bearer of characteristics
(qualities or relations). The “nature” of a person consists in the whole comprising its parts,
qualities, and relations.
Person-substances can be viewed from two perspectives. They can be viewed as
involving a unifying activity that creates and unites some of its parts and characteristics or
they can be viewed as mere bearers of characteristics and mere compounds of parts. The first
perspective views the person as a “‘subject” and the second as an “object” (or qualitybearer).
McTaggart’s account of the person as a compound unity of consciousness and
conscious states views the person-substance as a subject. The person involves a kind of
activity that organizes experience by assigning various characteristics to various substances
(including itself) and assesses what is experienced according to ideal representations of the
way the world ought to be). The person can also formulate and pursue goals on the basis of
their ideas and ideals, and so certain actions can be traced back to the person-substance as
their source. To view a substance in this way is to see it as a “living unity.”51 Insofar as it (at
least partly) causes some of its own parts and its own characteristics through its own activity,
these parts and characteristics are understood to “manifest” the subject to which they are
attributed.52 This is how each person experiences oneself from the first-person perspective

McTaggart, FDA, p. 249.
McTaggart uses the word “manifest” in this sense in the earlier works, but in The Nature of Existence he seems
to assign a much more restricted meaning to this term (see NE1, §§114-116, 144-166.) While he no longer uses
this term, he clearly thinks that that person-substance does something like what I call ‘manifest’ here (NE2,
§§381-404). Since I am not familiar with any other term to express this idea, I am opting to use ‘manifest’ in
McTaggart’s earlier sense.
51
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and this is the kind of nature that we assign to other person-substances we encounter in the
world. He expresses this idea well in the following quotation:
It would seem then, that we have here reached a standpoint [other persons
experienced as subjects] from which we are able to regard the object as it
regards itself. We are able to regard the history and content of the object of a
manifestation of its individuality, instead of being obliged to regard the
individuality as a dead residuum in which the content inheres. We are able to
see the object from within outwards, instead of from without inwards. And
so its claims to independence and substantiality become no more alien or
inharmonious to us than our own.53
In this citation, we see that McTaggart strongly contrasts this approach to substance as
“subject” with approaching a substance as an “object.”
The best way to understand how to approach a substance as an object is to contrast
how we approach “subjects” with how we normally approach inanimate substances.54 When
we encounter other persons, we can perceive (or at least infer) the same kind of conscious
activity in them as we experience in ourselves (perhaps through their use of language) and so
we take up a perspective that regards them “from within [the subject] outward [the subject’s
qualities].” But when we encounter an inanimate object, we only ever experience its various
qualities, relations, and parts and assign these to an ‘object’ of experience (according to the
various categories of the understanding); we have no experience of what (if anything) is
underlying and uniting the parts and qualities we assign to it. In this way the perspective we
take on such a substance is “from without [the qualities] inwards [the qualities’ object].”
Viewed as a mere quality-bearer, a substance has no determinate content. Conceived
abstractly apart from any of the characteristics it bears, there is no reason to think that it has
any parts and there is nothing to distinguish it from any other “pure” characteristic bearer.
McTaggart does not deny that we can approach person-substances as objects, nor
does he say that it is inappropriate to do so. Presumably, not all of a person’s characteristics
or conscious parts are the result of the person’s own activity and so they cannot all be
regarded as manifestations of a subject. We can and do describe people according to their
repeatable qualities and according to their relations to other people and we also group and
categorize people according to these characteristics. A person’s nature, as we have seen,
McTaggart, FDA, p. 258. [My emphasis.]
I am purposefully avoiding discussion about substances that are animate but non-persons (i.e. animals) since
these kinds of ‘substances’ occupy a kind of middle-ground, it seems, and therefore only introduce difficulties
that are not necessary to consider here.
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includes all of the qualities and relations assigned to the person. One important implication
of this is that our relations to other persons and the world in general make up a central part
of our nature in addition to our own unique set of personal experiences. Viewing the person
according to her external relations to others helps to balance the very isolated and atomistic
emphasis encountered when merely considering the person as a conscious subject with a
completely unique perspective on the world (i.e., the tendency to subjective solipsism or
monadistic solipsism). Our relations to others constitute who we are, and so our nature (or
identity) is essentially social.55 Viewing person-substances as objects (bearers of qualities)
whose nature is (at least partially) constituted by its qualities and relations is important and
necessary if one wants to discover the full nature of an individual person.
What is problematic, however, is viewing persons merely as objects. To do so is to
view a person as we view merely physical substance: as a “dead residuum in which the
content [qualities] inheres”56 or a “dead abstraction.”57 Part of the concern here is that
viewing persons merely as objects means that one assigns merely instrumental value to the
‘substance’ and intrinsic value to the qualities. Physical substances are valuable insofar as
they bear certain qualities that I deem good or useful; since they have no determinate
content of their own, merely physical objects have no intrinsic value. He states,
Only their [other persons regarded as mere objects] external relations to
ourselves and to one another have any significance for us. They [as subjects]
are individuals, they live from within outwards. But as we find satisfaction in
them, we are aware of them from without inwards, and their centre, instead
of being a living unity is a dead abstraction. We fail, then … to do justice to
the independence of the object.58
However, when persons are also regarded as subjects, those qualities (and parts) that are seen
to be manifestations of the person’s ‘inner life’ are primarily valuable because they are
manifestations in addition to any value they might have according to their relation to other
goods or to someone else’s goals. Regarding the perspective that allows us to view persons
as subjects (and not merely objects) He states,

For instance: McTaggart, SHC, §192; McTaggart, “The Individualism of Value,” in International Journal of
Ethics, 18.4 (July, 1908), p. 442; McTaggart, NE2, §791.
56 McTaggart, FDA p. 258.
57 McTaggart, FDA, p. 249.
58 McTaggart, FDA, p. 259.
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we do not, when it has been once reached, feel that the person is dear to us
on account of his qualities, but rather that our attitude towards his qualities is
determined by the fact that they belong to him.59
This finally allows us to clarify the distinction that McTaggart makes between attitudes taken
up towards “a person” as opposed to those taken up towards “a person’s qualities.”
Instances of the first kind of attitude (such as love) are understood to be in respect of a
subject-substance. They are aimed at a compound conscious substance comprising a
“consciousness” (or “I”) with its own unique and unrepeatable first-person perspective and a
completely unique set of conscious states experienced from that perspective. This
compound person-substance continually grows by undergoing new experiences or creating
new ideals or goals, but according to McTaggart it has a persisting diachronic unity and so
the same substance persists through the addition of new parts and any changes in its
qualities. Such substances are never experienced apart from their qualities; however, our
approach to qualities when the person is the object of an attitude is always dependent on our
interest in the person.
The attitudes that have a person’s qualities as their object do not necessarily treat a
person as a mere object, but they are not directed at them qua subject. These attitudes pick
out the qualities and assign value to the person due to its possessing these qualities. One
does not experience any qualities of a person independent of any existing individual person,
but our interest in the person – in terms of this kind of attitude – is always dependent on
their possessing this characteristic. Presumably, we might even be interested in the fact that
such a characteristic manifests the person, but again this will only be because we are interested
in the characteristic itself and not the person. In these attitudes, my interest in the person is
conditional on their having the characteristic that is the object of the attitude, whereas in the
other kind of attitude (those directed to the ‘person’) the interest in any characteristics is
conditional upon my interest in the subject.
Having discussed what McTaggart means when he distinguishes between “the
person” and ”the qualities of a person,” the final section of this chapter will outline
McTaggart’s method for describing love according to its objects and causes.

McTaggart, FDA, p. 255; McTaggart, SHC, §295. The perspective McTaggart describes here is the
perspective of love. As we shall see, McTaggart argues that love allows us to regard another as a subject (and
not merely as a means) by being directed towards the person and not merely the person’s qualities.
59
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1.4 Methodology: The Object-Cause Distinction: Describing and
Differentiating the Emotion of Love
According to McTaggart, emotions are always experienced as having intentionality (i.e., are
always directed towards an object), and they are always brought about by certain psychical
and physical stimuli or causes. McTaggart classifies and describes a kind of emotion by
identifying its “essence,” which he associates with the causes and objects that are necessary
and unique to it. While there is always a phenomenological aspect (e.g., the qualia or what-it-islikeness) of an emotional experience that is lost if we try to give a reductive analysis of an
emotion merely in terms of its causes and/or intentional structures,60 this does not mean that
we cannot communicate meaningfully about our emotions by appealing to these non-private
features of our experience (their objects and causes). This is, in fact, the very approach that
was used above to differentiate and describe the different kinds of conscious states in both
the early and late periods, as described in the previous sections. So, in order to describe the
nature of love, McTaggart will identify the object and causes that are necessarily involved in
love and are unique to it.
The method of classifying and describing emotions by identifying objects and causes
that are both necessary and unique to particular kinds of emotions had been used by
philosophers in the past, but perhaps one of the most famous uses of this method occurs in
David Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature. There is no doubt that McTaggart has Hume’s
account of love in mind in his own formulation of love in the Nature of Existence, even
though he never explicitly references Hume in it. Hume first introduces the distinction when
describing the emotions of pride and shame and then re-introduces it in his discussion on
love.61 His use of the distinction is the same for both emotions, so I will only consider his
discussion of love and hate.62 Hume asserts that love and hate both share the same object:

This non-reducibility into more basic components seems to be one way to understand what McTaggart,
Moore, and others during this time mean when they say emotions (or anything else) are “indefinable.”
Something is definable only if it is a complex thing that can be fully described merely by listing its basic parts
(each of which can be understood independently of all of the other parts and independent of being included in
the whole). Simple things or organic wholes (complex things where the whole and the parts are changed in
essential ways by inclusion or exclusion of any part from that whole), therefore, cannot be defined.
61 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, (Eds. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), Book II, Parts 1 and 2.
62 ”Since then the qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred; all the arguments that have
been employed to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the
passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter.” Hume, Treatise on Human Nature,
SB332.
60
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another person (pride and shame both share the same object as well: the person that is me).
The problem that he faces is explaining how it is that two different emotions can both be
directed at the same object; merely identifying an emotion’s object is clearly not sufficient to
adequately describe and distinguish different emotions. Hume introduces his solution by
stating that the philosopher must “make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of
these passions; betwixt the idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view,
when excited.”63 Hume asserts that the cause of an emotion need not necessarily be the same
as that towards which it is directed (and vice versa). Hume then looks towards the causes of
love and hate and finds that for each the causes are different. In the case of love the cause is
the idea of a quality that is both approved of (pleasing) and associated with the person that is
the object of love; in the case of hate the cause is the idea of a quality that is both
disapproved of (displeasing) and associated with the person that is the object of hate. If the
idea of Bob is associated with the idea of “being a liar” we do not hate “being a liar;” instead
we hate Bob. The quality of a person, on Hume’s account is not the target of love or hatred,
and so the cause and object are distinct. Noting this distinction allows Hume to classify
emotions according to both the object and the cause. If there were no such distinction, then
it would be impossible to explain how it is that both love and hate can be directed at the
same object.
The most notable difference between Hume’s use of the distinction and McTaggart’s
use is that while Hume takes the object of love for granted (‘another person’) and uses the
distinction to identify unique causes of each emotion, McTaggart uses the distinction to
isolate the exact object of the emotion. Hume does not entertain the possibility that the
exact nature of the object of love may not be immediately obvious; McTaggart, however,
assumes that some people might legitimately question whether love is for ‘the person’ or
merely ‘a person’s qualities,’ and so he goes beyond Hume’s use of the distinction and uses it
to provide a series of arguments in defense of his claim that the proper object is ‘the person.’
While their approaches differ in this regard, their overall project remains the same.
McTaggart’s argument (considered in detail in Chapter Two), can therefore be understood as
an extension of Hume’s original attempt to classify and describe love according to its
necessary and unique object and causes.
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Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, II.1.§2: pp. SB278.
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1.5 Summary
In this chapter I have provided important background material necessary to understand
McTaggart’s account of the nature of love. We have looked at the two theories of emotion
out of which McTaggart was working when he described love in the early stages of his career
and the later stages of his career. Understanding what exactly McTaggart means by
“emotion” at each stage will be important for understanding some of the particular features
of love that he identifies in each stage. While his overall theory of love does not change in its
core aspects, the shift in theories of emotion allows him to emphasize different aspects of
experience of love in each stage of his career. We also looked at McTaggart’s theory of the
person in order to understand how it is that a person’s conscious states and a person’s
properties are each related to and distinguished from the person itself. Understanding the
underlying metaphysical theory of the person will help make sense of McTaggart’s central
claim that that object of love is a person and not a person’s qualities, (though a person’s
qualities are the cause of love). Finally, we looked at the general approach that McTaggart
uses to distinguish and describe different kinds of conscious states according to their
necessary and unique causes and intentional object. In the next chapter I will summarize in
detail how McTaggart describes love in terms of its necessary and unique causes and object
and I will summarize and assess his arguments supporting these claims.
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CHAPTER 2
2 McTaggart’s Philosophy of Love
This chapter summarizes, explains, and assesses McTaggart’s philosophical account of love.
McTaggart describes love, and differentiates it from all other kinds of conscious states and
emotions by identifying certain causes and objects as essential for love (employing the
method outlined at the end of Chapter 1). The chapter proceeds in two parts. The first
considers what causes loving emotions. McTaggart seeks to isolate which causes, if any, are
necessary and sufficient for love and then explain the role of any other (proximate) causes
that might be involved in bringing about love. The second part looks at McTaggart’s
argument for the claim that the object of love is a person and never a person’s qualities.
McTaggart’s argument is very compressed and I will reconstruct and explain the various
steps required for it to succeed. My analysis will also provide reasons for thinking that
McTaggart held a particular view about the nature of the value of love: that it is a higherorder intrinsic good. This has important implications for the following chapters on
McTaggart’ theory of value, his moral philosophy, and the role that love is assigned within
moral philosophy.
Before beginning, however, it is important to clarify the kind of love that McTaggart
is investigating. There are clearly many senses in which we can be said to love things, and
McTaggart was aware of all of these. We often speak of loving inanimate objects, animals,
persons, abstract entities such as one’s nation/state or one’s “alma mater,” and even what is
represented by abstract concepts such as ‘justice’ or ‘truth.’ McTaggart’s interest is solely in
describing the love that we have for persons.1 Furthermore, it is clear that he is describing
love between fully developed and fully functional persons. It is not clear how his account
would apply to love for beings whose status as persons is ambiguous (e.g., a young child),
compromised (e.g., those suffering from certain psychological diseases), or controversial
McTaggart, NE2, §459: “But how is love to be distinguished from other sorts of liking? I propose to confine
the word, in the first place, to a liking which is felt towards persons. Here, perhaps, it is more doubtful if
common usage supports the restriction. It is not so clear that we are speaking metaphorically when we say that
a man loves the Alps, as when we say that he loves justice. Still less is it clear that we are speaking
metaphorically when we say that he loves his school or his country. But it is important to have a separate name
for the liking which is felt only towards persons, and there is, I think, no question that, however far the
common use of the word may extend, the central and typical use of it is for an emotion felt towards persons.
And thus, in using it exclusively for that emotion, we shall not depart much from the common use, if we depart
at all.” (Underlining is mine.)
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(e.g., some non-human animals). For instance, while there is clearly a legitimate and
important sense in which we can love young children, it is not clear that children are the
kinds of beings that can love in the way described below. While they certainly (at some point
in their development) have many of the core capacities associated with personhood (e.g., the
ability to self-consciously reflect on their own thoughts, actions, and character in a way that
allows them to contrast and compare these with the world outside of them; the ability to set
goals and make plans to carry them out; etc.) they clearly – as children – do not have the
capability to exercise such capacities at will, or in a constant way, or in a reliably successful
way. Being a child just means being the kind of entity who is developing such capacities and
who is (ideally) working towards a sufficient degree of aptitude and proficiency that is typical
of adulthood.2 McTaggart does not discuss the love of children in his work. He does discuss
issues surrounding child development when he discusses the extent to which we ought to
allow children the freedom to make mistakes and how we ought to discipline children, but
there is no explicit mention about love in these discussions.3 There is also the issue about
whether the love a parent feels for their child is just one kind of love throughout the whole
process of development (in utero, infancy, early childhood, late childhood, and adolescence)
or whether one moves between one distinct kind of love to another at various points in the
process. Since the person-status of children is very complicated (and would widely be
recognized as a “grey area” in regards to ethical issues) and since McTaggart’s account of
love was clearly only meant to apply to love for adult persons, I will not be addressing issues
related to loving children in what follows. There are surely some interesting questions to be
raised in this regards (and in regards to the other experiences of love for non-adult persons),
but it would take us far off task to address them in a meaningful way.

2.1 The Necessary, Sufficient, Immediate, and Proximate Causes of
Love

2.1.1

The Various Causes of Love Identified and Classified

McTaggart describes the distinction between the ‘objects’ and ‘causes’ of love as the
difference between love being in respect of x and love being because of y. That to which love is
2
3

Schapiro, Tamar. “What is a Child?” Ethics 109 (July 1999): 715-738.
McTaggart, SHC, Chapter V: “Punishment,” and Chapter VI: “Sin.” (pp. 129-150 and 151-176.)
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in respect of I am calling the ‘object of love’ and that of which love is because of I am calling a
‘cause of love.’ These are the terms that Hume used and they clearly correspond to
McTaggart’s phrasing.4 McTaggart establishes that the cause and object of an emotion can be
distinguished by considering the case of approval. According to him, approval is always in
respect of a quality of a person-substance but he adds that it is always also because of a quality of
a person-substance. He then notes, however, that “the quality in respect of which I approve
of him may be different from the quality because of which I approve of him.” 5 He
demonstrates this by considering a case of approval of the historical figure Oliver Cromwell
in respect of his courage.
If we assume that I approve of Cromwell in respect of his courage, the object of the
emotion is ‘courage’ (or, more accurately the general quality of ‘possessing courage’ or in this
particular case ‘Cromwell’s courage’). The cause of my feeling approval for ‘Cromwell’s
courage’ is not ‘Cromwell’s courage.’ Rather, McTaggart claims that the immediate cause of my
approval of Cromwell is my belief ‘that Cromwell was courageous.’ McTaggart suggests that
my belief about Cromwell can be restated as a quality of Cromwell in the following way: “he
[Cromwell] has the quality of being believed by me to be courageous.”6 So, the object of my
approval is the quality ‘[Cromwell’s] possessing courage’ and the cause of my approval is
‘[Cromwell’s] being believed by me to be courageous.’ And, as McTaggart observes, these are
not the same thing. Since the object and the cause of my approval of Cromwell are not
identical, the object and cause of an emotion of approval are distinct and since other
emotions have the same general structure as approval (i.e., intentionality) it is possible that
their objects and causes will not be identical and are therefore distinct as well.
McTaggart also notes that while the “immediate” cause of my approval is my belief
that Cromwell was courageous there can be a number of ‘proximate’ 7 causes of my approval
insofar as they determine my belief in Cromwell’s courage. For instance, my belief could be
caused by the fact that Cromwell was in fact courageous (assuming that I knew him
personally and had first-hand exposure to his courageous acts). In this sense the object of
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book II, Parts 1 and 2.
McTaggart, NE2, § 465.
6 McTaggart, NE2 §465. While it initially seems a bit awkward and forced to say that the fact that ‘P believes x
about Q’ results in a new quality of Q, upon further reflection is seems more plausible. For instance, to say that
someone was ‘famous’ or ‘notorious’ just is to say that they were the sort of person (quality) that people held
certain kinds of opinions about. Also, to be called ‘trustworthy’ can be a quality that comes about from a single
person’s belief that I can be trusted.
7 McTaggart, NE2, §465. McTaggart uses the term “remote.” I have opted for ‘proximate’ instead.
4
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my approval – ‘Cromwell’s courage’ – could also be a proximate cause of the approval.
Nonetheless, McTaggart notes that it is not necessary that ‘Cromwell’s courage’ be a
proximate cause at all. In cases of a false belief that Cromwell was courageous, the quality of
‘Cromwell’s courage’ never actually existed and therefore could not have been a cause at all.
In Gettier-type cases, where my belief is true but for the wrong reasons, it is also the case
that the quality that is the object of the emotion need not be the proximate cause of it. For
instance, if we assume that Cromwell was actually courageous and also assume that I falsely
believe Cromwell was courageous because he fought at the Battle of Waterloo (even though
he died 157 years before that battle), then Cromwell’s actual courage is not the proximate
cause of the emotion at all.8 So while the object of an emotion might be a proximate cause of
it, it is not necessary that it is a proximate cause of it.
Finally, McTaggart notes that there are all kinds of proximate causes of emotions
that are certainly never the objects of that emotion. For instance, in the case McTaggart
outlines above, the fact that ‘I did not die before Cromwell was born’ and the fact that ‘I
have read about Cromwell’ are both necessary conditions of my having any beliefs about
Cromwell; nonetheless, facts of this kind are never the objects of the emotion they cause.
Having established that the causes and objects of an emotion are distinct, and that in
some cases they cannot be the same, McTaggart now needs to determine the causes of love
and determine whether any of those causes are also the object of love. He will ultimately
argue that none of the characteristics (qualities or relations) that cause love (immediately or
proximately) are the object of love; instead, the object of love is always the individual
concrete person.

2.1.2

The Necessary and Sufficient Causes of Love

In order to identify causes that are uniquely related to love McTaggart asks whether there is
“any characteristic which, in our present experience, is always present when B loves C (either
in B, or in C, or as a relation between them?”9 He considers a number of candidates and
rules them out one by one before finally considering what he thinks is a necessary (and if
present in a high enough degree) sufficient cause for love. The candidates that McTaggart
rules-out are pleasure (caused in the lover by the person loved), moral approbation of the
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beloved, benevolence, and sympathy.10 McTaggart argues that for each candidate, love is
conceivable in its absence, even if it does (as a matter of fact) ordinarily attend love and even
if we would agree that the whole state of affairs would be better if they did attend love.
In reference to pleasure and pain, McTaggart observes that sometimes we can fall in
love with someone who we do not really find pleasant at all.11 He also notes that loving
someone can involve both pleasurable and painful causes and effects. In addition to all of
the pleasant feelings involved with love, love can also involve feelings like jealousy or
perhaps even betrayal. Also, when we love someone, we may be more likely to sympathize
with them (though this is not necessary, as will be shown below). If the person we love
endures a high amount of suffering and our love for them involves a deep level of sympathy,
then conceivably our love might be more painful than pleasant on the whole. Pleasure (or
pain) is therefore not a necessary cause of love nor is it necessarily concomitant or correlated
with it.12
Next McTaggart considers moral approbation.13 He observes that moral approval of
someone may attend love or may even cause it, but experience also shows that it is not
necessary for love, nor must it always attend love. He acknowledges that it is “possible that
he [the lover] should love him [the beloved], though he [the lover] knows him [the beloved]
to be wicked.”14 McTaggart hypothesizes that people have connected love so closely with
moral approbation in an attempt to distinguish it from mere sexual desire, but claiming that
we must view the beloved as moral or virtuous in order for love to arise plainly contradicts
experience. McTaggart also rejects aesthetic approbation as a necessary cause or concomitant
of love. Just as we can love someone who is wicked, we can also love someone who is ugly.15

McTaggart, NE2, §§461-462.
McTaggart, NE2, §462.
12 This is a clear departure from the definition of an emotion in the earlier works as “a state of consciousness
insofar as it is tinged with feeling (SHC, §828).” In the earlier works it is clear that love itself must be pleasant
(apart from any consideration of the pleasantness of causes or effects). In The Nature of Existence we get a
much more tentative claim that “[i]t might perhaps be maintained that love always involves some pleasure, even
if it involves a balance of pain (NE2, §481).” The pleasure involved in loving someone, however, would be a
quality of the cogitation of that person distinct from the emotional quality of love. Yet, nothing in the early
work suggests that pleasure is a cause of love, even if love is always itself pleasant. In this sense, McTaggart’s
earlier theory is consistent with these observations. Also, even if pleasure is considered to be an essential
component of love itself, this does not rule out the experience of love being more painful than pleasurable on
the whole for the reasons outlined above.
13 McTaggart, NE2, §463.
14 McTaggart, NE2, §463.
15 McTaggart, NE2, §463.
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After this, McTaggart considers benevolence and sympathy.16 He considers
benevolence to be a desire and sympathy to be a feeling or emotion. Benevolence is a desire
directed at someone else’s well-being. If the other’s well-being can be improved, then a
person experiencing benevolence will desire its increase; if the other person is currently
experiencing a sufficient, or high, level of well-being, then one still experiences benevolence
if one desires the maintenance of that level of well-being (such a desire to preserve existing
goods is called “acquiescence” in McTaggart’s terminology). Sympathy is directed towards
another person’s state of experiencing pleasure or experiencing pain. Insofar as they are
experiencing either of these feelings, sympathy causes the same kind of feeling (pleasure or
pain) in myself. McTaggart admits that love may be caused by either benevolence or
sympathy, and that things are better on the whole if love for someone involves both. Yet, he
maintains that it is conceivable that someone could love someone without desiring her wellbeing or without feeling any sympathy for her. He cites cases where people have been
known to voluntarily cause their loved one to experience pain or be worse-off. And it also
seems possible that I could fail to have sympathy for someone I love (perhaps through
callousness, inattentiveness, or a lack of my own personal experience with situations
comparable to those in which my beloved finds herself). McTaggart notes that cases where
benevolence and sympathy are lacking in love are rare and are probably best described as
“morbid.”17 Nonetheless, they are conceivable and they are experienced by some people. He
concludes that the options listed above are either necessary, or sufficient causes of love.
Next, McTaggart argues that there is only one experience that always accompanies
love. He states that whenever someone loves someone else “he feels that he is connected
with him by a bond of peculiar strength and intimacy – a bond stronger and more intimate
than any other by which two selves can be joined.”18 It is this awareness of the union
between two persons that McTaggart identifies as the necessary and sufficient cause of love
and that it helps isolate the “essence” of love.19 He states:
McTaggart, NE2, §463.
McTaggart, NE2, §463.
18 McTaggart, NE2, §464.
19 As we shall see, this aspect of love helps us to both isolate what exactly the particular emotion of love is like,
but it will also help us to isolate the particular kind of object. Since consciousness of ‘union’ is a necessary
cause, this implies that the object of love will always be another person. This is because two distinct elements are
required for any union (as opposed to mere identity/identification). So while the immediate cause of love is not
the object of love, it does tell us something about the object of love: that it is always directed towards another
person (with whom I am conscious of being in an intense and intimate union).
16
17
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And this seems to be the essence of love. Love is an emotion which springs
from a sense of union with another self. The sense of union is essential –
without it there is no love. And it is sufficient – whenever there is a sense of
a sufficiently close union, then there is love, whatever may be the qualities of
the lover and beloved, and whatever may be the other relations between
them.20
A few sections later, this important aspect of McTaggart’s theory is further elaborated in the
following passage:
We come then, to the conclusion that love, as we see it in our present
experience, involves a connection between the lover and the beloved which
is of peculiar strength and intimacy, and which is stronger and more intimate
than any other bond by which two selves can be joined. And we must hold,
also, that whenever one of these selves is conscious of this unity, then he
loves the other. And this is regardless of the qualities of the two persons, or
of the other relations between them. The fact that the union is there, or that
the sense of it is there, may depend on the qualities and relations of the two
persons. But if there is the union and the sense of it, then there is love,
whether the qualities and relations which determine it are known or
unknown, vital or trivial. Qualities and relations can only prevent love by
preventing the union, or the sense of it, and can only destroy love by
destroying the union, or the sense of it. Love is for the person, and not for
his qualities, nor is it for him in respect of his qualities. It is for him.21
Before attempting to understand what exactly this essential “union” is, it is useful to clarify
the kinds of causes that may be necessary and sufficient for love. As we have seen,
McTaggart identifies two kinds of causes of an emotion: immediate and proximate. The
lover’s sense of union (whatever the exact nature of this union turns out to be) can be
expressed as a belief ‘that P is intimately united with me,’ and it is this belief that is the
immediate cause of love. The proximate causes of love will be whatever caused the lover to
have a belief in an intimate union with the other person: if the belief that is the immediate
cause is true, then one proximate cause will be the fact that P is actually intimately united to
me (i.e., P has the relational property that I believe P has); if the belief is false (i.e., P does
not actually have the relational property I believe P has), then whatever caused me to have
the belief that an intimate union existed will be the proximate cause.
It is clear that the immediate cause (the ‘sense of union’ or ‘the belief that another is
intimately united to me’) is thought to be a necessary cause of love. However, it is not clear if
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a belief in union – on its own – is sufficient for love. In the first of the two quotes provided
prior to this paragraph, McTaggart speaks as if merely having a sense of union is all that is
required for love to come about: “whenever there is a sense of a sufficiently close union,
then there is love.”22 But in the second quote he seems to require that in addition to one’s
belief in an intimate union with another, an actual union – corresponding to one’s belief –
must exist as a matter of fact: “But if there is the union and the sense of it, then there is
love.”23 So, there seem to be two possible ways to interpret McTaggart:
1) An awareness of the right kind of deep intimate union on its own
(independent of whether or not an actual union of that kind exists) is
sufficient for love. (Supported by the first quote provided above from NE2,
§464.)
2) An awareness of the right kind of deep intimate union and the existence of
the right kind of deep intimate union are both necessary for love and so only
jointly sufficient. (Supported by the second quote provided above from NE2,
§468.)
The first interpretation means that one’s emotion of love is always authentic, even if one’s
sense of union turns out to be ill-founded. The second interpretation restricts authentic
emotions of love to those cases that are based upon true beliefs about the sensed union
from which loving emotions spring. So how should we interpret McTaggart?
Except for a few places (such as Section 464 of the Nature of Existence), McTaggart
almost always mentions both a sense of an intimate union and the existence of an intimate
union as the necessary and sufficient conditions for love. This, on its own, gives some
weight to the second interpretation. The case for the second interpretation is also
strengthened by the fact that McTaggart’s exclusion of the existence of the appropriate
union can be explained by the fact that McTaggart seems to presuppose that where there is
an awareness of intimate union between myself and another there is also always an actual
intimate union between myself and another. This claim that an awareness of an intimate
union implies the existence of such a union shows up in two ways.
First, McTaggart sometimes suggests that having a loving emotion produces an
intimate union with the beloved. In a number of places in the late and early works
McTaggart states that love ‘justifies itself.’ For instance, he claims in Studies in Hegelian
Cosmology that,
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[l]ove is itself the relation which binds individuals together. … It does not
require or admit of justification or determination by anything else. It is itself
its own justification and determination.24
In passages like this he seems to claim that once I love someone, I simultaneously establish
the very kind of state of affairs (an intimate union with another) that corresponds to (and so
justifies) the belief from which love springs. This means that even if one assumes that
authentic love is not possible without the actual existence of an intimate union between the
lovers (making the existence of such a union a necessary condition), if love produces an
intimate union, then the mere sense of union (whether this is a true or false belief) is
sufficient – on its own – to produce genuine love.25
Secondly, McTaggart believed, on metaphysical grounds, that while we only ever
have a sense of deep intimate union with a few people, ultimately all individuals are actually
intimately connected with each other through the kind of union that we sense when we love
someone. He argues that if we perfectly knew someone, we would also always be aware of
this union (since part of knowing them perfectly would also always involve knowing about
this actual intimate connection with me) and so we will always love everyone we perfectly
know.26 It seems that under our imperfect conditions of existence, which for McTaggart are
always characterized by a lack of full knowledge about the ultimate nature of the universe,
we only ever arrive at an awareness of this intimate union through our encounters with a
very limited number of people.27 So, it seems that sometimes McTaggart is assuming that
whenever we do have a sense of union with another, we are merely coming to a subjective
(yet very real) appreciation about what is always already objectively true about any two
people. McTaggart’s description of love does not depend on any claims about the kinds of
relationships that actually exist between people; therefore, one could (justifiably I think)
reject this part of McTaggart’s metaphysics without rejecting his philosophy of love. His
theory still makes sense even if it turns out that not everyone is actually intimately united in
the way required to experience love. However, the fact that McTaggart did believe that these
McTaggart, SHC, §310.
I will address the issue of love ‘causing itself’ through producing its own intimate union below. Some of the
counter-intuitive implications involved in love producing its own necessary and sufficient cause can be
mitigated if one can show that there is more than one kind of intimate union and that love-independent forms
of intimate union can also act as necessary and sufficient causes of love.
26 McTaggart, NE2, §§472-473. McTaggart does not, however, claim that we know everyone perfectly (even in
an ideally conceived universe) and so he does not claim that we will love everyone. (McTaggart, SHC, §311n.1;
McTaggart, NE2, §475.)
27 McTaggart, NE2, §470.
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types of relations actually always exist between everyone (even though for the most part we
are completely ignorant of this) might help explain why McTaggart speaks as he does in the
first quote and only mentions an awareness of an intimate union as the necessary and
sufficient cause of love.
I think, therefore, that there is good reason to adopt the second interpretation
outlined above. McTaggart uses the two condition formulation more often, and when he
does not use it, it may be because he is implicitly assuming that the first condition is always
already met (given his conception of the ultimate nature of the relations between
persons/the ultimate nature of reality) and so doesn’t need to be mentioned. Therefore, if
the shorter single condition formulation shows up, it must be understood as merely a shortform of expressing the longer two-condition formula.
Apart from the sections dedicated to discovering the necessary and sufficient
cause(s) of love, when McTaggart discusses causes and qualities in The Nature of Existence, he
makes no mention of the quality of ‘being united with me in an intense and intimate way;’
instead the qualities considered are largely moral qualities or qualities such as ‘being
beautiful’ or ‘being conducive to pleasure.’ These qualities are only brought up to exclude
them as objects of love, even though they are acknowledged to be potential (proximate)
causes of it. Such qualities may be the reason why we start spending time with another
person and they can (and do) serve as the means by which we become aware of, or create, an
intimate union between myself and another. It is not always clear whether the union is the
result of knowing the other in a more intimate way or if it is rather discovered through
knowing the other in a more intimate way; whichever it may be, some quality of the beloved
directs our attention to our union with another person. This awareness of the union
stimulates the loving emotional response that is then directed towards the other person (and
not their qualities). Also, the qualities of another person can act as obstacles to the awareness
of the union with the other so also as barriers to love. Presumably, if one came to an
awareness of union with another unmediated through an awareness of some other quality,
love could arise and so these other proximate causes are neither necessary nor sufficient for
love. We obviously do not love everyone that we know or everyone that we have relations
with. For example, it is possible that out of two siblings, I might feel love for only one of
them, yet my knowledge and relation to both is presumably very similar in terms of intimacy.
We can be aware of many other kinds of qualities and relations related to myself and another
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and still not fall in love with the other unless that sense of union is added. 28 This seems to
support the idea that merely having beliefs about the properties (qualities or relations) of
another, independent of any belief about an intimate union existing between us, is not
sufficient for love. And while it is, at least theoretically, possible to have a direct sense of this
union independent of any beliefs about the qualities of another, in actual experience we
never experience another as united to us without also experiencing them as having a wide
variety of other properties. So, while love might be conceptually independent of
considerations of the characteristics of another person, at the practical level considerations
about the various qualities of the people we know play an important role as proximate causes
of love by promoting, or at least not preventing, an awareness of an intimate union with
another.

2.1.3

2.1.3.1

The Nature of the “Intimate Union”

“Awareness”

Before considering what it is that we are aware of – an intimate union between two persons
– it is worthwhile to consider what it means to “be aware.” McTaggart asserts that in the
idealized conception of perfect reality (“Absolute Reality” in McTaggart’s terms) the
awareness of union would be “perception” of union. This is emphasized throughout both
the early works and the later works. A perception provides the strongest and most accurate
form of awareness on McTaggart’s psychology. Presumably, in our current experience there
is some lesser degree of awareness: either directly through some imperfect form of
perception or indirectly through some form of inference. Whatever form our imperfect
awareness takes under current conditions of experience, he makes it clear that it is less
certain and intense than it would be if we had a perfect and clear perception of it. McTaggart
also claims that experience show us that “[t]he more intense the consciousness of unity, the
greater the love,”29 or in other words, that the less imperfect our awareness of the union is,
the greater is the intensity of our love.
It is important to keep in mind that while McTaggart is speaking about the cognitive
aspect of the emotion of love, he is not saying that love is only some form of cognition. Love
28
29

McTaggart, NE2, §470.
McTaggart, NE2, §470.

39
is a way of perceiving in a uniquely emotional way, it is a way of perceiving lovingly (see the
previous chapter). So while love is cognitive, and is stronger in proportion to how clear and
distinct the cognitive aspect of it is, love always also involves some additional “noncognitional” element.30 Therefore, while McTaggart’s discussion of love normally speaks
about perceptions of this union and of the beloved, and therefore carries a highly cognitive
tone throughout, one must keep in mind that the awareness involved in loving is not merely a
cognitive form of conscious awareness; loving is an emotional form of awareness.

2.1.3.2 “Intimate Union”
So, what exactly does McTaggart mean by a “union with another self” that is “of peculiar
strength and intimacy31”? What exactly is a relationship of “union” for McTaggart and how
is “intimacy” involved? Overall, McTaggart’s description of the nature of the ‘intimate
union’ is vague32; however, he does provide some hints at to its nature. One hint is provided
when he claims that the way I perceive those that I love is comparable (though not identical)
with the way that I perceive myself.33 For instance, in one place he states:
If I perceive another self, I know him with the same directness, the same
immediacy, the same intimacy, with which I know myself. There is no longer
any of that separation which weakens love. Separation – or rather distinction
– of course remains, for if there were not two distinct selves, there could be
no love. But there is no barrier between the selves. The unity is unhampered.
Love is no longer held back by the inadequacy of knowledge.34
In another place he states:
It is true that love brings us, more than anything else in our present
experience does, into a relation with other selves resembling that in which
each of us stands to himself. A man’s relation to himself is very close – even
omitting the fundamental relation of identity – because he can perceive
himself. And since he can perceive himself, his knowledge of himself is more
independent of his knowledge of his qualities than is the case, in present
McTaggart, NE2, §470.
McTaggart, NE2, §466.
32 McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” pp. 71-72. McKerlie agrees with this assessment; however, though
McTaggart’s account is far from offering a determinate account of the nature of this union, McTaggart does
seem to provide more information than McKerlie suggests he does.
33 McTaggart presents a long argument in “Personality” and NE2 (§§381-404) to defend the claim that we have
a direct perception or awareness of myself (my personality). This is opposed to knowing myself by ‘definition.’
In both cases he is relying upon Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
definition. McTaggart insists that we know ourselves by acquaintance and that it is at least conceivable (not
logically impossible) that we could know others in this way too.
34 McTaggart, NE2, §473.
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experience, with his knowledge of other selves. The intensity of his interest
in himself, again, is independent of his qualities which he believes himself to
have.35
These passages suggest that McTaggart is thinking of intimacy in terms of something like
‘transparency.’ He seems to have in mind the kind of connection that results when we
experience the other – as they are – in a direct way. In a sense, it is like experiencing
someone whose guard is down, who reveals themselves to you as they are with raw honesty.
These passages betray a cognitive bias in McTaggart’s description of love. Love is described
as a sort of passive contemplation of the other, and its intensity is proportional to how much
I can observe about the person that I love. While there are shortcomings to placing such
emphasis on the cognitive or perceptual aspects of intimacy, there is a sense in which
McTaggart’s insight can be interpreted in a way that makes it sound plausible. There are
experiences where others seem to impress themselves upon us in a uniquely intense and
transparent way in our encounters with them. Also, I am sure that many of us have
experienced a situation where we encounter someone who seems to ‘get us’ right from the
start. Though McTaggart rarely acknowledges the experience of the person loved, it is
helpful to take up that perspective here. In cases where I encounter a person that seems to
‘get me’ in a unique and intense way, it is both exhilarating and a bit disarming. There is a
real and immediate sense of vulnerability. There is also a sense that they see me in the way
that I see myself (or perhaps even better than I see myself). This kind of experience is
possible even on the first encounter between two people; in fact, my strongest friendships
have almost all started with an initial encounter like the one described above. When we ‘get
someone’ else in this way, there is an intense sense of a connection, and this might be the
root experience that McTaggart has in mind. We do not experience this kind of awareness
with everyone we meet, know, or are connected to in an important way, and it is not strictly
a kind of ‘knowing’ in any regular sense of the term. The connection, therefore, appears to
be one of transparency and vulnerability and this fits well with the ‘intimacy’ that he
indicates is involved.
In the early works, McTaggart also describes the ‘intimacy’ essential to love in terms
of perceived equality between the lover and the beloved. These works emphasize that
through love we regard the beloved as equal to ourselves. Within this intimate union neither
35
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person is subordinated to the other. In relationships based purely on need or desire,
McTaggart insists that the other must be reduced to a mere means to my own satisfaction.
By its very nature volition seeks to adapt the world to correspond to my ideas. Even when I
acquiesce in a person’s existence, this is only because she corresponds to my idea of who she
should be. As discussed at the start of the last chapter, knowledge and volition are
distinguished from each other insofar as either fact or ideal is given normative priority and
the other is subordinated to the norm and most comply with it. Emotions, in the early
works, result from (approaching) perfect harmony between fact and idea and so McTaggart
suggests that the loving subject experiences the beloved object (the beloved person) as an
equal and that “… [n]either side has the pre-eminence in love…”36 and “… where the sides
have equal rights, where neither is bound to give way…”37 McTaggart also observes that
“[t]his complete equilibrium between subject and object is the reason why love cannot be
conceived as a duty on either side. It is not our duty to love others. … It is not the duty of
others to be loveable by us.”38 Our intuitions that duty does not apply to love are therefore
also grounded upon the egalitarian nature of the intimate union, the awareness of which is
the essence of love. So, the intimate union can also be characterized as a union of complete
equality and harmony between persons where each person’s intrinsic value is recognized and
neither is reduced to the means of the other.
McTaggart also emphasizes that to love a person is to take up an attitude towards
him that emphasizes that the person loved is a special kind of substance that not only bears
properties (such as qualities and relations), but also has a centre of conscious subjectivity that
is aware of those qualities and that unites all of its various states of consciousness into a
unified whole (a unified conscious substance). In other words, it is to take up an attitude
towards another person that emphasizes that they are the same kind of being that I
experience myself to be: a “self” or a “subject.”39 This type of attitude is opposed to those that
give priority to qualities instead of the person that bears those qualities and that, in doing so,
emphasize that the person is an object (i.e., a quality-bearer). The quality-bearer itself need not
have any positive content (as is the case with mere physical objects) and McTaggart
sometimes describes the ‘mere object’ as a “dead residuum in which the content [qualities]
McTaggart, SHC, §284.
McTaggart, SHC, §284.
38 McTaggart, SHC, §284.
39 Mander, On McTaggart on Love, pp. 144-146.
36
37

42
inheres”40 or a “dead abstraction”41 as compared to the “living unity”42 that is captured in the
attitude that treats the person as a unique individual personality (and not merely as an object).
The real interest of this kind of attitude is the qualities. In the loving attitude, however, the
primary interest is in the person and the person’s qualities are assigned value based on their
relation to it. Since a person is experienced as both a subject and an object, both attitudes are
appropriate to have towards persons; however, regarding a person merely as an object would
be inappropriate.
McTaggart sometimes expresses the difference outlined above by distinguishing
attitudes which present the person “from within outwards” and those that present the
person “from without inwards.” The attitude which gives priority to the experiencing person
as a whole is “from within outwards.” From the first person perspective, this is how I
experience the world and give priority of importance to what I find in it. I always experience
my own perspective as the starting point and I relate everything to each other and to me
from this point of view. The attitude which gives priority to the qualities is “from without
inwards.” This is how I experience mere ‘objects.’ I experience qualities and then assign
them to an object. I start from the qualities and work my way towards the object. The
importance that I assign to objects is arrived at in this way too. Our primary interest is in
certain qualities, and any objects that have those qualities are therefore deemed important
too. Usually, the qualities we are most interested with are those that will serve as means to
some adopted end (either my own end, a shared end, or even the end of another). This
means that on the second attitude, objects are usually important because they are merely
useful and so are only good in a derivative way. Any other object that has the same quality
will be equally good (useful) and any other object that has the quality to a higher degree will
be better (more useful). If the object loses that quality for any reason, then it also loses its
importance. This view is summarized by McTaggart when he states:
Only their [other persons experienced as objects] external relations to
ourselves and to one another have any significance for us. They are
individuals, they live from within outwards. But as we find satisfaction in
them, we are aware of them from without inwards, and their centre, instead
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of being a living unity is a dead abstraction. We fail, then … to do justice to
the independence of the object.43
When the emphasis is on the other as a subject, qualities are treated differently. They are seen
as “expressing” or “manifesting” the nature of the person as a whole, a nature that is not
exhausted by a quality or set of qualities. Of this attitude, McTaggart states:
It would seem then, that we have here reached a standpoint [other persons
experienced as subjects] from which we are able to regard the object as it
regards itself. We are able to regard the history and content of the object as a
manifestation of its individuality, instead of being obliged to regard the
individuality as a dead residuum in which the content inheres. We are able to
see the object from within outwards, instead of from without inwards. And
so its claims to independence and substantiality become no more alien or
inharmonious to us than our own.44
But in the harmony which we are now considering [love], we do not, when it
has been once reached, feel that the person is dear to us on account of his
qualities, but rather that our attitude towards his qualities is determined by
the fact that they belong to him.45
Here knowledge of qualities is not seen as an end in itself, but as a means towards coming to
know the person that underlies those qualities.
McTaggart observes that one of the most notable characteristics of love “is the
manner in which reference to the object tends to become equivalent to reference to self.” 46
He describes this experience of ‘equality’ as follows:
The position here is different. The subject is no longer in the same position
of one-sided supremacy. In knowledge and volition it exists as a centre of
which the world of objects is the circumference. This relation continues, for
without it our self-consciousness and our existence would disappear. But
conjoined with it we have now the recognition of the fact that we ourselves
form part of the circumference of other systems of which other individuals
are the centre. We know of course that this must be so. But it is only in love
that it actually takes place. We are not only part of someone else’s world in
his eyes, but in our own. And we feel that this dependence on another is as
directly and truly self-realisation as is the dependence of others on us.47
Whereas we often only regard things as good relative to my own beliefs, desires, emotions,
and feelings (i.e., what I think is good for me), McTaggart suggests that in the case of love,
McTaggart, FDA, p. 259.
McTaggart, FDA, p. 258.
45 McTaggart, FDA, p. 255; McTaggart, SHC, §295.
46 McTaggart, SHC, §296; McTaggart, FDA, p. 256.
47 McTaggart, SHC, §298; McTaggart, FDA, p. 259.
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we come to experience (and not merely know via inference) the value of many things as
dependent on the existence of another person and her beliefs, desires, emotions, and feelings
(i.e., what is good for them). In love, things that are good for the beloved are regarded as
equally important as things that are good for me and they are recognized as good independent
of what happens to be good for me (though, of course, it will often happen that for those
who fall in love, the good of each will be intimately overlap with the good of the other). 48
This is not merely because we happen to also be interested in the same things or values as
the other person (i.e., we share the same ultimate ends); rather it is “because all our interest
in the universe is conceived as deriving force from his existence.”49 In loving another person,
McTaggart suggests that our interest in the world is no longer solely determined by reference
to me. In fact, when experiencing the emotion of love for some person, in many cases the
world seems to derive most of its value from the existence of the beloved and it is difficult
to see how the world would have any value without the beloved in it; in fact, such an
imagined world may seem horrific. Even the value of truth and virtue (even if granted prima
facie intrinsic value independent of ‘my own good’) also begin to be valued by reference to
the beloved.50 McTaggart sometimes describes seeing all value as dependent on the beloved
as experiencing the world “sub specie amati” or under the mode/guise of the beloved.51
So, McTaggart claims that to love someone is to take up an attitude towards them
that gives priority to the person as a whole over their qualities. This means that one has an
emotion that is directed towards them as a ‘subject’ and not merely as an object. The
emotion of love both indicates and springs from a subject-subject relation and not from a
subject-object relation.52 In love, the other person is experienced in the same way that I
experience myself. In love, my primary concern is for the person as a whole and my interest
in their qualities is derived from this concern. This relationship does not reduce the beloved
This experience of the other’s good as equally important to my own should not be confused with experiences
of benevolence or sympathy. While another’s good (or bad) is clearly the object of such attitudes, it is possible
to feel benevolence or sympathy for another without recognizing that their good as equally important as my
own. I could take up such attitudes towards another by thinking that my own good is more important than
theirs, or thinking that their good is more important than my own. What seems to be of central importance in
these passages, is that through love I experience in a direct way the importance of the other (and all other
things in the world in relation to this importance) and that I directly experience this importance as equal to the
importance I assign myself by default as a conscious subject/person.
49 McTaggart, SHC §296; McTaggart, FDA p.256.
50 McTaggart, SHC, §296.
51 McTaggart, SHC, §297.
52 See Mander, “On McTaggart on Love,” pp.-. 144-146 for a discussion of McTaggart’s distinction between
subject-object attitudes and subject-subject attitudes.
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to a mere bearer of a quality that is useful for attaining some ultimate end of my own or to a
mere bearer of some intrinsically valuable quality. In other words, McTaggart says that the
other is not ‘subordinated’ to my own projects or to some quality that I judge to be
ultimately valuable. Rather, the other is experienced as the same kind of being as myself and
so produces a harmonious relationship of equality.
It is worth noting that respect might also be a form of subject-subject attitude;
however, it seems clear to me that any plausible account of respect would not involve an
emphasis on intimate union, as is the case with love. At the very least, if the essence of
respect involves some form of union, it will not be nearly as intimate as that involved in
love. It is likely that had McTaggart distinguished between love and respect (which he did
not), the intimate nature of the union involved in love would surely have been a defining and
distinguishing feature in relation to respect. Marcia Baron argues that this is one way that
Kant might have made a distinction between love and respect in the Metaphysics of Morals
when he states: “… mutual love admonishes men constantly to come closer to one another;
that of the respect they owe one another, to keep themselves at a distance from one another
… (MM, 449).”53
Even though the intimate union that is essential for love is characterized by
regarding the beloved as one regards oneself – as a living, autonomous person whose good is
as equally important as my own – McTaggart makes it clear in The Nature of Existence that
loving does not involve a form of ‘identification’ between the lover and the beloved which
would remove (or at least reduce) the individuality, the uniqueness, and the separateness of
each person. He states:
If I perceive another self, I know him with the same directness, the same
immediacy, the same intimacy, with which I know myself. There is no longer
any of that separation which weakens love. Separation – or rather distinction
– of course remains, for if there were not two distinct selves, there could be
no love.54
In contemporary terms, we might say that the loving attitude must always recognize the
importance of each person’s unique perspective on the world and each person’s autonomy.
An ‘intimate union’ does not refer to some new entity that is formed through a process of
Marcia Baron, “Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 36.Supplement
(1997): pp. 29-44.
54 McTaggart, NE2, §473.
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‘subsumption’ or ‘absorption’ of the individuals that entered into it, such that each individual
no longer has any individual identity or autonomy apart from that relationship (as some
nineteenth century proponents of Romanticism or Hegelianism might have proposed). Nor
is it the case that the lover comes to view the beloved merely as an extension of herself. Nor,
finally, is it the case that the lover loses herself completely by identifying herself with the
beloved, fully sacrificing her own unique ideas, desires, aims, and autonomy. For McTaggart,
an ideal form of the intrinsic union that is essential to love is a union that strikes a perfect
balance between harmony and differentiation; it is a union which both allows people to fully
become who they are as unique individuals and at the same time allows them to be deeply
and fully connected with another unique individual person.55 Since a union is not possible
unless there is a multiplicity to be united, and since there cannot be an ‘intimate union’
between persons unless there are two persons, McTaggart concludes that “[w]hile it is
essential to love that it should be felt towards a person, it is also essential that it should be
felt towards another person.”56 Love, therefore, is essentially social: it is a relation that can
only exist between a plurality of persons.
An implication of McTaggart’s view is that “the emotion which a man feels towards
himself is never the same emotion which, when felt towards others, is called love.”57 Selflove, in the strictest sense, is not possible on McTaggart’s view. The emotion denoted by
self-love (an emotion McTaggart suggests “seems only to mean an interest in my own wellbeing” while love for another person “is very much more than an interest in his wellbeing”)58 is called “self-reverence” by McTaggart to emphasize this point.59 In denying the
possibility of authentic self-love (in the strictest sense), McTaggart is aligning himself with
other famous philosophers. For instance, a similar claim is made in the Aristotelian work The
Eudemian Ethics which states:
For this friendship – that to oneself – is, in a way, friendship by analogy, not
absolutely. For loving and being loved requires two separate individuals. …
McTaggart, SHC, §§12-15, 64-65, 97-98, 197, 300-303. McTaggart, NE1, §256.
McTaggart, NE2, §469. As will be discussed below, McTaggart argues that the object of love is a person and
not a person’s qualities. McTaggart’s considerations about the necessary and sufficient cause of love (intimate
union) work together with that argument to narrow down the scope of potential objects for love: from any
person to any person except myself. The various aspects of McTaggart’s account of love must therefore be
understood as working together to support his ultimate conclusions about the nature of love.
57 McTaggart, NE2, §469.
58 McTaggart, NE2, §469.
59 McTaggart, NE2, §477.
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these relations require two separate individuals; so far then as the soul is two,
these relations can in a sense belong to it; so far as these two are not
separate, the relations cannot belong to it.60
Hume also makes a very similar claim in his discussion of love in A Treatise on Human Nature
when he states:
… so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts,
actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is sufficiently evident from
experience. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being
external to us, and when we talk of self-love, ‘tis not in a proper sense, nor has
the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion,
which is excited by a friend or mistress.61
So, even though McTaggart’s understanding of the nature of intimate union results in a
seemingly counter-intuitive claim that self-love is impossible, he is not alone in arriving at
this conclusion. This aspect of love is important to keep in mind, since McTaggart also
claims that love is an intrinsic good. This means that there are some intrinsic goods that are
possible only by means of establishing some form of relation between two people. Though
McTaggart will not claim that love must be reciprocal to have value, his view implies that in
order to attain the good of love at least two individual people must exist and must be related
in a way that recognizes and preserves the individuality and autonomy of each individual
person. If love is one of the most important intrinsic goods that can be attained, a claim that
McTaggart will also attempt to defend, this means that there may be very strong
consequentialist reasons to respect, honour, and promote the individuality and autonomy of
others so that love is possible and can be maintained where it already exists. These issues will
be discussed in more detail in Chapters Four and Five.
One final characteristic of this intimate union between persons — already mentioned
above – is the idea that love itself produces a kind of intimate union between individuals.
McTaggart does sometimes speak as if this is the case. For instance, in Studies in Hegelian
Cosmology he claims that,
[l]ove is itself the relation which binds individuals together. Each relation it
establishes is part of the ultimate nature of the unity of the whole. It does not
Aristotle, “Eudemian Ethics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, Ed. Jonathan Barnes, Tr. J.
Solomon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): VII.6 1140a10-23. [Solomon’s translation
originally published in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. IX. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1915.]
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require or admit of justification or determination by anything else. It is itself
its own justification and determination.62
So it would seem that once I love someone, I establish the very kind of relationship
sufficient for maintaining love (at least so long as nothing interferes with my awareness I am
aware of the kind of intimate union that love itself creates between persons).
Now, it would be viciously circular to say that the kind of intimate union produced
by love is necessarily identical to the kind of intimate union that is the immediate, necessary,
and sufficient cause of love: if a loving intimate union is necessary for love, then how will
love ever get started? Presumably if love is to be ‘created,’ then the kind of intimate union
resulting from love cannot be presumed to exist. There seems to be only two ways to avoid
such circularity yet maintain that once love comes about it is (potentially) self-sustaining.
First, one could maintain that there is only one kind of intimate union involved – the
intimate union resulting from love – but insist that since love can arise from the mere belief
that such a union exists, the origin of love can be accounted for by means of false beliefs.
This option would only be available so long as the existence of an actual intimate union is
not also required in addition to the awareness of that union (the first of the two
interpretations of McTaggart’s description of the necessary and sufficient descriptions
discussed earlier in this chapter). One could claim that the origin of love is always a false
belief that a love-like intimate union exists between myself and another (when it actually
does not). Perhaps the belief is not described as false, but rather as “unfounded” or as a kind
of “leap of faith” (in the spirit of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and William James). This
false/unfounded belief would turn out to be a kind of “self-fulfilling prophecy” since once
the belief exists, it is sufficient to cause love and will thereby produce the actual intimate
union sufficient for justifying love thereafter. This is possible, but I think that most would
agree that it is not an attractive option. It would mean that love could only ever originate in a
delusion or fiction.63 Also, it does not seem to be a viable option for McTaggart if he accepts
that in addition to an awareness of an intimate union, an actual intimate union must also
exist in order for there to be love (and as I suggested earlier, there seems to be good reason
to think that this was McTaggart’s actual view).
McTaggart, SHC, §310.
Alan Soble, The Philosophy of Sex and Love: An Introduction: Second Edition: Revised and Expanded (St. Paul, MN:
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A more attractive option would be to claim that there is more than one kind of intimate
union that is sufficient to cause love. In one of the passages where McTaggart outlines the
necessary and sufficient conditions for love (a quote provided earlier in the chapter) he says
that “The sense of union is essential – without it there is no love. And it is sufficient –
wherever there is a sense of a sufficiently close union, then there is love.”64 While a loving
relationship is itself one kind of intimate union (awareness of which is itself a sufficient
condition for love), it may not be the only kind of intimate union that is sufficient. Perhaps
in the case where I feel that another person ‘gets me’ (even before we fall in love), I am
aware of a kind of transparency and vulnerability between myself and that person; this
awareness could surely result in a union describable as intimate and yet may not be intimate
enough to be the union that is essential for love. Perhaps the awareness that who I am is (at
least in part) meaningfully linked to another person (such as a parent, sibling, teammate, etc.)
is an awareness of one kind of intimate union. McTaggart allows that circumstances such as
“birth in the same family, or by childhood in the same house,” while not themselves
necessary and sufficient for love may give rise to the conditions that are. 65 Presumably he is
referring to a bond formed by the shared experience of growing up (and not merely the fact
of geographic proximity). Having an awareness of a shared history or shared goals with
another person may be another form of a union that while intimate is not as deeply intimate
as the union characteristic of love. Surely it is possible to feel some kind of connection to
people that is more intimate than that I would have with a mere stranger, or even an
acquaintance, yet it not nearly as intimate as the union we experience as love. Such unions
might lead to the deep intimacy of love, but it is also possible they will not. If there are lesser
degrees of intimate union that are possible independently of the presence of the emotion of
love (which these three examples seem to be) then the vicious circle can be avoided by
claiming that the original intimate union, and the original awareness of the intimate union, that
are necessary and sufficient conditions for love, must be one of these ‘non-love’ forms of
intimate unions. Once a deeply intimate loving union is originally established in these ways,
there seems to be nothing viciously circular about claiming that love is thereby able to
sustain itself on its own because it produces its own unique kind of awareness of itself that is
also a sufficient condition for love (to continue). There seems, therefore, to be an interesting
64
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‘virtuous’ circle wherein love is potentially self-sustaining so long as our awareness of the
deeply intimate loving union itself is not destroyed or interfered with by some other factor.66
One might wonder if an infinite regress is possible in regards to this second option.67
For instance, assume that there is a certain kind of camaraderie that is established between
two people by attending the same political rally. Such camaraderie surely involves some
degree of intimate union between them (a union that is not shared between everyone),
though not a union deep enough to be called a loving union. Would a necessary and
sufficient condition of having an emotion of camaraderie towards someone require the preexistence of some other kind of intimate union (and an awareness of it)? And if so, would I
then need to posit a somewhat less intimate form of union as existing prior to our
camaraderie in order to get it off the ground in the way that I proposed for getting love
started? And so on, without end?
I am not sure that an infinite regress must necessarily be assumed. There is no reason
to think that every emotion that establishes an intimate union between two people, or that
arises from the establishment of an intimate union, will require a pre-existing union or any
awareness of a union at all. In fact, experience suggests that there are many union-forming
emotions that do not require any pre-existing connection between the people involved to get
started at all. For instance, I could surely admire or respect someone with whom I am not
intimately related with at all.
To see that this is true, imagine that I have deep respect for the fourteenth Dalai
Lama even though I have never met him, am not related to him, am not a member of his
religion, am not a Tibetan, and I have not been engaged in any shared projects with him.
Having this emotion, however, would establish a kind of connection between myself and the
Dalai Lama that I do not have with anyone else (I do not admire or respect anyone else in
this way). This connection, however, need not be “intimate;” respect, it seems does not
require intimacy in order to be directed towards someone. The very presence of this
emotion, however, establishes some kind of connection between myself and the Dalai Lama,
Niko Kolodny “Love as a Valuing Relationship,” Philosophical Review 112.2 (2003): 161; 169-170: He presents
a similar solution to the fear that a “Relationship” theory of love (where the object and cause of love are the
relationship itself and not the relations) cannot explain how love can arise without ‘bootstrapping.’ On his
solution, two potential lovers start engaging in the kinds of activity that constitute a loving relationship, and if
this works out love will result as they come to accrue more shared history, activities, goals, and values. (See next
Chapter).
67 I thank Anthony Skelton for pointing out this issue.
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but I need not be aware of it for me to respect him. Nor need there by any pre-existing
connection between myself and the Dalai Lama in order to develop or maintain my
admiration and respect for the Dalai Lama. However, if situations are such that I become
aware of my admiration and respect for him, and if I also become aware that my emotions
towards this him are unique and so connect me with him in a way that I am not connected
with anyone else, this may act as a kind of platform or fulcrum from which more intimate
forms of union can arise and so may potentially (though not necessarily) lead to a deeply
intimate loving union with him.
Imagine that my respect for the Dalai Lama motivates me to attend a peaceful
political rally he organized for freeing Tibet from Chinese rule, and so I engage in a shared
project with him. I later get the chance to meet him at a book-signing and mention my
experience at the rally. We feel a connection through this shared experience and so engage in
more conversation about our unique interests and histories. This eventually leads to a deep
sense of understanding between us and within this deep sense of mutual understanding we
come to a realization that a deeply intimate friendly love has developed between us. All of
this started from a feeling of respect that did not presuppose any connection between myself
and the Dalai Lama, and so an infinite regress is not necessary in order to establish love. In
order to avoid the regress, it must be possible to establish unions though emotions such as
admiration and respect that do not themselves require any intimate union or sense of union
to be established. If admiration and respect are two examples of such emotions, which they
seem to be, then such starting points are both plausible and very common.
So, while McTaggart says very little in a direct way about the nature of the intimate
union that he identifies as the necessary and sufficient cause of love in The Nature of Existence,
looking at his statements about it in that work and in the earlier works we can summarize the
intimate union under consideration in the following way. It is a union that unites two
persons without diminishing the individuality, uniqueness, or autonomy of each person. As
such, the union is essentially social and therefore non-reflexive: it can only exist between
distinct individuals. The intimacy can be understood as a kind of transparency and
vulnerability sensed between two people who ‘get each other’ (even from the very start) in a
way in which no one else does. The intimate union also relates two persons as persons
equally and without subordination. Finally, there is likely more than one species of intimate
union of which the relationship established through love is just one example. Other types of

52
intimate unions will be necessary to get love started, but once it exists love can provide its
own sufficient sustaining cause through establishing its own kind of intimate union between
persons.

2.2 The Object vs. Cause Distinction and The Argument for the
Restriction of the Object of Love to the Person (and not Qualities of
a Person)

2.2.1

Classifying Emotions into Genera According to their Objects

Now that we have looked at McTaggart’s account of the causes of love, we can look at his
account of the object of love. Early in his discussion of emotion in The Nature of Existence,
McTaggart divides emotions into two genera based on the general kind of object that each
picks out.68 One class of emotions are directed towards ‘the qualities of a substance.’ One
might also say that the object of these emotions is ‘a substance insofar as it possesses certain
qualities.’ In these cases the substance is only included in the object in an indirect or
conditional way. The primary focus is on the quality, and should a substance lose that quality
there is nothing about it (in itself) that directs the emotion towards it. These kinds of
emotions are called “approval” and “disapproval” (differing in their positive or negative
attitudes to their objects).
Another genus of emotions are those directed at “particular substances as wholes,
though they may be determined by the qualities of substances.”69 As we have seen, a substance
cannot exist without qualities and we cannot know the nature of a particular substance apart
from its qualities (a substance without qualities is a mere abstraction and would have nothing
to distinguish it from the ‘bare’ substance of any other particular thing). McTaggart,
therefore, is not claiming that these emotions are directed to some kind of pure substancecore to which qualities are added. Instead, he is claiming that these kinds of emotions are
directed towards the substance conceived as a whole made up of its parts and that is a bearer
of qualities. These kinds of emotions are called “liking” and “repugnance.” McTaggart wants
to argue that love is a species of liking and so is directed towards persons (substances) as
persons.
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While the distinction between “approval” and “liking” makes sense at a conceptual
level, it is also possible that no actual emotions that can be classed under the ‘liking’ genus.
McTaggart takes seriously the possibility that someone could (plausibly) doubt that
substances (including persons) are ever actually the object of an emotion. He has
acknowledged that qualities play a prominent and core role in causing all emotions (including
love) and he also acknowledges that the proper objects of many (and possibly most)
emotions are qualities of a person. McTaggart also acknowledges that qualities play an
important role in determining the ‘nature’ of each person, and so qualities cannot be ruled
out as merely superficial aspects of personality. Considering these facts alone might lead one
to conclude that the object of any emotion – including love – is always some quality of a
person. So McTaggart must show that there is reason to believe that some emotions, like
love, do in fact pick out the person as their object and not merely the person’s qualities. He
needs to explain why we have reason to think that love “is more independent than any other
emotion of the qualities of the substance towards which it is felt.”70 In other words, he needs
to provide an argument for why one should accept that love is such an exceptional and
unique kind of emotion. McTaggart’s terminology can be confusing and may give the
impression that he is begging the question if some of the language is not cleared up. Stating
that McTaggart wants to prove that ‘loving’ is a species of ‘liking’ (as opposed to ‘approval’)
may make his conclusion seem much more obvious or trivial than it is because the meanings
of these words are so closely connected in their ordinary usage. Rather than using ‘liking’ and
‘approval,’ as the names for the two fundamental genera of emotions, I think it is useful and
clearer to say that emotions having persons (or substances) as their objects (P-type objects) are
‘genus-P emotions’ and emotions having qualities as their objects (Q-type objects) are
‘genus-Q emotions.’ So, using this more neutral terminology, the question that McTaggart
must answer is whether or not the emotion that we call ‘love’ is a genus-P emotion or a genus-Q
emotion. If we do this it should be clear that McTaggart’s conclusion is not trivial and his
distinctions and lines of reasoning should be easier to follow.
McTaggart’s method for differentiating and classifying emotions is based on two
fundamental assumptions. First, it is clear that he assumes that an emotion cannot have
more than one object. Second, it is also clear that the fundamental and ultimate distinction
between emotions is the type of object towards which they are directed. Any other unique
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features (such as causes or pro/con qualities) can only be used to create species within the
fundamental object-based genera. If one rejects either of these assumptions, then they are
not merely rejecting this argument, but rather McTaggart’s whole system.
The second assumption is important to keep in mind. In one of C. D. Broad’s
criticisms of McTaggart’s theory of emotion (and theory of love) he states that he cannot see
why the same emotion cannot start by being directed towards a person’s qualities and then
shift towards the person “as a whole” (or vice versa).71 He provides two examples to explain
his point. In the first, he sees a snake, and without any more thought fears it. He does not
judge that ‘this snake is poisonous’ or ‘this snake is angry’ and then feel fear towards the
qualities of ‘being poisonous’ or ‘being hostile.’ Broad concludes that we must feel fear for
the snake “as a whole” (prior to any reflection, analysis, or judgment). Afterwards, however,
he might reflect on the experience and make these judgements and then feel fear towards
these qualities instead of unsophisticated immediate awareness of a ‘snake as a whole.’ In the
second example, Broad suggests that I might come to admire a person because of certain
qualities, but then as I get to know her my admiration is directed towards that person as a
whole without thinking of the qualities at all. In both cases, Broad wants to suggest that
emotions can be distinguished and classified based primarily on each emotion’s unique
phenomenological quality. Under Broad’s assumptions, a person can have two emotional
experiences having the same phenomenological quality, but each can be directed at a
different kind of object (either qualities or persons). The difficulty with this approach, as
mentioned earlier, is that the phenomenological quality is very difficult to describe in a
determinate way. This means that any disputes between people about classification or
differentiation will be difficult to resolve. Also, the qualitative characteristic of some
emotions can be very similar, and where these emotions are intense it can be difficult to
distinguish them, even from the first-person perspective where one has access to the
phenomenological quality of the emotions. If there is no necessary (or at least highly reliable)
connection between certain emotions and certain kinds of causes or objects and, so, if one
cannot appeal to other aspects of the emotion – i.e., causes or objects – in order to
distinguish and classify such emotions, it is very difficult to conceive of what other options
might be available.
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Broad’s interpretation of the emotions involved in his two examples does not
provide a decisive objection to McTaggart; they merely provide an alternative method of
classification. They are not decisive against his view because McTaggart can explain the same
experiences, only differently. He might state that when we first see the snake the
phenomenological quality of the emotion itself (fear) is more clear and distinct then our
knowledge of the object of that emotion. That we can be certain that we are experiencing a
certain kind of emotion but still be in doubt as to whether its object is a person’s qualities or
the person as a whole is assumed from the start. This is why we must determine what the
object of love is: it is not immediately clear. When I am afraid of the snake, I am aware in a
vague way that the object is the snake, but what needs to be determined is whether it is
directed towards the snake (as a whole) or towards its qualities. According to McTaggart, it is
not that fear is directed to the snake as a whole at the start and then to its qualities; rather,
fear is always directed towards the snake’s qualities, but this is only clarified upon reflection.
If Broad insisted that he felt a strong negative emotion towards the snake as a whole, then
McTaggart could just insist that we would have to call such an emotion ‘hate,’ and not ‘fear.’
McTaggart could then say that what is happening is that a person is alternating between two
kinds of con-emotion each with its own object (hate for the snake as a whole and fear of its
qualities) and not that there is just one emotion with alternating objects.
I think that the same explanation could be employed in Broad’s second example.
McTaggart holds that I always admire a person in respect of her qualities. I might lose
awareness of this fact as I become familiar with the person such that I no longer call to mind
the qualities even though the emotion persists. But McTaggart would point out that if I
became aware that the qualities that I admire are no longer possessed by the person (or
never really were) the emotion would/should end.72 If Broad insists that once I know the
person I have an emotion directed to her independent of those qualities, then McTaggart
would just say that the emotion described is love, and not admiration. Perhaps I only started
having admiration for her, but then love for her also developed. I might alternate focus
between these two simultaneous emotions; however, in order to distinguish the proemotions I have for her McTaggart would say I would have to isolate what exactly the object
is (P-type or Q-type) in each case.

72

McTaggart, NE2, §468.

56
I mention this because it seems that in this objection Broad is not really taking issue
with McTaggart’s understanding of the phenomenon of emotions (though perhaps in
general he does); rather, he is ultimately rejecting McTaggart’s assumption that emotions are
fundamentally differentiated and classified according to each emotion’s unique object. This
might be a fair criticism of McTaggart’s classification of emotions as a whole, but it cannot
be an objection to his attempt to explain love according to it. Since McTaggart’s approach to
differentiation and classification is plausible, and since it does offer a way to bypass the
problem of the privacy of ‘qualia’ by appealing to aspects of the emotion that are more
‘public’ (i.e., the causes and objects accompanying each phenomenologically unique emotion)
it is reasonable to accept McTaggart’s method and focus on the argument that he develops
based on it.

2.2.2

McTaggart’s Argument for Why We have Reason to Believe that Object of
Love is a Person and Not a Person’s Qualities

McTaggart argues that the object of love must be a person and not just a person’s qualities
by showing that particular cases of love can only be explained if we assume that their object
is a person and not some quality of a person. In order to do this, he must assume that there
is a conceptual link between the type of emotion (of which a particular emotion is an
instance or token) and its type of object (of which the object of a particular emotion is a
token). If there were not some kind of conceptual link between the types in question, then
McTaggart would not be able to infer from these examples that it is necessarily the case that
the object of love is never a quality but always a person; rather, at most the argument could
be inductive. Since McTaggart is clearly making a universal and necessary claim about the
kind of object that love is directed towards, McTaggart must be assuming this kind of
conceptual link. I want to suggest that the conceptual link is a kind of definitional (or biconditional) link.
This conceptual link holds that an emotion is a P-type emotion if and only if the object of that
emotion is a P-type object, and an emotion is a Q-type emotion if and only if the object of that emotion is a
Q-type object. The division of objects into two types is an exhaustive and mutually exclusive
disjunction and so McTaggart is also proposing that the object of any emotion must be either a Ptype object or a Q-type object, but not both. McTaggart must also assume the following principle to
carry out his categorization: If two particular emotions each have a different kind of object, they will be
different kinds of emotions (they will belong to different genera). Emotions of the same kind (genus), therefore,
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cannot have different kinds of objects. This does not mean that all emotions having the same object
are really just one kind of emotion. There might be other factors – such as the causes of
emotions or the kind of orientation (pro- or con-) it has towards its object – that might allow
for genera of emotions to be further sub-divided into species of emotions.
The important implication of this conceptual link is that if one determines that an
instance of any species of emotion must have a particular kind of object, then one can infer
that all other instances that belong to that species will have the same kind of object. If
McTaggart can show that, in some particular instances, love cannot be directed towards a Qtype object, and must therefore be directed to P-type objects, then he can conclude that
every particular instance of the emotional species of love will have a P-type object and
belongs to the P-type genus of emotions. McTaggart argues that some instances of love
cannot have Q-type objects by appealing to intuitions about the inappropriateness of
‘condemning’ love in three situations where we would ‘condemn’ other kinds of emotion.
Each case presents a characteristic of love that could only be maintained if the object of love
were a person, and not merely a person’s qualities.
The general structure of argument is as follows:
Key:
“type-P object”: an object that is a person (or substance)
“type-Q object”: an object that is a quality (attributable to a person or substance)
“genus-P emotion”: an emotion having a person (or substance) as its object
“genus-Q emotion”: an emotion having a quality (attributable to a person) as its object
“species-L” emotion: the species of ‘loving emotion’
“l”: a particular instance (or token) of L (the species of ‘loving emotion’)
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Argument:
P1: The object of an emotion x is either a P-type object or a Q-type object (but not both).
[Assumption of Emotional Classification]
P2: All instances of an emotion x belonging to the same species of emotion X have the same
kind of object. [Assumption of Emotional Classification]
P3: An emotion x, or species of emotion X, belongs to genus-P if and only if it has a P-type
object, and an emotion x, or species of emotion X, belongs to genus-Q if and only if it
has a Q-type object. [Assumption of Emotional Classification]
P4: Every emotion x, or species of emotion X, belongs to either genus-P or genus-Q (but
not both). [P1-P3]
P5: For each instance of l (belonging to the species L): if l has a Q-type object, then
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R. [General intuitions about norms for
‘approval’ and ‘condemnation’]
P6: There is an instance of l (belonging to the species L) where it is not the case that
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R. [Particular intuitions about applying
norms for ‘approval’ and ‘condemnation’]
C1: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is not a Q-type object. [P5-P6]
C2: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is a P-type object. [P1+C1]
C3: Therefore, a P-type object is the object of every instance of a species L emotion and a
Q-type object is not the object of any instance of a species L emotion. [P1-P2 +C2]
C4: Therefore, L is a genus-P emotion and not a genus-Q emotion. [P1-C3]
Explanation of Premises:
P1 – P3: Assumptions of Classification: McTaggart assumes that emotions
can have only one kind of object (and still be the same emotion). Emotions
are divided into genera according to the type of object they are directed at (Ptype or Q-type). Genera of emotion can be sub-divided into species, but the
members of each species will be either P-objects or Q-objects, but not both.
On McTaggart’s classification-system species cannot include members in two
different genera.
P4: The division of objects into P-type and Q-type is exhaustive and
mutually exclusive; therefore, any emotion must therefore be directed
towards either a P-type object or a Q-type object (but not both) and so any
emotion or species of emotion will either be a P-genus emotion or a Q-genus
emotion.
P5, P6, C1, C2: Certain intuitions about the (non-)condemnation of love
cannot be explained if the object of love in those cases is a Q-type emotion.
In each case (described below) if the object was a Q-type object, then the
emotion ought to be condemned; but in these cases there are strong
common-sense intuitions that these cases of love should not be condemned.
Therefore, in these cases the object of love is not a Q-type emotion and so
must be a P-type emotion).
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C4: Since all members of a genus (and so all members of a species) must
have the same kind of object, and the objects of these particular cases of love
cannot be a Q-type object, the object of all instances of love must be a Ptype object and so love is always a P-type emotion. In other words, the object
of love is always a person and never a person’s qualities.

2.2.2.1 The “Three Characteristics of Love” Supporting McTaggart’s Thesis
In order to establish P5, P6, and C1 of the overall argument, McTaggart considers three
cases. Each example contrasts love with typical genus-Q emotions (such as admiration)
where the (represented) quality that causes the emotion is also the object of that emotion.73
Next, each case appeals to intuitions about whether certain emotions ought to be
condemned (or approved) for various reasons. The first case involves the evaluation of an
emotion according to whether or not its object is proportionate to that emotional response;
rephrased, it evaluates an instance of a kind of emotion according to whether or not that
kind of emotion is an appropriate response to the object towards which it is directed. The
third case involves evaluations of emotions according to whether or not the emotion’s
represented object actually exists. The second case considers cases where it is not possible to
determine whether or not the object of the emotion is appropriate nor whether it exists and
how emotions are evaluated under these conditions of ignorance. Each of these grounds for
evaluation provides a particular form of condemnation for each instance of l (belonging to
the species L): if l has a Q-type object, then l ought to be condemned for the following
reasons: i) because of an inappropriate object-emotion combination (disproportionate), ii)
because the object does not exist, or iii) because it is unknown whether the object is
appropriate or if it exists. All three reasons could be summed up by the following test: ‘If the
relation between the emotion and x is inappropriate, then x ought to be condemned.’ For the first reason,
the failure is direct: the object is inappropriate and so ought to be condemned. We condemn
an emotion for the second reason because since there is no object, there cannot an
appropriate object.74 The condemnation of an emotion for the third reason assumes that to

As noted earlier, the immediate cause of any emotion will be some belief in the person experiencing the
emotion. In the case of Q-type objects, the belief is always that some quality is possessed by someone (Qp). So
the quality that causes an emotion is always the ‘represented quality.’ The actual possession of that quality
causes grounds for approval or condemnation, but it is not the cause of the emotion itself. So while McTaggart
speaks of the qualities as ‘determining’ or ‘causing’ emotions, it is clear that he is considering the qualities as
objects of emotions in these instances.
74 The lack of an object, in itself, may not be sufficient for condemning the emotion. If, for instance, certain
emotions are properly directed towards non-existent objects (such as grief, hope, or anxiety, for instance) then
73
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approve an emotion one must establish that the object is appropriate. If one cannot establish
appropriateness, then one ought not approve it and so love ought to be condemned.75
Finally, each case then identifies a ‘characteristic’ of love. Each ‘characteristic’
represents a kind of independence from the qualities that cause love, an independence which
we intuitively think makes love immune to condemnation on account of qualities in a way
the Q-type emotions are not. In each case, such intuitions prove P6 that can be described as
the ‘hinge’ allowing McTaggart to arrive at his ultimate conclusions. Therefore, in order to
fully understand the argument as whole, it is important to look at each case in detail.

2.2.2.1.1 Case 1: “love is not necessarily proportional to the dignity and adequacy of
the qualities that determine it.”76
In the first case McTaggart observes that genus-Q emotions arise because we believe that
someone has a certain quality. The object of these emotions is this quality (or the person
only insofar as they possess this quality). He then proposes that we condemn or approve
such emotions depending on whether or not there is a certain kind of proportionality
between the quality at issue and that emotion. If the necessary kind of proportionality is
lacking, then we condemn the emotion as inappropriate. One example of a typical Q-type
emotion that he considers is ‘admiring’ someone (as a hero) because I believe they are highly
skilled at playing soccer. He suggests that if my belief about someone’s soccer skills causes
an emotion like admiration (of those soccer skills), this emotion would be condemned
because the quality at issue “is trivial and inadequate.”77 While the extreme development of
physical skills (and the discipline involved to attain such excellence) is worthy of some
admiration, McTaggart’s intuition about the problem with admiring the skills of a soccer
player is especially salient when we consider a case where I passionately admire (as heroic)
one woman’s ability to kick a penalty shot as much (or more than) the courage of another
woman who saved 30 children from being kidnapped by notoriously brutal extremists. It
seems correct to say that the quality that I admire in the soccer player does not justify such

a non-existent object would be an appropriate object. The second reason therefore presumes the
inappropriateness established in the first.
75 McTaggart does not appear to entertain the possibility of taking a neutral attitude towards the emotion in
terms of approval or condemnation (i.e. remaining agnostic about whether it should exist or not). However,
since such an attitude would not tell us anything about the object, and determining the object is the goal, it may
be understandable that he excluded this option here.
76 McTaggart, NE2, §466.
77 McTaggart, NE2, §466.
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intense admiration, whereas the courage of the woman who saves the children does;
therefore, the admiration of the soccer skills (as heroic) is condemned insofar as the object
of admiration is inappropriate or disproportionate. The same will be true for any Q-type
emotion: if the quality that is the object of the emotion is not appropriate for the emotion,
then the emotion ought to be condemned.
If love is assumed to be a Q-type emotion, then love should arise from my belief that
the beloved has some quality and this quality should be the object of my love. McTaggart
notes that it sometimes happens that love arises because we notice a very trivial quality in
someone else, perhaps something as trivial as his or her eye colour.78 Presumably, given his
account of the causes of love, my noticing this quality results in an awareness of a deep
intimate union existing between myself and another and so I experience love. If love is a Qtype emotion, however, then a trivial quality – such as eye colour – would be the object of
love and this type of object would seem to be disproportionate to “the value of the
emotion,”79 and so we should condemn love if this is the case. McTaggart claims, however,
that we do not think that love should be condemned in these cases. Instead, he suggests, we
think that what actually happens in such cases is that we are “determined to a very great
thing by a very small cause,” and that “[i]f what is caused is really love – and this is
sometimes the case – it is not condemned on that ground.”80 This characteristic of love
(“that love is not necessarily proportional to the dignity or adequacy of the qualities that
determine it”81), he thinks,
would seem to indicate that the emotion is directed to the person,
independently of his qualities, and that the determining qualities are no the
justification of that quality but only the means by which it arises.82
As McTaggart noted earlier, if the object of an emotion is inappropriate/disproportionate
for that type of emotion, then that emotion ought to be condemned. He observes that the
qualities that give rise to love are often trivial and so if they were objects of love they would
surely be judged to be disproportionate or inappropriate objects of that emotion. But,
McTaggart claims, when it comes to love that arises from trivial qualities we judge that it is

McTaggart, NE2, §466.
McTaggart, NE2, §466.
80 McTaggart, NE2, §466.
81 McTaggart, NE2, §466.
82 McTaggart, NE2, §466.
78
79
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not the case the love ought to be condemned in such cases. So, by modus tollens, the object of
love is not inappropriate/disproportionate to the emotion. And so McTaggart concludes
that qualities are not the object of love in this instance, but only its causes and so such an
instance of love would not be a Q-type emotion (C1). That love has an object cannot be
doubted (love has intentionality on his theory). The object of love, in these cases, must be
something appropriate, and since it cannot be the qualities that caused love, McTaggart
suggests that it must be the person.
Before moving on to the second case, it is important to note that in this example
McTaggart also provides a hint as to why we approve of love, even in cases where its cause is
clearly trivial. He states that love is a “very great thing” and because it is so great “[i]f the
love does arise, it justifies itself, regardless of what causes produce it.”83 He ends the example
by stating that if qualities are merely the cause of love and not its object then:
it is natural that their value should sometimes bear no greater relation to the
value of the emotion than the intrinsic value of the key of a safe bears to the
value of the gold to which it gives us access.84
These quotes, especially the last one, indicate that love ought to be approved because as a
loving state of consciousness it is highly intrinsically valuable: it is a kind of conscious state
that we ought to desire for its own sake.

2.2.2.1.2 Case 2: Love is not condemned even “in those cases in which we are
unable to find any quality in the object of love which determines love to
arise.”
In the second example, McTaggart observes that for a Q-type emotion, if we were unable to
determine what quality caused the emotion, then we would have to condemn the emotion
because there is no way to determine if the quality is “adequate.”85 For instance, if I admired
someone, but I could not trace my emotion back to any beliefs that I have about the person
I admire (i.e., I cannot explain my admiration in terms of any of the qualities that I believe
that person to have), then my admiration would be condemnable. This seems to follow from
the first case: Q-type emotions should be approved only if their object (the quality I believe
them to have) is appropriate. Since I cannot determine if the object is appropriate, I cannot
approve of love and so must condemn it.
McTaggart, NE2, §466.
McTaggart, NE2, §466.
85 McTaggart, NE2, §467.
83
84
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When it comes to love, however, McTaggart claims that it does not matter if I
cannot explain why it is that I love one person (and even if I cannot explain why I do not
love others instead of the one that I do love). Why? He does not say, but presumably this is
because “[n]o cause can be inadequate, if it produces such a result.”86 What kind of result?
Presumably, as the first case indicates, a highly valuable emotion such as love. The example
seems to be designed to show that the intrinsic value of love is not dependent on any quality
in the person loved; presumably, for other Q-type emotions, their value (and so their
approval/condemnation) will be dependent on the appropriateness of the quality that is its
object. McTaggart concludes that this characteristic of love further supports the claim that
while qualities can cause love, they cannot be the object of love (instead it must be the
person that is the proper object of love).

2.2.2.1.3 Case 3: “If love has once arisen, there is no reason why it ought to cease,
because the belief has ceased which was its cause. And this is true,
however important the quality believed in may be.”
The third case is based upon considerations about what happens when we discover that the
(represented) object of our emotion no longer exists, or never actually existed at all (i.e., our
belief was false). In the case of Q-type emotions, my belief that p has some quality Q that
causes me to have a certain Q-type emotional attitude towards Q. If, however, we discover
that p does not have Q, or never actually had Q at all, then “such a discovery would at once
condemn the emotion, and in many cases, though not in all, would soon destroy it.”87 So for
Q-type emotions, once it is established that the ‘belief that p has Q’ is false – that the quality
towards which the emotion is directed does not actually currently exist – then that emotion
ought to be condemned. So, if I admire someone because I think they are wise, but it turns
out they are a merely clever, then my admiration for that person on this basis ought not
exist. If I continue admiring the person for their wisdom, in spite of the new information
and in spite of my revised beliefs, then my continued admiration ought to be condemned.
Once again, however, McTaggart claims that this is not the case with love. He states:
But with love it is different. If love has once arisen, there is no reason why it
ought to cease, because the belief has ceased which was its cause. And this is
86
87
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true, however important the quality believed in may be. If a man whom I
have come to love because I believed him virtuous or brave proves to be
vicious or cowardly, this may make me miserable. It may make me judge him
to be evil. But that I should be miserable, or that he should be evil, is
irrelevant to my love. It often happens, of course, that such a strain is too
hard for love, and destroys it. But while such a result would be accepted as
the only reasonable course with any other emotion, it is felt here as a failure.
Admiration, hope, trust, ought to yield. But love, if it were strong enough,
could have resisted, and ought to have resisted.88
Our intuition, McTaggart asserts, is that love ought to persist even if the qualities that
originally caused us to love the person turn out to be false (either because the person has
now lost those qualities or because I was mistaken to think they ever had them). McTaggart
must have in mind the intuition that is at the core of many literary explorations of love, an
intuition that I think is aptly captured in Shakespeare’s 116th sonnet:
… love is not love/ Which alters when it alteration finds/ Or bends with the
remover to remove./ O no, it is an ever-fixèd mark/ That looks on tempests
and is never shaken;/ It is the star to every wand'ring bark/ Whose worth's
unknown, although his height be taken.89
McTaggart’s assertion is somewhat radical. He is not claiming that love ought to persist
through trivial or minor changes, but that it ought, ideally, to persist even through major
changes in the qualities of the person one loves; the claim is that love for the beloved ought
to persist independently of all qualitative changes in the beloved. An implication of the third
characteristic of love is that love is not condemned on any consideration of qualities. Some
may, understandably, consider this intuition too controversial. However, McTaggart does
concede that under existing non-ideal circumstances the discovery that someone lacks
certain important qualities that I believed them to have may introduce enough psychological
interference to cause love to end and this concession may make his claim more plausible.
Most of us recognize that it is best to remove ourselves from situations and relationships
with people who turned out to be more abusive or vicious than we originally believed.
Nonetheless, removing oneself from a situation and altering the terms of one’s relationship
does not mean that all love for that person must cease: we can acknowledge that we love
someone (at least in some way), but also recognize that the best thing for both parties is to

McTaggart, NE2, §468.
“Sonnet 116,” http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poems/shakespeares-sonnets-let-me-notmarriage-true-minds
88

89Shakespeare,
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end any shared activities. Yet if love does end, many of us would admit that it is always at
least somewhat regrettable that a loving relationship had to end: things would have been
better if there had been a way to salvage the relationship (even though it turned out that it
was impossible, practically, to save it).
Once again, this case gives us a hint as to why love is approved, and not merely an
assertion that it (intuitively) ought not to be condemned. Given McTaggart’s previous claims
about love’s intrinsic value, it makes sense to think that an instance of love ought (at least
prima facie) to exist because by existing it adds value to the universe and so makes that
universe better than it would be without it. Under certain conditions, we might think that
love for a person who has a certain quality would make love instrumentally evil: love for that
particular person will result in more suffering and harm overall than the goodness
contributed by its own intrinsic value. For instance, perhaps I love someone who is only ever
extremely cruel to those he thinks love him (perhaps because he thinks that such people will
not be immediately alienated by his cruelty in the way strangers or mere acquaintances would
be). Loving this person will result in the beloved committing serious acts of cruelty, result in
intense suffering for the lover, and likely result in suffering for many others as well. Clearly,
there is a reason to end love in such a case, but this does not affect the fact that love is
intrinsically good. There is nothing about love itself that causes this tragic situation; instead it
is a particular characteristic of the beloved (that they are intensely cruel to those who love
them) that introduces the evil results. In an ideal situation, it would be best to remove this
characteristic in the beloved so that an instance of intrinsically good love could exist;
however, if such a situation is not plausible or would require sacrifices from the lover,
beloved, and others that would outweigh the value of that particular instance of love, then
regrettably, there would be reason to remove an intrinsic good from the world in order to
reduce certain evils. The total amount of good in the world would be decreased by the
removal of this good, but since evil having a greater disvalue than love is also removed, the
overall balance of value in the world is better than it would have been with this instance of
love in it. Clearly, removing goods in order to decrease greater evil is required in some cases,
but removing intrinsic goods is not an ideal way to make the world better. If evils can be
removed and goods preserved, this option, it seems, is prima facie preferable. Understanding
that love is approved because it is intrinsically valuable helps make sense of McTaggart’s
claims in this case and may help make his claim that love ought to persist all qualitative
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changes at least somewhat more plausible. McTaggart concludes the third case by claiming
that this feature of love also confirms that the object of love is a person and not a person’s
qualities. Love is not condemned as a Q-type emotion would be and so it must be (by
process of elimination) a P-type emotion.
All three cases and the role each plays in establishing P5-C1 in the general argument can be
schematized as follows:
Table 1: Schematization of the Arguments Related to the Three Characteristic of Love
Schema

Characteristic 1

Characteristic 2

Characteristic 3

P5: if l

has a
Q-type
object, then l
ought to be
condemned
for reason(s)
R.

P5a: If l is has a Q-type
object, then being caused by
a quality that is
disproportionate to it is a
sufficient reason to condemn
that instance of the emotion.
(Since the cause and object
are the same for Q-type
emotions, the object would
be inappropriate for that
emotion.)

P5b: If l has a Q-type object,
then being unable to identify
the quality that causes the
emotion is a sufficient reason
to condemn that instance of
the emotion.
(Since the cause and object
are the same for Q-type
emotions, one must
determine if the quality that
caused the emotion would be
an appropriate object of the
emotion.)

P5c: If l has a Q-type object,
then the discovery that a
belief in the existence of a
certain quality that caused the
emotion is false is a sufficient
reason to condemn that
instance of the emotion.
(Since the cause and object
are the same for a Q-type
emotion if a belief 'that a
quality exists' caused the
emotion turns out to be false,
then there is actually no
appropriate object of the
emotion.)

P6: it is not the
case that l
ought to be
condemned for
reason R
(or: ‘R is not a
sufficient
reason to
condemn x.’)
(Intuition)

P6a: Being caused by a
quality that is
disproportionate to love is a
not sufficient reason to
condemn that instance of the
emotion.
(Instead, this means only that
a highly valuable intrinsic
good was caused by
something less valuable than
it.)

P6b: Being unable to identify
the quality that causes love is
not a sufficient reason to
condemn that instance of the
emotion.
(The mere existence of an
intrinsic good such as love
provides grounds for
approving it, regardless of
what caused it.)

P6c: The discovery that the
belief in the existence of a
certain quality (which caused
love) is false is not a
sufficient reason to condemn
that instance of the emotion.
(For any instance of love,
once it exists it ought to exist
regardless of the truth-value
of my beliefs about the
beloved's qualities and
regardless of the actual
qualities of the beloved.)

C1: Therefore, love is not a
genus-Q emotion.

C1: Therefore, love is not a
genus-Q emotion.

C1: Therefore, l C1: Therefore, love is not a
is not a genus- genus-Q emotion.
Q emotion.
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As indicated earlier, P5, P6, and C1 ultimately lead to an argument by elimination concluding
that the object of love is a person and not the qualities of a person.

2.2.2.2 What Does this Argument Tell Us about the Kind of Intrinsic Value
Possessed by Love?
Each of the cases in Chapter XLI of The Nature of Existence represents love as a highly
important intrinsic good. McTaggart directly (and repeatedly) confirms this claim throughout
the final Chapters (LXIV-LXVIII) which are dedicated to value theory. But what kind of
intrinsic value does love have? Dennis McKerlie proposes two options: love can be a firstorder (or basic) intrinsic good or it can be a higher-order intrinsic good.90 His concept of a
higher order intrinsic good is similar to the one proposed by Thomas Hurka as a way to
understand the kind of intrinsic value that is often assigned to virtue. It is worth briefly
outlining Hurka’s view in order to clarify the two options McKerlie proposes.
In his book Virtue, Vice, and Value, Hurka outlines a concept of “higher-order”
intrinsic goods.91 The concept is meant to preserve the idea that certain goods are ‘noninstrumentally’ valuable (i.e., their value is not [completely] conditional upon the value of its
results), but moves away from the idea that the non-instrumental value of such goods must
also be independent of its relationships to other (valuable) objects in the world (i.e., intrinsic
value must depend solely on non-relational or ‘intrinsic’ characteristics).92 While this is true
of some kinds of intrinsic goods (what he calls ‘basic’ or ‘first-order’ goods), it is not true of
all of them. The non-instrumental value of some intrinsic goods (what he calls ‘higher-order’
goods) is a function of the relation of that higher-order good to some other intrinsic good
(either another ‘higher-order’ good or, ultimately, to some ‘basic-good’) and so Hurka
describes such higher-order goods as intrinsic goods. Due to their structure of intentionality,
conscious states are prime candidates for higher-order intrinsic goods; such conscious states
are related to (directed towards) objects of consciousness, and it seems (intuitively) the value
of some conscious states is a function of the value of the attitude’s object and the kind of

Dennis McKerlie. “McTaggart on Love,” Underivative Duty. p. 70
Dennis McKerlie. “McTaggart on Love,” Underivative Duty. p. 70; see also, Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and
Value. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 11-19.
92 Hurka, VVV, p. 6, 13. The restriction of ‘intrinsic value’ solely to considerations of ‘intrinsic characteristics’
seems to illegitimately ignore a distinction between teleological relations (an cause to its effects) with all other
kinds of relations and Hurka’s theory offers a way to avoid this error.
90
91
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attitude that is taken up towards the object (either a ‘pro-’ or a ‘con-’ attitude).93 For
example, Hurka argues that virtues (conative attitudes) are best explained as taking a
“positive orientation” towards a basic good (in itself)94 or taking a “negative orientation”
towards a basic evil (in itself). Vices are taking a positive orientation towards a basic evil (in
itself) or a negative orientation towards a basic good (in itself). The value of the higher-order
conative attitude is therefore a function of the intrinsic value of its object (some basic
intrinsic good) and its pro- or con-orientation to the basic good. This function will identify a
particular conative state as proportionate and appropriate (virtuous) or disproportionate or
inappropriate (vicious). Considered apart from any basic goods, the value of a positive or
negative orientation could not be determined. If Sarah had a pro-orientation towards x we
could meaningfully condemn her attitude as ‘vicious’ (higher-order evil) by showing that x is
a basic intrinsic evil. Sarah could defend herself, however, by convincing us that x is a basic
intrinsic good. Even if we accept that x is a basic intrinsic good, we might be able to criticize
her pro-orientation towards it by stating that the pro-orientation is too strong. If x is a polite
gesture performed by Sarah, and the pro-orientation is expressed in pride, we could criticize
Sarah for taking too much pride in being polite (perhaps she views her politeness to be as
intrinsically valuable as heroism). These examples show how on such an account of value the
intrinsic value of certain attitudes depends on the value of its object.
As McKerlie notes, McTaggart describes ‘virtue’ as a higher-order good in exactly
this fashion.95 McTaggart, in accordance with others such as G. E. Moore and Hastings
Rashdall, defines the ‘ideally’ virtuous person as one who always has virtuous desires and
whose “volitions must be directed towards what is good, or at least, to what appears to him
to be good.”96 Virtuous desires are always pro-conations directed towards goods.
Furthermore, McTaggart clearly states that the intrinsic value of the desire depends on the
value of the object of the desire: “If J [a “volition”] is to be virtuous, then K [the object of
the volition] must be good.”97 So there is good textual evidence to support the claim that
McTaggart had a conception of higher-order intrinsic goods (even if he did not explicitly
Hurka, VVV, p. 11-23.
Instead of pro-attitude, Hurka uses the term ‘love.’ Since the meaning of ‘love’ has a much broader meaning
for Hurka in his book than what McTaggart assigns to it, I have substituted ‘pro-attitude’ to avoid any
unnecessary confusion.
95 McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love," p. 70n11.
96 McTaggart, NE2, §828 (also §815, §§827-829).
97 McTaggart, NE2, §829.
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describe them in the same terms used by Hurka). Is there reason to think that McTaggart
assigned this kind of higher-order intrinsic value to conscious states of emotion (such as
love) in addition to assigning it to conscious states of volition?
McKerlie thinks that there is not; instead, he thinks McTaggart conceives of love as a
“first-order” good.98 Some of McTaggart’s language could be interpreted in this way. For
instance, as we saw, McTaggart makes claims like the following:
If the love does arise, it justifies itself, regardless of what causes produce it.
But if what is caused is really love – and this is sometimes the case – it is not
condemned on that ground [disproportionality of the quality to love]. It is
there, and that is enough.99
He also compares the relation between the value of the causes of love (qualities) to the
intrinsic value of love to the relation between the value of the key to a safe and the value of
the gold within it. It seems that the value of the gold, at least in this example, is completely
independent of its relation to what causes my possession of it (the key) and so love is the
same. One might interpret these passages to mean that love’s intrinsic value is solely
dependent on non-relational qualities.
However, close examination of these quotes shows that McTaggart is merely
claiming that the value of love is independent of any causal relations to other conscious-states
(e.g., beliefs) or to other objects; he does not explicitly deny that the value of emotional
states is a function of the intentional relation to its object as is the case with the value of
conative states.100 Instead of reading “justifies itself” as meaning that we approve love
independently of any of its relations (of any kind) to anything else, we could read these
statements as claiming that we have a (prima facie) reason to approve love directly because
of its own intrinsic value – a value that is independent of its causal relations, but not
necessarily independent of its intentional relation to its object.
Furthermore, in the later works McTaggart describes emotions as having the exact
same kind of structure of intentionality as volitions do (though they are qualitatively
different). It is not immediately obvious why the structure of intentionality allowing for
higher-order intrinsic goodness in conative states would not allow for the same kind of

McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” p. 70.
McTaggart, NE2, §466.
100 Hurka distinguishes between ‘causal’ and ‘intentional’ relations and states that the value of desires (on
Hasting Rashdall’s theory) is independent of the former but a function of the latter. (VVV, p.11.)
98
99
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goodness for emotional states. Also, Moore (a student and colleague of McTaggart) thinks
that both conations and emotions (including the ‘personal affection’ or ‘love’) have higherorder intrinsic goodness.101 Love, on Moore’s view, has intrinsic value (and great intrinsic
value) because it is directed towards a conscious being in respect of “admirable mental
qualities” (which include the other’s appreciation of beauty and the other’s appreciation
[love] of other persons) along with the beloved’s beautiful qualities.102 It is not clear why
McTaggart, unlike Moore, would arbitrarily rule out higher-order intrinsic goodness for love
and identify it as a basic first-order good (as McKerlie suggests), even though it is so similar
in structure (through different in quality) from conative states.
Finally, it seems that in his consideration of the three characteristics of love outlined
above, McTaggart assumes that Q-type emotions have higher-order intrinsic value. As noted
earlier, Q-type emotions are evaluated in terms of the appropriateness of the relation
between the emotional attitude and the object. The judgements of ‘condemnation’ or
‘approval’ in each of the cases do not make sense unless one assumes that certain Q-type
emotions are ‘condemned’ because their object (some quality) is inappropriate (either
because the object’s value is ‘disproportionate’ to the emotion or because there is actually no
appropriate object at all). It would be odd if the value of all Q-type emotions was dependent
on its intentional relations to intrinsically valuable Q-type objects, and yet the intrinsic value
of a P-type emotion was completely independent of its intentional relations to its intrinsically
valuable P-type objects. If we pay attention to McTaggart’s arguments and conclusion, he
never claims that considerations about the object of love – the person – do not play any role
in determining the value of love. The negative conclusion of the argument is only that
qualities cannot play the role of the object of love because our intuitions about the value of
love are independent of any considerations about the qualities of a person; nonetheless, his
argument allows (and, as I am arguing, must assume) that our intuitions about the value of
love may be linked to our intuitions about the value of the person (and so the person is the
object of love).
While these considerations provide circumstantial reasons in favour of thinking that
McTaggart assigned higher-order intrinsic goodness to love, there is another strong indirect
Hurka, VVV, p. 25. Thomas Hurka, “Moore’s Moral Philosophy,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP),
Section 4. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica [1903] (Editor:
Thomas Baldwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.) §122.
102 Moore, PE, §122.
101
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reason for attributing this kind of value to love on McTaggart’s view. I want to argue that if
love is assumed to be a basic good for McTaggart, then his whole argument that persons are
the object of love and not the qualities of a person – as outlined above – will not work. I will
make this argument by showing that the argument gets McTaggart the conclusion he needs if
we assume that love has higher-order goodness. If we assume, however, that love is a basic
good, he cannot get the conclusion he sets out to prove. On a charitable interpretation of
McTaggart we would want to assume that he made assumptions of the first kind and not the
second. Even if he did not assume that love is a higher-order good, the following argument
shows that he should have assumed this given his ultimate aim, and so we are justified in
assigning love this kind of value in our interpretation of McTaggart in order to preserve his
overall project.

2.2.2.2.1 Assume that love is a higher-order intrinsic good:
If McTaggart thinks that love, like the Q-type emotions he considers, is a higher-order
intrinsic good, then the intrinsic value of love will be determined by the intrinsic value of its
object (just as Q-type emotions are). This means that there will be a necessary connection
(i.e., a constant function) between the value of an emotion and the value of its object. An
implication of this is that if one were trying to determine what kind of object an emotion has
(if for instance the kind of object an emotion has is under dispute) then one could identify
possible candidates for objects of that emotion and determine if there is any necessary
connection between the value of the assumed object and the value of the emotion. If it
turned out that there were no necessary connection between the intrinsic value of the
emotion and the proposed object (say of proportionality) then that kind of object could be
ruled out. If you had a limited set of options for types of object-candidates then one could
potentially isolate the correct object by a process of elimination. It seems to me that this is
exactly the kind of argument that McTaggart needs in these sections and I believe that it
makes most sense to understand him as employing this type of argument.
If we assume that love is a higher-order good, the argument based on intuitions
about (non-)condemnation (P5-C1 in the argument) could be expanded and reformulated in
the following way:
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[Pα]: An emotion is a higher-order intrinsic good if and only if, x determines the intrinsic
value of an emotion if and only if x is the object of that emotion (The intrinsic value of
love will be determined by its object.) [Assumed Definition: higher-order intrinsic
good.]
[Pβ]: Love (an emotion) is a higher-order intrinsic good. [Assumption]
[Cα]: Therefore, x determines the intrinsic value of love if and only if x is the object of love.
(The value of love is determined by its object.) [Pα + Pβ]
P1: The object of an emotion x is either a P-type object or a Q-type object (but not both).
[Assumption of Emotional Classification]
…
P5: For each instance of l (belonging to the species L): if l has a Q-type object, then
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R (If the relation between the emotion
and the object is inappropriate/disproportionate, then that emotion ought to be
condemned.) [Intuition supported by Cα]
P6: There is an instance of l (belonging to the species L) where it is not the case that
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R. (A disproportion between the value
of the qualities of the person loved and the value of the emotion of love is not
(in fact) grounds for condemning love: the value of the emotion of love is not
determined by Q-type objects.) [Intuition]
C1: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is not a Q-type object. [Cα,
P5-P6]
C2: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is a P-type object. [P1+C1]
C3: Therefore, a P-type object is the object of every instance of a species L emotion and a
Q-type object is not the object of any instance of a species L emotion. [P1-P2 +C2]
C4: Therefore, L is a genus-P emotion and not a genus-Q emotion. [P1-C3]
This reformulation adds a sub-argument represented by Pα, Pβ, and Cα. This
argument establishes the kind of constant (and necessary) relationship that would exist
between a loving state and its object if loving states are assumed to be higher-order intrinsic
goods. This argument would help explain why emotions (such as love) can be condemned
based on the reasons identified in each case: objects are approved or condemned (as
intrinsically good or evil) according to the kind of relationship (appropriate/inappropriate or
proportionate/disproportionate) existing between the emotion and the object. These
premises – especially Pβ – also provide a link between the intuitions about (non)condemnation in P6 and the kind of object that love picks out.
On this interpretation, McTaggart’s argument is a kind of transcendental argument.
It starts from a given phenomenon and then attempts to determine the necessary conditions
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for the possibility of that experience. In this case McTaggart starts from the intuition that (in
each of the cases considered) love ought not to be condemned, even where there is a
disproportion between the qualities that determine love and the emotion of love itself, and
then he reasons towards the kind of object of love that would be necessary to justify such
non-condemnation. To do this however, he needs some kind of necessary link between the
object and the non-condemnation of love. The account of love as having higher-order
intrinsic value provides this connection for McTaggart.
As the reformulated and expanded argument shows, this connection (established
through Pα, Pβ, and Cα) not only allows him to rule out Q-type objects because they lack
the required kind of necessary connection to the value of love, it also allows him to assert
that the object is a P-type object. This is because if love is a higher-order good, then its value
must be determined by some object. Since there are only two kinds of objects, and Q-type
objects are ruled out McTaggart can conclude (validly) that the object of love is therefore
always a P-type object. Assuming that love is a higher-order intrinsic good allows McTaggart
to arrive at the conclusion he is looking for: that the object of love is always a person and
not a person’s qualities.

2.2.2.2.2 Assume that love is a basic first-order good (the intrinsic goodness of love
is independent of any relational properties, including intentional relations)
If we assume (with McKerlie) that McTaggart thinks that love is a basic good, this will mean
that love has an intrinsic value that is completely independent of any relationship it has to
anything else, including its intentional relationship to its (good or bad) object. In other
words, the intrinsic value of love will not be determined by the intrinsic value of the object
of love. There will be no necessary connection between the value of love and the value of
the object of love. If McTaggart really did believe this, it is not clear how the intuitions about
non-condemnation (‘characteristics’ of love) that he identifies can help him establish both
that the object of love is not a Q-type object and that it is a P-type object. If we can judge
that an instance of love is good-in-itself (and so ought to exist) or that it is evil-in-itself (and so
ought not to exist) independently of any relation it has to anything else (i.e., solely by its intrinsic
characteristics), then it is not clear how any consideration about whether we approve of the
object or condemn it tells us anything about the kind of object that is proper to love. The
considerations that McTaggart brings up about the existence/non-existence of the qualities
corresponding to the beliefs we have about the beloved (beliefs that are proximate causes of

74
love) might be relevant to epistemic evaluations about our attitudes (i.e., whether the beliefs
which underlie our attitudes are true or false), but again, it is not clear how this helps us
determine anything about the unique kind of object that can be used to help classify love.
By denying that there is any necessary connection between the value of love and (the
value of) its object, one removes the possibility of using any considerations about whether
love ought to be approved or condemned to establish anything about the kind of object that
is a necessary condition for the possibility of such judgements. The impotency of the
argument, if it is based on the assumption that love is a basic first-order good, is made
clearer if we look at the structure of the argument itself and compare it to the structure of
the argument if love is assumed to have higher-order goodness.
[Pα]: An emotion is a higher-order intrinsic good if and only if, x determines the intrinsic
value of an emotion if and only if x is the object of that emotion (The intrinsic value of
love will be determined by its object.) [Assumed Definition: higher-order intrinsic
good.]
[Pβ’]: Love (unlike all other Q-type emotions) is not a higher-order intrinsic good.
[Assumption]
[Cα’]: Therefore, it is not the case that x determines the value of love if and only if x
is the object of love. (The value of love is not be determined by its object.) [Pα +
Pβ]
P1: The object of an emotion x is either a P-type object or a Q-type object (but not both).
[Assumption of Emotional Classification]
…
P5: For each instance of l (belonging to the species L): if l has a Q-type object, then
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R (If the relation between the emotion
and the object is inappropriate/disproportionate, then that emotion ought to be
condemned.) [Intuition supported by Cα]
P6: There is an instance of l (belonging to the species L) where it is not the case that
l ought to be condemned for reason(s) R. (A disproportion between the value
of the qualities of the person loved and the value of the emotion of love is not
(in fact) grounds for condemning love: the value of the emotion of love is not
determined by Q-type objects.) [Intuition]
C1: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is not a Q-type object. [Cα,
P5-P6]
C1’: The object of this instance of love (l) is either a P-type object or a Q-type

object (but not both).
C2: Therefore, the object of l (belonging to species L) is a P-type object. [P1+C1]
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C3: Therefore, a P-type object is the object of every instance of a species L emotion and a
Q-type object is not the object of any instance of a species L emotion. [P1-P2 +C2]
C4: Therefore, L is a genus-P emotion and not a genus-Q emotion. [P1-C3]
In order to represent this alternative assumption (that love is a first-order intrinsic good)
Pβ’and Cα’ are substituted for the Pβ and Cα for the previous assumption (that love is a
higher-order intrinsic good). Whereas the bi-conditional in the original Cα allowed us to
make a connection between our intuitions about what emotions ought to be condemned (as
intrinsically evil) and the kind of object of such emotions, Cα’ denies this kind of link: the
value of love is independent of its relations with any other kind of object (no matter what
kind). Cα’ conflicts with P5; even if intuitions about the (non-)condemnation of certain
emotions are correct (P6), our (non-)condemnation cannot be for any of the reasons listed,
since these all take into account the appropriateness or existence of things other than the
emotion itself. Our condemnation or approval will be made solely on the basis of the
‘intrinsic qualities’ of the emotion in question (i.e., admiration or love) and not on the basis
of any considerations as to the ‘appropriateness’ or ‘existence’ of the object of such
emotions. This means that P5 cannot be combined with P6 in a modus tollens argument to rule
out Q-type qualities as the object of love (C1). As a result we are also not able to arrive at C2
and C3 of the original argument and this means that we cannot use a process of elimination
to assert that the object of love is P-type. The ultimate conclusion, that the object of love is
always a person and never a person’s qualities (C4) is therefore also ruled out. At most,
McTaggart could arrive at C1’, which is merely a more specific form of P4: the object of love
is either a P-type object or a Q-type object. Since the very question that McTaggart is trying
to answer – Is the object of love a Q-type object or a P-type object? – is left open if we
assume that love is a basic intrinsic good, this is a good reason to reject the claim that
McTaggart thinks love is a first-order intrinsic good. Considerations about the problems
involved with this assumption combined with observed benefits of the alternative
assumption provide us good reason to think that McTaggart assigned (or at least ought to
have assigned) love a higher-order intrinsic goodness since this kind of value is necessary for
him to establish his conclusion from the kind of reasoning that he puts forward in his
considerations of the three characteristics of love in The Nature of Existence.
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There is one last implication of these considerations that is worth mentioning here.
If McTaggart thinks that love is a higher-order good, then this means that McTaggart and
Moore (his student and colleague) are not opposed in the way that is suggested by
McKerlie.103 As mentioned earlier, McKerlie thinks that the main difference between
McTaggart and Moore is that love is a higher-order good for Moore and a basic good for
McTaggart; however, if both agree about the kind of intrinsic value that love has, then the
real point of dispute between them is over the proper objects of love. Moore apparently
thinks that the objects of love are Q-type (the person is loved insofar as they have beautiful
qualities and they have certain kinds of good ‘mental qualities’: mental states appreciating
what is beautiful and appreciating good mental states in others)104 and McTaggart clearly
thinks they are P-type. This makes the difference between them far more interesting (I think)
given criticisms that views like Moore’s cannot handle problems like “the fungibility
problem” of love because it focuses too much on ‘repeatable qualities.’ By focusing on such
qualities he makes the person a mere ‘bearer’ of what ‘really matters’ (the good qualities)105
and so ignores the intrinsic value of the unique individual person that is loved.106 If
McTaggart is correct that while the qualities of a person may cause love, the object of love is
always an individual person, then McTaggart may be able to avoid some fungibility problem
more successfully (though perhaps not completely) than Moore.
Before ending, it is necessary to note one final complication related to McTaggart’s
theory of love. In many places McTaggart refers to love as an intrinsic good. Love is clearly a
pro-orientation. If love is a higher-order good, then it seems possible that love could be
either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad depending on the value of the object. If a person
can be intrinsically bad, then loving that person would be intrinsically bad. McTaggart,
however, never entertains the idea that the person can be intrinsically evil. If love is always
intrinsically good, this can only be because the person qua person is always intrinsically good.
McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” pp. 69-70.
Moore, Principia Ethica, §122.
105 Vlastos, Gregory. “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” in Eros, Agape, and Philia: Readings in the
Philosophy of Love (Ed. Alan Soble, New York: Paragon House, 1989): pp. 96-127.
106 Hurka, “Moore’s Moral Philosophy” SEP. Section 5. McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” pp. 69-70. The
fungibility problem arises when a theory of love implies that the person that I love could be completely
replaced (without any loss) by another person having the identical relevant qualities (perhaps even to a greater
degree). If repeatable qualities are the sole reason that I have for loving another, then an implication is that I
have an equal reason to love every person that has the same relevant qualities as my beloved and more reason
to love those who have a greater quantity or more perfect instantiation of those qualities than my beloved. This
is a widely recognized and discussed problem in contemporary philosophy of love.
103
104
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This claim, however, is hard to accept. While we may accept that it is possible to distinguish
the ‘person substance’ (as a conscious subject) from the qualities assigned to that personsubstance and accept that love is (primarily) directed at the person-substance independent of
these qualities, it is difficult to accept the claim that a person’s qualities do not affect the
overall intrinsic value of ‘the person’ that love picks out. Someone who repeatedly and
purposefully tortures other human beings, for instance, seems to be evil qua person precisely
because they have the qualities we assign to vicious and brutal people.
One might try to defend McTaggart and claim that even such vicious people have
rational capacities, autonomy, and so an inviolable dignity, regardless of what they do, and so
on these grounds are always deserving of love. Such an abstract ‘rational capacity’ seems,
however, to be exactly the kind of abstraction that we saw McTaggart tries to avoid in his
theory of the person. Whatever is loved is an individual and particular person and it is not
clear how an individual particular person’s value cannot be affected by one’s life history and
the qualities that one gains thereby. McTaggart assumes that persons are ultimately more
good than evil. The second volume of The Nature of Existence, as a whole, is a complex
argument that seeks to establish such a metaphysically optimistic view. McTaggart believed
that the ultimate nature of persons is truly revealed in our conceptualization of perfect
reality: whatever persons are like in this perfectly conceived state are what persons will
ultimately become, and for McTaggart they ultimately become more good than bad. Our
present experience, however, is far from perfect. It seems more likely that at least some
persons will be ‘intrinsically evil,’ and thus that loving such beings would be intrinsically evil.
Given that McTaggart’s argument, as we have seen, requires assigning love higher-order
intrinsic value, this seems to be a concession that McTaggart will have to make. Luckily, it
seems that as a matter of fact most people are not normally so bad qua person that they are
‘intrinsically evil.’ For most people, their faults are balanced by a number of good qualities
and the persistence of intrinsically good capacities that could be developed if the person
converted from their vicious ways. So while there might be cases of intrinsically evil love for
intrinsically evil persons, such cases would be rare and do not pose a major threat to many of
McTaggart’s conclusions about love (or, as we shall see, the role that love plays in ethical
theory).
McTaggart, then, might not be able to claim that we never ought to condemn love
when he presents the cases above; at most, he should claim that normally (except for in very
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rare circumstances where the potential object of love is an extremely evil person) our
intuition is that we ought not to condemn love in each of the three circumstances. Yet, it
seems that this is all he needs to claim in order for his arguments to be plausible. It seems
reasonable to assume that in each case the love referred to is not love for a rare instance of
an extremely evil person. Furthermore, this concession would not threaten McTaggart’s
overall goal, which is to show that the object of love is a person and not a person’s qualities.
So long as our intuitions about the higher-order intrinsic value of love track the intrinsic
value of the person loved (the P-type object), then the value of love does not depend on the
qualities of the object in the way that it ought to if love were a Q-type emotion having
higher-order intrinsic value. And, this establishes the kind of relationship that enables
McTaggart to conclude that the object of love is not a quality of a person but, instead, must
be a person. If it turns out that we have strong intuitions that we ought to condemn love for
highly evil persons, this does not threaten McTaggart’s main point so long as what is
grounding the condemnation of love (as intrinsically evil) is the intrinsic value of the object
of love: the person.
The previous sections have provided an outline of McTaggart’s argument for the
claim that while the qualities of a person may be the causes of love, they are never the object
of love. While scholars have recognized the presence of the distinction between the object
and the cause of love in McTaggart, and while they have acknowledged the existence of the
argument based on the ‘three characteristics of love,’ the exact form of the argument and the
assumptions necessary to make it work has been largely unexplored. McTaggart’s argument
shows that he recognized that the motivations (or causes) of love are distinct from its
justification: the reasons that we have for condemning or approving love are based upon its
value (which is a function of the appropriateness of the object to the loving attitude), and
such reasons are independent of the nature of the qualities which bring love about. Deeper
consideration of the structure of the argument and the intuitions that are introduced as
premises in the argument have allowed us to better understand the kind of intrinsic value
that McTaggart must assign to love in order for his argument to succeed. McTaggart, I have
argued, should be interpreted as conceptualizing love as a higher-order intrinsic good (pace
McKerlie). Its value is determined by the intrinsic value of its object: the human person.
Insofar as persons are intrinsically good (which it seems plausible to assume almost all
humans, with rare exceptions, are) then love is intrinsically valuable. Because love is
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intrinsically good we have reason to preserve or promote it (at least unless there are
overriding reasons not to do so).

2.3 Conclusion
Having considered that nature of love and the nature of its value, I will now investigate the
role that McTaggart assigns to love within his consequentialist moral philosophy.
Contemporary philosophers have developed various forms of what I will call the “lovebased objection” to consequentialism (LBO). I will outline this objection in the next chapter.
I will then argue (in Chapters Four and Five) that McTaggart’s philosophy of love, when
combined with specific features of the kind of ethical theory he adopted (Ideal
Utilitarianism) is able to overcome this objection. His observation of the object-cause
distinction, his recognition of the distinction between the motivational and justifying
reasons, and his recognition of the higher-order intrinsic goodness of love will all play a
central role in overcoming this objection.
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3 Love Based Objections to Consequentialism

3.1 Introduction: The Love-Based Objection (LBO) to
Consequentialism (1971 – Present)
Over the last forty years, philosophers have formulated various versions of an objection to
consequentialist ethical theories that is based upon certain assumptions about the value and
importance of loving emotions and the loving relationships grounded upon them.1 Two of
the most well-known and influential versions of this love-based objection (LBO) were
formulated in Michael Stocker’s “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” 2 and
Bernard Williams’ “Persons, Character, and Morality.”3 Peter Railton later defended
consequentialism against core aspects of these objections in his famous article, “Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.”4 In response to Railton, Neera Badhwar
wrote a paper called “Why it is Wrong to Always be Guided by the Best: Consequentialism
and Friendship,” which reemphasized a number of Williams’ and Stocker’s original
objections that she believed Railton’s proposed solution did not address.5 Dean Cocking and
Dustin Oakley built upon all of these criticisms and formulated their own highly influential
criticism of Railton’s view in their essay “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the
Problem of Alienation.”6 In response to Badhwar’s, Cocking’s and Oakley’s criticisms of
Railton’s solution, philosophers such as Elinor Mason, Robert Card, and Matthew Tedesco

Critics usually focus on friendships and romantic relationships; however familial relationships grounded in
love are also clearly valuable in the ways described here and are clearly comparable in terms of importance.
Also, if loving familial relationships (as opposed to mere biological or legal relationships) could be expected to
be reliably impeded or threatened by an ethical theory, there would be reasonable and sufficient grounds for
rejecting such a theory.
2 Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” The Journal of Philosophy 73.14 (August
1976): 453-466.
3 Bernard Williams, “Persons, character, and morality,” Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp. 1-19.
4 Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13.2
(Spring 1984): 134-171.
5 Neera Badhwar, “Why is it Always Wrong to be Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship,”
Ethics 101.3 (April 1991): 483-504.
6 Dean Cocking and Justin Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation,”
Ethics 106.1 (October 1995): 86-111.
1
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have attempted to once again defend various forms of consequentialism from Cocking and
Oakley’s concerns.7
This chapter outlines the main versions of the love-based objection and the various
ways in which consequentialists have tried to meet this objection. I will conclude this section
by noting what structural and substantive features any plausible version of consequentialism
will require in order to overcome these objections.

3.2 Integration: Michael Stocker and the Requirement of Harmonious
Integration of Motives and Reason
One of the earliest and most influential versions of the love-based objection (LBO) was
formulated in Michael Stocker’s “Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” (1976). The
argument in “Schizophrenia,” is very rich and complex. It targets both consequentialist and
deontological forms of ‘modern moral philosophy.’8 The following synopsis does not
provide a comprehensive summary of all of Stocker’s arguments in that work (or other
subsequent works); however, I do believe that the argument that I reconstruct below does
accurately capture his core objection to consequentialism. This is confirmed by statements
Stocker has made in a more recent work where he claimed that “one of the central points of
‘Schizophrenia,’ is that our moral theories are defective as moral theories precisely because
they fail to recognize the moral value and importance of friends and friendship.”9 This
objection identifies an ‘incompatibility’ occurring between the reasons (aims, values, or
justifications)10 at work in morality and love or between the motivations required for
morality and love. The basic assumption is that a single person cannot (psychologically) hold
Elinor Mason, “Can an Indirect Consequentialist be a Real Friend?” Ethics 108.2 (January 1998): 386-393;
Elinor Mason, “Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2.3
(1999): pp. 243-261; Robert Card, “Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique,” Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 85.2 (2004): 149-172; Matthew Tedesco, “Indirect Consequentialism, Sub-optimality, and
Friendship,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 87.4 (2006): 567-577
8 “Modern moral philosophy’ is generally used to identify any ethical system that requires that agent-neutral
moral considerations always overrule agent-relative reasons (if such agent-relative reasons are given any
important recognition at all). Modern moral ethical theories are often described as requiring the agent to take
up the ‘moral point of view’ which gives (lexical) priority to rationality, universalizability, and impartiality over
concerns related to particularities and partiality.
9 Michael Stocker, “Friendship and Duty: Some Difficult Relations,” in Identity, Character, and Morality (Eds. O. J.
Flanagan and A. O. Rorty, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 231.
10 Stocker often lists ‘reasons, aims, values, and justifications’ together and seems to use these terms as
interchangeable at points. Throughout this chapter I will just use the term ‘reasons’ to cover all of these
different terms (though I recognize that they are not all equivalent). Since ‘aims, values, and justifications’ are
all aspects usually included in one’s reasons, it seemed most appropriate to primarily use ‘reasons’ as Stocker
seems to do.
7
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two incompatible motivations or reasons at the same time; furthermore, if a person cannot
somehow integrate one’s motivations and reasons, the result will be alienation from others
or from the self (through an undesirable form of psychological splitting). So, mere
compatibility between motivations and reasons is not enough; she must also have
motivations and reasons that are ‘integrated’ in a way that reflects the unity of the moral
agent – a unity that a functioning and mature moral agent ought to have. In order to
understand how his argument works, it will be necessary to explain what kind of ‘integration’
he thinks is required for love and ethics to be compatible and to explain what kind of
‘reasons’ and ‘motives’ are characteristic of love and of ethics.
Stocker’s objection to consequentialism is based upon an assumption that the
“mark” of a “good life” is “harmony between one’s motives and one’s reasons, values, and
justifications.”11 For Stocker, ‘reasons’ are expressed in the form ‘act for the sake of x.’ Reasons
are grounded in the ultimate aims of our actions (the ultimate/intrinsic values we seek to
attain through action) and/or the normative standards that outline which actions are
permitted/required. Motivations are expressed in the form ‘act out of x/out of concern for x,’
and they involve a ‘sensibility’ to certain features of objects and states of affairs.12 A motive
cannot be explained solely in terms of ‘aims,’ or teleological ‘reasons’; nonetheless, a motive
‘embodies’ a particular reason for acting if it involves having a ‘sensibility’ to the specific
aims, values, and justifications that are centrally involved in the reason.13 It is possible (and
common) that one’s motives do not embody one’s reasons for acting; however, Stocker’s
main point is that if embodiment is seriously lacking within an agent, then that agent is
suffering from some kind of “malady” which he calls “moral schizophrenia.” As moral
agents, our reasons ought to be embodied in our motives: there ought to be a ‘harmony’
between an agent’s motives and reasons. He states:
At the very least, we should be moved by our major values and we should value
what our major motives seek. Should, that is, if we are to lead a good life. To

Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” pp. 453-454. In the remaining summary of Stocker, I will use “reasons” to
represent “reasons, values, and justifications.” Stocker seems to understand these terms and intimately interrelated and he also seems to use ‘reasons’ to refer to all three in the article itself.
12 Stocker, “Friendship and Duty,” 221-222; Stocker, “Values and Purposes,” pp. 753, 757.
13 Stocker, “Schizophrenia, p. 458 (Stocker uses the term “embody” here, and in other places in this specific
sense.); Stocker, “Values and Purposes,” p. 753.
11
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repeat – such harmony is a mark of a good life. Indeed, one might wonder
whether human life – good or bad – is possible without some integration.14
So, ideally, if one has particular reasons for doing x, then those reasons ought to be
embodied in one’s motive to do x; furthermore, if one has a motive to do x, then such a
motive ought to embody one’s particular reasons for doing x. Reasons without
corresponding motivations and motivations without corresponding reasons are an indication
of a problematic form of alienation or division, signs which reliably indicate that one’s life
could be better.
This represents what I will call the “Harmonious Integration Requirement” (HIR):
ideally, one ought to integrate one’s motives and reasons (if one wants to live a ‘good life’).
Stocker appears to use this normative (ideal) standard to formulate what I will call the
“Harmonious Integration Test” (HIT) for assessing the adequacy of an ethical theory: if one
cannot both achieve the ultimate goals of an ethical theory and at the same time achieve an integration of one’s
motivations and reasons, then there is a sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting that ethical theory. He
ultimately concludes that modern ethical theories like consequentialism “fail by making it
impossible for a person to achieve the good in an integrated way.”15 It is this normative
requirement of harmonious integration (represented in HIR and HIT) that when combined
with the basic schema of the love-based objection provides the particular version of the
love-based objection raised against consequentialist theories.
In order to show that the motives and reasons of consequentialism cannot be
harmoniously integrated with the reasons and motives of love, Stocker describes what he
understands to be the essential ‘aims’ or ‘reasons’ and the essential ‘motives’ required for
genuine love and loving relationships.16 Stocker states:
For it is essential to the very concept of love, that one care for the beloved,
that one be prepared to act for the sake of the beloved. More strongly, one
must care for the beloved and act for that person’s sake as a final goal; the beloved,

Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 454. My emphasis.
Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” pp. 455-456.
16 Stocker tends to speak of ‘friendships’ and ‘friends’ but it is clear that he understands friendship to be an
instance of a much broader category of ‘love,’ ‘loving relationship,’ or ‘beloved.’ This is clear in the following
passage: “Just as the notion of doing something for the sake of another, or caring for the person for that
person’s sake is essential to love, so too is it essential for friendships and all affectionate relations.”
“Schizophrenia,” p. 457.
14
15
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or the beloved’s welfare or interest, must be a final goal of one’s concern

and action.17

In genuine love, one values the beloved as an end-in-herself – as intrinsically valuable. Any
aim which would treat the ‘beloved’ merely as a means to some other end (so some end
other than the sake of the beloved) would be directly opposed and therefore incompatible
with love.18 A loving motivation involves acting out of concern for the beloved person (or the
beloved’s welfare or interest) for the sake of that beloved person. One’s concern for the
beloved is direct. Such a motivation embodies the aims/reasons of friendship. Someone
might act merely ‘in accordance’ with love by doing what would be required if one were to
act for the sake of the beloved, but if one lacks the motivation of love – if one lacks a
sensibility to the intrinsic value of the beloved and does not act directly as a result of such a
sensibility – then one’s action will not be a genuinely loving action. If my relationship with
the other merely comprises actions that do not originate from loving motivations, then my
relationship is not a genuinely loving relationship.
Consequentialism claims that an act is right insofar as (out of the options available to
the agent in the situation) that act maximizes net aggregate goodness (or insofar as that act
does not produce results that are worse than any other option available to the agent in the
situation). One’s ultimate aim, as a moral agent, will be to maximize goodness where one’s
actions allow one to do so. The content of a consequentialist’s aims will be determined by an
account of what has intrinsic value and so various forms of consequentialism can be
distinguished according to the theory of value each adopts. For instance, if I am a Classical
Utilitarian, I will ultimately value only happiness or well-being. Alternatively, if I am a
perfectionist consequentialist, then I will ultimately value only the highest possible
attainment and exercise of each being’s ‘essential’ capabilities. Finally, if I am a
consequentialist adopting a pluralist theory of value (an Ideal Utilitarian, for instance), then I
will ultimately value those states, relationships, objects, actions, states of affairs, etc. that are
identified as intrinsically good. Actions will be justifiable or condemnable insofar as they

Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 456; emphasis mine.
While love requires us to value the beloved for the sake of the beloved (as an end) this does not seem to rule
out also valuing the beloved as a means to some other ends (for the sake of some other end). So long as this
instrumental valuing does not preclude or outweigh the non-instrumental valuing, it would be compatible. In
this sense the kind of valuing required for love seems similar to the kind of valuing required for Kantian
respect: ‘not merely as a means but also always at the same time as an end.’ (See J. David Velleman, “Love as a
Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109.2 (January 1999), pp. 338-374.)
17
18
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meet the consequentialist criterion of rightness. In short, consequentialists ought to guide
their behaviour such that they act for the sake of maximizing goodness.
In order to ‘embody’ the reasons required by consequentialism in a consequentialist
agent, such an agent would need to establish a ‘sensibility’ to those values that are identified
as intrinsically good and important and give priority and attention to those features of the
world. A consequentialist agent would also, presumably, be required to act out of a concern for
maximizing goodness.
Stocker argues that one cannot both ‘act for the sake of this beloved person’ and ‘act for
the sake of maximizing goodness.’ Any attempt to embody such reasons, values, or
justifications into one’s motives would also produce incompatibility. Love requires the kind
of ‘sensibility’ where one is moved directly by and acts directly for the uniquely intrinsically
valuable human person that is loved, and love requires that one treat the beloved always and
primarily as an end and never merely as a means to some other end (even moral ones). Having
moral motivations, on the other hand, means forming a sensibility directed primarily at
‘maximum goodness’ and so requires regarding and treating everything else merely as
opportunities to contribute to what one is ultimately concerned with: maximizing good. He
concludes that the aims and motivations of ethics require that we “dehumanize” people or
treat them “externally” by treating them as mere bearers of abstract intrinsic values or as mere
instruments to a maximally good state of affairs.19
Stocker’s overall argument can be summarized as follows:

The Love-Based Objection (LBO)
P1: Love and loving relations are highly valuable and important intrinsic
goods.20 [Assumption]
P2: Love-based Adequacy Test (LBAT): If a moral theory – e.g.,
consequentialism – can be expected to reliably and significantly impede,
interfere, or terminate instances of loving emotions/relations, then there
is a sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting it. [Assumption
grounded in P1]
P3: Love/loving relationships require acting for the sake of/out of concern
for ‘the beloved’ (as an ultimate end).
P4: Consequentialism requires acting for the sake of/out of concern for
‘maximizing overall good’ (as an ultimate end).
Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 160.
In addition to having intrinsic value, love and loving relations may be (and are) instrumentally or
constitutively valuable also.
19
20
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P5: Harmonious Integration Test: if one cannot both achieve the ultimate
goals of an ethical theory and at the same time achieve an integration of
one’s motivations and reasons (the ‘mark’ of a ‘good life’), then there is a
sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting that ethical theory
[Assumption]
P6: Because an integrated agent committed to both consequentialism and
love would have to act for the sake of/out of concern for both maximizing
overall good (primarily/solely) and the beloved person
(primarily/solely), the reasons and motivations required by
consequentialism are incompatible with the reasons and motivations
required for love in a way that can be expected to reliably and
significantly impede, interfere with, or terminate instances of loving
emotions/relations. [P3+P4+P5]
C: Therefore, there is a sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting
consequentialism. [P2+P6]
P1 is plausible and I suspect that this is a widely held opinion among those who take
morality seriously. P2 and P5 are independent adequacy tests, and one could possibly arrive
at P2 without P5 by arguing that the mere exclusion of an important intrinsic good is
sufficient grounds for reasonably rejecting a moral theory. One might, however,
acknowledge that love is an important intrinsic good, but also think that morality (as
embodied in individual characters or as embodied as a social institution) is more valuable
(perhaps even ‘lexically’ or ‘infinitely’ more valuable) and so is willing to sacrifice love for the
sake of all the other goods morality includes. I am not personally convinced that I would be
willing to sacrifice all love for the other goods provided by morality (and equally
unconvinced I would be willing to sacrifice all morality for love), and I suspect that many
others would share these hesitations. The addition of P5 supplements the force of P2
insofar as it emphasizes that the kind of incompatibility between love and morality at issue in
LBO is not merely an ‘external’ conflict between two incompatible goods; rather the
incompatibility of the LBO involves a deep and highly problematic conflict within the moral
agent and it is this internal conflict which forces the agent to have to choose between either
acting out of/for the sake of only one of the two goods and thereby maintaining one’s
integrity (in Stocker’s sense of having integrated motives and reasons) or try to
accommodate both of them and give up one’s integrity.
Given the incompatibility described in P6, one is faced with the following options:
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1. Give up love and loving relationships.
2. Give up consequentialist ethics.
3. Preserve both consequentialism and love/loving relationships by segregating
(psychologically) consequentialist reasons and motivations from an agent's loving
reasons and motivations.
The third option, according to Stocker, would have to be achieved through some form of
self-distraction or self-deception and it represents the kind of move that is often introduced
by ‘self-effacing’ forms of consequentialism. It is ruled out, though, by the harmonious
integration requirement (HIR) represented in P5. Any self-effacing version of
consequentialism posits a separation of incompatible motives/reasons within an agent. This
is done either diachronically (by separating moments of action from moments of reflection)
or synchronically (either by preventing certain reasons from being embodied as motives in
the agent or by segregating incompatible reasons/motives by splitting the agent
psychologically through some form of deep self-deception). Such effacing ‘techniques’ are
clearly designed to prevent the kind of integration outlined in HIR and so clearly conflict
with it. The first option is not a live option given the assumption about love’s important
value. This only leaves the second option which is represented by the conclusion of the
LBO.
This version of the love-based objection is therefore a serious issue that cannot be
ignored by those hoping to formulate a plausible version of consequentialist ethics. It is
therefore necessary for consequentialists to respond to this objection.

3.3 Peter Railton’s Response to the Love-based Objection:
Sophisticated Consequentialism
Peter Railton presents a highly detailed and complex defense of consequentialist ethics
against the charges of the LBO in his article entitled “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the
Demands of Morality.” He begins with a description of how a person named John is
imagined to explain the “extraordinary quality of concern” that he shows towards Anne, the
person he loves. John responds as follows:
I’ve always thought that people should help each other when they’re in a
specially good position to do so. I know Anne better than anyone else does,
so I know better what she wants and needs. Besides, I have such affection
for her that it’s no great burden – instead, I get a lot of satisfaction out of it.
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Just think how awful marriage would be, or life itself, if people didn’t take
special care of the ones they love.21
This response seems to be the kind of response that Bernard Williams worries about in the
‘Drowning Spouse Example’ in “Persons, Character, and Morality.”22 Like Williams, Railton
notes that the person ‘loved’ (Anne) could reasonably object to this kind of response
pointing out that John ought to pay special attention to her directly for her sake. John’s response
seems to cast his love and Anne merely as the best opportunity to promote John’s own welfare
(“I get a lot of satisfaction out of it”) or general welfare (“how awful marriage [in general]
would be, or life itself”). John only singles himself out as specially related to Anne through
his particular knowledge of her and not by his particular emotion of love towards her or her
unique importance for him as the person he loves. If the reasons mentioned here are
ultimately authoritative for John and are embodied as primary motivations (what Stocker’s
HIR claims ought to happen) then John’s motives and reasons appear to be incompatible
with acting out of love and for the sake of Anne. If we grant that John merely forgot to
include his love for Anne in the explanation, then this seems to be a clear case of ‘one
thought too many;’ on the other hand, if it turns out that his love for her does not play any
Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” p. 135.
Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” p. 15-18. The case relates to a man who must choose
between saving only one of two people who are drowning: either someone he deeply loves (his wife) or a
stranger. The man chooses to rescue his wife. Williams points out that if an ethicist were to try to provide a
justification “on behalf of” the rescuer for saving his wife and not the stranger, it would have to be along the
following lines: “in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.” The permissibility would be
determined by one’s ethical criterion of rightness. If one was a utilitarian this would mean that ‘in situations of
this kind, saving one’s spouse (or the person one loves most) tends to promote the objectively best possible
state of affairs out of those options available to the agent.’ On further consideration, however, Williams shows
that this kind of ethical ‘justification’ appears deeply counter-intuitive. There is a strong sense this this kind of
justification is somehow inappropriate and is somehow misdirected. If this is the only reason why the rescuer
saved his spouse, then, as Williams suggests, the spouse might have reason to doubt that the rescuer genuinely
loves her. The inappropriateness seems to arise because it ignores the fact that one of the people drowning is
loved by the rescuer. It seems that if the love alluded to here is real and is to survive the tragedy, then the
rescuer’s love should somehow be included among the rescuer’s reasons and motives. According to Williams,
the more intuitively appropriate justification “on behalf of the rescuer” should be something like: ‘I saved my
spouse (and not the stranger) because I love my spouse.” This kind of reason, suggests Williams, provides a
sufficient justification for the rescuer’s actions. Furthermore, he claims that any attempt to combine a lovebased justification with an ethically-based justification is problematic in an important way. For instance, if the
rescuer said, ‘I saved my spouse because I love her and in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s
spouse,’ then the rescuer has “one thought too many.” Providing the additional justification seems to involve
the assumption or admission that (at least for the rescuer) ‘I love her’ is not a sufficiently motivating or
justifying reason for saving the spouse and so the presence of the ethical justification seems to threaten or
infect authenticity of the rescuer’s love. Perhaps it might even taint our judgements about the goodness of the
rescuer’s character on the grounds that if a rescuer provides this kind of compound-explanation then this
reveals that the rescuer has some kind of under-developed (or deficient) capacity for genuinely loving people,
will be unlikely to maintain personal relationships, and is therefore lacking a highly important and valuable
aspect of well-being and good character.
21
22
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authoritative reason-giving or motivational role for John, then it is clearly a case of ‘not
enough thoughts at all.’
Later in the article, John is contrasted with Juan who gives a very different response
when asked to explain his special concern for the person he loves – Linda. He states:
I love Linda. I even like her. So it means a lot to me to do things for her.
After all we've been through, it's almost a part of me to do it.23
Juan is then imagined to be challenged by his interviewer to justify the special care he gives
to his wife especially given the fact that the time and resources he dedicates to her could be
used to effect more good by relieving the extreme suffering of poverty affecting so many
people in our world. Juan responds:
Look, it's a better world when people can have a relationship like ours and
nobody could if everyone were always asking themselves who's got the most
need. It's not easy to make things work in this world, and one of the best
things that happens to people is to have a close relationship like ours. You'd
make things worse in a hurry if you broke up those close relationships for the
sake of some higher goal. Anyhow, I know that you can't always put family
first. The world isn't such a wonderful place that it's OK just to retreat into
your own little circle. But still, you need that little circle. People get burned
out, or lose touch, if they try to save the world by themselves. The ones who
can stick with it and do a good job of making things better are usually the
ones who can make that fit into a life that does not make them miserable.24
The point of the article is to explain how it is that “what Juan recognizes to be morally
required is not by its nature incompatible with acting directly for the sake of another [which
is required for genuine love/loving relationships].”25 Railton assumes that both John and
Juan care about doing the right thing in consequentialist terms and both genuinely feel love
for another person; yet, he claims that only Juan’s response is able to integrate both kinds of
reasons and concerns. In other words, Railton thinks that the kind of response given by Juan
models how love-based objections can be overcome.
The kind of consequentialism Railton understands Juan to endorse and the
motivational structure he attributes to Juan are the core elements of his response. Railton
rejects oversimplified accounts of consequentialism and human motivation he finds in
versions of the LBO. By offering a more complex account of consequentialism Railton
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 150.
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 150.
25 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 151.
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challenges the claim that consequentialism requires an agent to always act ‘for the sake of’
and ‘out of concern for’ maximizing overall goodness (and so rejects P4 in the argument
outlined above and opts for the third option outlined on page 87.) The more complex
account of moral psychology introduces the idea of multi-level higher-order
motivations/dispositions and offers a way to separate potentially conflicting motives and
reasons at different psychological levels while still maintaining harmonious integration
through a hierarchical motivational structure that satisfies a ‘counter-factual condition’ he
describes as characteristic of ‘sophisticated consequentialism.’

3.3.1

Sophisticated Consequentialism: Value Pluralism and the Distinction
between ‘Criteria of Rightness’ and ‘Decision-Making Procedures’

Railton suggests that love-based objections to consequentialism are often based on an
oversimplified representation of it. The first oversimplification represents consequentialism
as based upon a monistic theory of value. This may arise from focusing too exclusively on
classical forms of utilitarianism that hold that there is only one intrinsic good: ‘happiness’
understood to consist in pleasure. Railton accepts that such theories will be problematic for
love insofar as agents will be forced to represent loving relationships and those they love
solely as means to what is really valuable (mere instrumental value) or as mere parts of what
really matters: net aggregate happiness. Love and loving relationships demand that we regard
the person loved as valuable as an ultimate end and that we act for the sake of and out of concern
for the beloved (and not something else that really matters to us). It also seems that love and
loving relations are also good in themselves (in addition to their high instrumental value).
Railton concludes that monistic forms of consequentialism cannot accommodate our
intuitions about the intrinsic value and role of love in morality and so rejects such forms of
it.26 Any consequentialist theory capable of overcoming LBO will have to be based on a
value theory recognizing a plurality of “intrinsically, non-morally valuable” goods that can be
compared and that need not be lexically ranked.27 Among these it should recognize
love/loving relationships among the most important and valuable intrinsic goods.28
Railton does not entertain the idea of a monistic consequentialist theory that accepted love/loving relations
as the only intrinsic good. Since I am ultimately considering Railton (and the others) for the sake of assessing
McTaggart’s pluralistic form of consequentialism it seems appropriate to ignore this possibility here.
27 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 149. “let me suggest and approach that seems to be less hopeless as a way of
capturing human value: a pluralistic approach in which several goods are viewed as intrinsically, non-morally
valuable – such as happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, solidarity [including friendship (p.
149n21)], respect, and beauty. These goods need not be ranked lexically, but may be attributed weights and the
26
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The second oversimplification ignores an important and widely recognized
distinction between a “criterion of rightness” and what is called a “decision-making
procedure.”29 It was explicitly recognized by Sidgwick in Methods of Ethics30 and it is at least
implicitly endorsed by Mill in his account of his experience of overcoming the “paradox of
happiness” in his Autobiography.31 In 1971, R. Eugene Bales re-emphasized the distinction in
order to respond to some objections made to consequentialism in the 1950’s and 1960’s. He
noted that ethical theories can be thought to serve a number of purposes, but one of the
most widely held expectations of an ethical theory is that it will “provide an account of rightmaking characteristics” which is what is meant by the term “criterion of rightness.”32
According to consequentialism, the right-making characteristic that makes an act x right is ‘x
maximizes goodness’ and so this is the consequentialist ‘criterion of rightness.’ Another
widely recognized purpose of ethical theories is to provide a “decision-making procedure”
that Bales describes as “a procedure which would help us single out, in the particular case
and under immediately helpful description, which alternative would in fact maximize utility.”33 Bales
notes that it is a mistake to assume

criterion of rightness for an act would be that it most contribute to the weighted sum of those in the long run.
This creates the possibility of trade-offs among values of the kinds discussed in the previous section.”
28 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 139.
2929 This term is misleading insofar as one might accept that the best way to guide one’s action is not to
explicitly ‘deliberate’ or ‘decide’ between options, but to act from certain dispositions to perceive and act in
certain contexts. A better term might be “option-selection procedure” but I will stick to the established term
here.
30 Henry Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Edition [1907] (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981),
p. 413: “Finally, the doctrine that Universal Happiness is the ultimate standard must not be understood to
imply that Universal Benevolence is the only right or always best motive of action. For, as we have before
observed, it is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at
which we consciously aim: and if experience shows that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily
attained if men frequently act from other motives than pure universal philanthropy, it is obvious that these
other motives are reasonably to be preferred on Utilitarian principles.”
31 John Stuart Mill, Autobiography in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: Volume 1: Autobiography and Literary Essays
(Eds. John M. Robson and Jack Stillinger. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). pp.145, 147: “The
experiences of this period had two very marked effects on my opinions and character. … I never, indeed,
wavered in the conviction that happiness is the test of all rules of conduct, and the end of life. But I now
thought that this end was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I thought)
who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness; on the happiness of others, on the
improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end.
Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way. … This theory now became the basis of my
philosophy of life. And I still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of
sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment, that is, for the great majority of mankind.”
32 Bales, “Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?”
American Philosophical Quarterly. 8.3 (July 1971): p. 260.
33 Bales, “Act Utilitarianism,” p. 261.
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that the acceptance of the act-utilitarian account of right-making
characteristics somehow commits one a priori to a particular decision making
procedure: the procedure of estimating and comparing probable
consequences of alternative acts. … the account [of right-making
characteristics] itself places no a priori restrictions on the procedures we use
to isolate that [objectively right] alternative.34
The choice of the appropriate decision-making criterion for a particular kind of action or
situation will be determined by facts about human capacities (intellectual and motivational)
and the situation itself. Bales’ advice for selecting a decision-making procedure:
look and see what kind of procedure has tended to work in given situations. If
he doesn’t have a foolproof procedure for determining in each and every
case which of the acts open to him will maximize utility, at least he can look
to those procedures which have tended to be reliable in the past, and he can look
to strategists for reliable procedures to use in the future.35
Railton fully accepts and employs this distinction in his article.36 Railton also emphasizes that
in many cases it is not an explicit form of deliberation that leads to the best outcomes.
Human nature is limited in its capacity to consciously self-regulate and carry out certain
forms of deliberation. Our attention is limited and we are also susceptible to erroneous and
biased perception and reasoning.37 Therefore, oftentimes, the most reliable method for
arriving at the best outcomes is to act from certain stable dispositions. Such dispositions
cause one to perceive the world in a certain way and so respond to it accordingly without
engaging in any (explicit) cost-benefit analysis. Once we have identified the intrinsic goods
that we are to seek, the nature of these intrinsic goods will determine which stable
dispositions are the most appropriate to select in order to fulfill our consequentialist duty to
create the best world possible. Any form of deliberation or any stable disposition that
interferes with attaining the particular kind of good it aims at would therefore be rejected on
consequentialist grounds. The criterion of rightness guides our selection of decision-making
procedures but this does not affect its primary role in determining the objective moral status
of particular acts. The main purpose of the criterion of rightness remains unchanged: to
assess whether particular actions are objectively right or wrong.
Bales, “Act Utilitarianism,” p. 263.
Bales, “Act Utilitarianism,” p. 264.
36 Railton does not explicitly attribute the view to Bales, nor is the distinction unique to him. I selected him as
representative of those who accept this distinction due to the clarity with which he described that distinction
and the process for selecting a decision-making procedure.
37 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 158.
34
35
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To provide a more nuanced account of consequentialist ethical theory that can
overcome the LBO, Railton introduces some terminology of his own. “Objective
consequentialism” refers to theories that accept the consequentialist criterion of rightness.38
“Subjective consequentialism” and “sophisticated consequentialism” each represent a
different way to accept the consequentialist criterion of rightness and commit to living an
“objectively consequentialist life” which refers to “those acts (or that life) of those available
to the agent that would bring about the best outcomes.”39 “Subjective consequentialism”,
requires additional commitments to act solely for the sake of/out of concern for maximizing
overall good and to only employ a cost-benefit analysis decision-making procedure in all
circumstances.40 “Sophisticated consequentialism,” on the other hand, rejects such exclusive
fixation on maximizing goodness by also endorsing any other reasons, motivations, or
decision-procedures that are thought to be more conducive to an objectively consequentialist
life.41 Railton suggests that Juan is a sophisticated consequentialist. He has a strong
commitment to ensuring that his actions contribute to the best world possible but he does
not think that such a world can be achieved if people adopt this as their only goal, life
project, commitment, or decision-making procedure.
If Juan rejects an exclusive commitment to using cost-benefit analysis to guide his
behaviour, what decision-making procedure does Juan select? If Juan does not act directly
for the sake of/out of concern for maximizing good, how are consequentialist values,
justifications, and reasons harmoniously integrated within Juan’s motivations, dispositions,
or character? Why doesn’t Juan suffer from ‘moral Schizophrenia’ as Stocker suggests he
should? The answers to these questions are provided by the complex moral psychology
described by Railton.

3.3.2

Sophisticated Consequentialism: Multi-level Dispositional Structures

Railton suggests sophisticated consequentialists recognize that certain “stable dispositions”
tend to reliably produce actions that are morally right (i.e., actions producing optimal states
of affairs) and adopts a certain pattern of dispositions (a ‘character’) thought to produce the
best possible amount of right actions and the best possible life in the long-run. When one
Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” p. 152.
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 152.
40 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 152; see also: David Sosa, “Consequences of Consequentialism,” Mind 102.405
(January 1993): p. 107. David Sosa describes this as “consequentialist deliberationism.”
41 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 153.
38
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acts from a disposition, one perceives situations in a certain way and responds to them
accordingly. So, the sophisticated consequentialist selects certain stable dispositions as
decision making procedures. Such dispositions do not infallibly produce optimal actions;
however, insofar as dispositions are the most reliable way to guide one to the action that is
morally right, they ought to be developed and maintained.
As noted by Stocker, certain attitudes, dispositions, and relationships (such as
love/loving relationships) preclude consequentialist aims and motivations. Railton proposes
to solve this problem by explaining that one can embody one’s commitment to
consequentialism within one’s motivational structure – not by including a concern for
maximizing goodness as one motivation among others – but by structuring one’s whole
motivational structure so that it meets the following counterfactual condition: “while he
ordinarily does not do what he does simply for the sake of doing what is right, he would seek
to lead a different sort of life if he did not think his were morally defensible.”42 Phrased in
more consequentialist terms one might express such a counter-factual condition as:
One does not always act for the sake of maximizing goodness, since
one may develop/maintain certain dispositions which lead one to do
various things for their own sake or for the sake of others, but one
would not develop/maintain a certain disposition (and so act as one
does) if it were not compatible with one leading an objectively
consequentialist life (that life of those available to the agent that would
bring about the best outcome). 43
If one is a sophisticated consequentialist, then one’s character (stable set of dispositions) can
be described this way.
If one were to make an analogy, one might say that on Railton’s view the
consequentialist criterion of rightness functions more like a ‘political constitution’ than a
‘prime-minister of a legislative assembly.’ It is not merely a motivation that is ‘first among
equals,’ nor is it clearly reducible to any single member of the ‘community’ of motivations
that make up the agent’s complete motivational set; nonetheless it clearly exists in the way it
orders the members, sets limits on what any member can do, and so guides what occurs in it,
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 151.
This is my own formulation. Railton notes that the formulation mentioned in the previous sentence is “akin
to that of the sophisticated hedonist” which he formulated as follows: “he need not always act for the sake of
happiness, since he may do various things for their own sake or for the sake of others, but he would not act as
he does if it were not compatible with his leading an objectively hedonistic life.” I base my formulation on this
one by swapping out the ‘egoist’ characteristics of rightness (maximizes my own happiness) with the
consequentialist criterion of rightness (maximizes overall good).
42
43

95
even if it is not explicitly invoked by every member for every particular action. Railton’s
account implies a multi-leveled (hierarchical) motivational structure comprising various
higher-order motivational dispositions, each of which is directed to objects at some level
below it.44 Elinor Mason describes a ‘disposition’ as “feeling like doing certain things on
certain occasions.”45 One might say that one is habitually or naturally ‘inclined’ (or
‘disposed’) to act in certain ways under certain circumstances: it is part of one’s character to
perceive the world in a certain way and respond to it accordingly under particular kinds of
circumstances. On such a view, a disposition is always some readiness to act ‘for the sake of x’ or
‘out of concern for x’ and so is always directed towards some x. At the most basic level,
dispositions can be directed towards certain values or things (actions, persons, etc.) that are
not themselves dispositions; these might be called ‘first-order motivations’ and are directed
at ‘base-level motivating objects.’ In addition to these, however, a disposition can take as its
object another disposition; these can be called ‘higher-order’ dispositions.
An example of a first-order disposition is the stable structure of motivations and
reasons required for love. Such a ‘pro-love disposition’ comprises a readiness to have certain
emotional perceptions of and responses to the beloved person, motivations to act out of
concern for the beloved, and intentions to act for the sake of the beloved.46 Pro-love dispositions
will be directed towards the person loved, will perceive that person as valuable for his/her
own sake, will include stable intentions to act for the sake of the person loved, and include
stable motivations to act out of concern for the beloved. Since ‘the beloved person’ is not a
disposition, pro-love dispositions are first-order dispositions that will operate alongside
other first-order dispositions. Such dispositions presumably make up the majority of one’s
character and directly produce the majority of one’s everyday actions. Character would also
include higher-order dispositions that take other dispositions as their object.
A sophisticated consequentialist, if I understand Railton correctly, has a higher-order
consequentialist disposition (C-disposition) directed at first-order dispositions. A
consequentialist disposition is a stable attitude of endorsement or condemnation towards
particular first-order dispositions (or combinations of them) in accordance with whether or
Elinor Mason, “Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2.3
(1999): pp. 252-253.
45 Mason, “Do Consequentialists Have One Thought Too Many?” p. 253. (Italics in the original.)
46 Elinor Mason, “Can an Indirect Consequentialist be a Real Friend?” passim: Mason refers to the dispositions
at issue in Railton as “pro-friendship dispositions.” I use ‘pro-love dispositions’ to be more inclusive regarding
the kinds of loving relations at issue: friendship and romantic relationships.
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not they tend to reliably produce (in the long-run) individual actions that will, in fact,
promote the best possible state of affairs. Endorsed dispositions will be developed or
maintained for the sake of maximizing overall good and we will be disposed to assess our
dispositions (where appropriate) out of concern for maximizing the good. Presumably, the
process for forming a C-disposition initially requires some sort of conscious and reflective
consequentialist assessment and endorsement (or condemnation) of first-order dispositions.
However, once a stable C-disposition is formed at the higher-order, an agent need not be
conscious of it for it to operate and so approved first-order dispositions will operate
unimpeded. The recognition of disapproved first-order dispositions will directly illicit
responses of resistance, though such resistance may not necessarily be effective if the firstorder disposition is already deeply imbedded in one’s nature. Finally, if a first-order
disposition is unrecognized (i.e., there is not yet a stable evaluation or response to it) – either
because the unrecognized disposition was previously un-encountered or because
circumstances have significantly changed since it was last encountered – the agent will be
moved to take up the higher-level process of explicit consequentialist assessment and
endorse/condemn the unrecognized kind of first-order disposition according to the criterion
of rightness. Therefore, the higher-order C-disposition will only operate consciously when
first-order dispositions are not recognized; however, most of the time first-order
dispositions are recognized by mature agents and so are allowed to operate directly upon
their objects without the agent engaging in any explicit consequentialist assessment. In other
words, once an agent has established a stable C-dispositional endorsement of pro-love
dispositions, one is generally free to ‘love without counting the costs’ or to ‘love without
measure’ (to quote some popular proverbs).
Railton makes it clear at various points that he is proposing a version of act
consequentialism: the criterion of rightness is applied directly to individual actions in moral
judgements of rightness.47 While the sophisticated consequentialist approves certain
An indirect form of consequentialism -- such as virtue-consequentialism – would produce a different
judgement of the particular action’s moral status. This version of consequentialism would identify “being the
result of an optimal disposition” as the right-making characteristic of an action as opposed to “that action
which maximizes overall good.” According to indirect virtue-consequentialism Juan’s act would be morally
right since it is consistent with a pro-love disposition which is (when combined in a particular set of other
dispositions) a reliable producer optimizing actions. As Neera Badhwar notes that though this indirect version
of consequentialism and sophisticated version of (direct) act consequentialism will produce different
judgements about the moral status of particular non-optimal acts of friendship, their “motivational structures
are identical.” (Neera Badhwar, “Why it is Wrong to Always be Guided by the Best,” p. 494.) So while it might
47
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dispositions to function as ‘decision-making procedures,’ she will still judge each individual
action according to the relative value of its resultant state of affairs. One implication of this
is that one might not have a reason to resist a particular act one knows is morally wrong.
Railton imagines a case where Juan can buy a plane ticket to help cheer up his anxious
spouse or Juan can donate that money to OXFAM where it will relieve the extreme povertyrelated suffering of many more people.48 If Juan already has a higher-order C-disposition of
endorsement towards first-order pro-love dispositions, then Juan will – as a matter of fact –
respond to this situation by buying the ticket home without thinking much about it. Yet, if
Juan is a sophisticated act consequentialist, then when Juan evaluates the moral status of his
action (perhaps because he is challenged by another or finds himself in a moment of leisured
reflection) he would have to conclude that the particular act of flying home to his spouse is
objectively wrong because other options would have made the world as a whole objectively
better. Yet, this would not necessarily change the (assumed) fact that normally pro-love
dispositions do reliably result in right action and an objectively consequentialist life. So while
Juan would have to acknowledge that this particular action was morally wrong, this
conclusion would not provide a reason to change his standing endorsement of pro-love
dispositions and he would have no reason to resist the dispositional pull towards buying the
ticket. There would have to be a serious change in circumstances or Juan’s own nature to
make it such that the pro-love disposition itself would no longer be optimal and so could not
be endorsed by the C-disposition at the higher level.
Railton observes that this kind of account of a multi-level dispositional structure
helps explain how it is that we overcome common examples of similar kinds of
psychological interference in everyday life. Many of us have experienced how a desire to win
can prevent us from actually developing the skills and psychological resilience required to do
so.49 More commonly, we are usually all too familiar with how difficult it is to fall asleep if
one is aware that one is not sleeping while at the same time desiring to sleep (the insomniac’s
paradox). Yet, through various indirect methods, we are able to overcome these forms of
psychological interference. We can develop dispositions not to have certain dispositions and
through enough practice we can adjust our stable dispositional set such that when the
produce judgements about the moral status of certain actions (such as Juan’s) that seem less counter-intuitive
to some, it would not really affect the overall motivational structure that Railton is focused on here.
48 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 159.
49 Railton, “Alienation,” pp. 144-146; 154.
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opportunity to achieve the end we desire at the higher-level presents itself we automatically
respond in the ways that will most reliably achieve that end. Railton concludes, therefore,
that such solutions are not absurd or ridiculous, but actually quite common and necessary
given our psychological make-up.

3.4 Sophisticated Consequentialism and LBO
How does Railton’s argument stand-up to the LBO outlined in previous sections? It is clear
that Railton accepts many of the assumptions underlying LBO. For instance, it is clear that
he accepts the claim that love is a highly important and valuable good (P1) when he says:
we must recognize that loving relationships, friendships, group loyalties, and
spontaneous actions are among the most important contributors to whatever
it is that makes life worthwhile; any moral theory deserving of serious
consideration must itself give them serious consideration.50
He proposes to give them this serious consideration by adopting a “pluralistic approach” to
human value: “a pluralistic approach in which several goods are viewed as intrinsically, nonmorally valuable-such as happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, solidarity,
respect, and beauty.”51 He immediately expands on what it means to call “relationships of
solidarity” (i.e., “friendships” or other loving relationships) intrinsically valuable in a long
footnote, part of which states:
It becomes a complex matter to describe the psychology of intrinsic value.
For example, should we say that one values a relationship of solidarity, say, a
friendship, because it is a friendship? That makes it sound as if it were
somehow instrumental to the realization of some abstract value, friendship.
Surely this is a misdescription. We may be able to get a clearer idea of what is
involved by considering the case of happiness. We certainly do not value a
particular bit of experienced happiness because it is instrumental in the
realization of the abstract goal, happiness – we value the experience for its
own sake because it is a happy experience. Similarly, a friendship is itself the
valued thing, the thing of a valued kind. Of course, one can say that one
values friendship and therefore seeks friends, just as one can say one values
happiness and therefore seeks happy experiences. But this locution must be
contrasted with what is being said when, for example, one talks of seeking
things that make one happy. Friends are not "things that make one achieve
friendship"- they partially constitute friendships, just as particular happy
experience partially constitute happiness for an individual. Thus taking
50
51

Railton, “Alienation,” p. 139.
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 149.
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friendship as an intrinsic value does not entail viewing particular friendships
instrumentally.52
It is clear from these passages that he thinks that love and the loving relationships beloved
people that constitute it are highly important intrinsic values (alongside other important
intrinsic values such as happiness) as is required by P1.
He also explicitly accepts the LBAT (P2) in the following passage:
If we were to find that adopting a particular morality led to irreconcilable
conflict with certain types of human well-being , as cases akin to John’s …
have led some to suspect, then they would surely give us a good reason to
doubt its claims.53
He also accepts the claim that love requires the lover to act for the sake of and out of concern for
the beloved (as an ultimate end) in an unmediated way (P3).54 The beloved should be valued
intrinsically and one should have a stable commitment to the beloved: other concerns should
not easily override one’s commitment to the beloved as an end (though in some extreme
cases they may actually do so). It is at this point that Railton observes that “strength is not
the same as structure,” and that one must avoid confusing the idea that ‘one values x as an
end’ with the idea ‘x cannot be overridden by other important goods.’ 55 So while the
beloved, the loving affection, and the loving relationship are acknowledged to be important
intrinsic goods by Railton, they are not such that they cannot be overridden nor are they
lexically more important than any other goods.
As explained above, Railton rejects the claim that consequentialism requires those
who accept its criterion of rightness and are committed to living an objectively
consequentialist life are also required to always act for the sake of and out of concern for
maximizing goodness. He also denies that cost-benefit analysis must be accepted as one’s
decision-making procedure in all circumstances. As a result, Railton rejects P4 and replaces it
with a much more complex consequentialist view: sophisticated consequentialism.
Railton challenges the claim that alienation is as problematic as the LBO suggests,
and ultimately rejects the over-simplified understanding of human moral psychology implied
in the representation of the harmonious integration requirement (HIR) (P5). He notes that a
certain degree of alienation or distance from our emotions, our loved ones, and our own
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 149.
Railton, “Alienation,” p. 139.
54 Railton, “Alienation,” pp. 136-137 & 140-141.
55 Railton, “Alienation,” p. 141.
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dispositions and commitments is healthy and necessary to ensure autonomy in agents.56
While Stocker never claims that an absence of alienation is a necessary condition for a good
life in his formulation of the LBO – he only states that it is a reliable ‘mark’ or index which
usually accompanies a good life57 – it does seem that a certain amount and a certain kind of
alienation is more common in the good life than the LBO advanced by Stocker (and others)
indirectly leads readers to believe.
Railton is ultimately suggesting the kind of multi-level dispositional model outlined
here is able to integrate our various motivations and reasons within a hierarchy of higherand lower-order dispositions. Because each disposition has a different kind of object, each
operates at a different psychological level and so need not conflict or interfere with those to
which it might be opposed if one directed them towards the same object or tried to integrate
them at the same level. While there is a certain kind of internal ‘alienation’ or self-division
involved in positing different dispositional layers, the kind and amount of alienation
involved in Railton’s model does not provide a reliable ‘mark’ of a bad life and is not
obviously problematic. A person’s dispositional structure is ultimately a unified whole and,
though hierarchical and multi-layered, it can harmoniously integrate the various dispositions
and the dispositional structures necessary for morality and love within the organized system
that makes up an individual person’s character.
Furthermore, Railton’s model meets Stocker’s requirement that we ought to be
“moved by our major values and we should value what our major motives seek.”58 The
motivations and reasons that comprise a pro-love disposition are all focused on a highly
important intrinsic value of the beloved individual human person. Through first-order prolove dispositions, we are clearly moved by our major values – the intrinsic value of the
beloved – and we value (intrinsically) what our major motive (loving concern for the
beloved) seeks. At the higher-order dispositional level we are also moved by important
goods and we recognize the first-order pro-love disposition as highly valuable both
instrumentally and in-itself. Our motivations and reasons are not only consistently united in
an integrated whole, but they are integrated with each other in the kind of way Stocker seems
to envision.

Railton, “Alienation,” pp. 146-148.
Stocker, “Schizophrenia," pp. 453-454.
58 Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 454.
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Therefore, Railton’s model suggests that it is not the case that the integration of
reasons and motives of love and morality in a unified dispositional set (character) must
reliably prevent the existence of the highly important and valuable goods of love and loving
relations. In fact, it turns out that pro-love dispositions, loving emotions, loving
relationships, and the people we love are all given a highly important place within moral life.
They are so important that their continued existence can even justify the permissibility of
morally wrong individual actions in certain cases. Consequentialism can acknowledge the
important role that love and loving relationships play in making the world as good as
possible and in doing so strongly approve of our natural dispositions to love others and also
provides strong reasons to try to make the world as conducive to love as possible.59

3.5 The New Love-Based Objection and the Defense of Railton’s
Model of Consequentialism
In the decade following Railton’s proposed defense of consequentialism, two articles were
published containing a new love-based objection directed at Railton’s model. The first was
published by Neera K. Badhwar and was entitled “Why it is Wrong to Always be Guided by
the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship.” The second was co-authored by Dean Cocking
and Dustin Oakley “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation.”
The concerns they raise were not absent from the earlier versions outlined by Stocker but
they place new emphasis on them in light of Railton’s sophisticated consequentialism. Again,
I will not be summarizing all of their arguments in this section; instead, I will try to represent
what I take to be the core objection they pose for views like Railton’s. I agree with Elinor
Mason that this objection, as they present it, is avoidable with a proper understanding of
Railton’s claims, but the objection still highlights an important and difficult challenge that
consequentialist theories cannot ignore when trying to develop the kind of consequentialist
system with the structural features outlined by Railton.

Railton, “Alienation,” p. 161. As Railton notes, if the existence of extreme poverty threatens the
permissibility of our current loving relationships, then this provides a strong motivating reason to seek
individual and political solutions to this wide-spread problem so that the world as a whole need get to a state
where it must be made seriously worse in order to get better at all.
59
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3.5.1

Cocking and Oakley: Sophisticated Consequentialists Must Avoid the Kind of
Commitment Necessary to be Friends

Cocking and Oakley grant that Railton’s view addresses the concerns about psychological
integration raised by the original LBO. In particular, they strongly agree with Railton’s claim
that certain high-level commitments and dispositions based upon what they call “regulative
ideals” (such as a conception of moral rightness as ‘maximizing overall goodness’) are able to
guide our actions without becoming either purposes or motives for acting after these
regulative ideals have become sufficiently embedded and internalized in an agent through a
process of character formation and education.60 They observe that the regulative ideals of
grammar guide the formation of sentences in a fluent person’s conversational speech
without being included in the motives or purposes of the speaker’s conversational responses
(the speaker’s motives and aims are presumably to express her thoughts in response to the
other speaker’s comments). It is plausible, therefore, that the regulative ideals of morality
might also operate in this way. They are willing to grant that if consequentialist morality
operates in this way, then consequentialism can be psychologically compatible with pro-love
dispositions. Nonetheless, while they grant this to Railton, they still insist that love and
morality conflict, though not in the way emphasized in the original LBO. Cocking and
Oakley argue that the counter-factual condition of the motivational structure that defines the
sophisticated consequentialist requires a kind of (non-)commitment that is incompatible with
the commitment distinctive of friendship.
Cocking and Oakley agree that acting for the sake of and out of concern for the beloved are
necessary for genuine love/loving relationships, but they also note that many other
relationships require these attitudes as well. In particular they mention that relationships
characterized by ‘therapeutic care’ or ‘educative care’ also have these purposes and motives.
What distinguishes these kinds of person-purposive and person-motivated relationships is
the kind of commitment involved and one way to characterize commitments is in terms of
‘governing conditions.’ Governing conditions comprise the set of ‘acceptance conditions’
and ‘terminating conditions’ for a particular kind of relationship. The acceptance conditions
identify the properties a person, relationship, or state of affairs must have in order for there
to be a reason and a desire to have that kind of relationship with a particular person at all.
The terminating conditions identify the properties a person, relationship, and state of affairs
60

Cocking & Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism,” p. 87-91.
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must have in order for there to be a reason and a desire to end a kind of relationship with a
particular person. For example, the governing conditions for a therapeutic relationship are
determined by the ‘need’ of the person requiring assistance and the ability of the therapist to
provide the assistance necessary. If I can help remove the cause of someone’s current
suffering, then the acceptance condition is met. If I can no longer assist the person anymore
(either because they are cured or because the condition is now beyond my capability to help)
then the terminating condition is satisfied. If we continued our relationship after I can no
longer provide the needed assistance, then either it is the case that I should end the
relationship (because there is a good reason to do so) or it is the case that other conditions
govern the relationship and so the relationship is not (merely) therapeutic after all.
Loving relationships will therefore have a distinctive set of governing conditions.61
Cocking and Oakley do not provide a positive account of what these are; however, they do
identify some terminating conditions that are consistent with our intuitions about genuine
loving relationships and some terminating conditions that are not. Among the legitimate
kinds are those based upon trust and the mutual well-being of both people involved: if trust
is no longer possible or if the relationship is clearly harming one of the people in a serious
way, then there are legitimate reasons and motives to end such relationships, even if they
were genuinely loving (at least at some point). One example of an illegitimate terminating
condition for love is the ‘inability to supply the other’s need’ (the terminating condition
characteristic of the therapeutic relationship). If I stop loving someone because they no
longer need my assistance to overcome some form of suffering, then I might have a
therapeutic attitude towards them and a therapeutic relationship, but not a loving one. Most
importantly, they note that a terminating condition based on optimality (on being a reliable
means to maximizing overall goodness) cannot be included among the governing conditions
of love. But, the counter-factual condition embodying the higher-level commitment to the
consequentialist regulative ideal is a terminating condition based on optimality. According to
the counter-factual condition, if one has reason to believe that certain dispositions – and
presumably certain relationships or certain people – are no longer reliable sources of optimal
actions, the consequentialist agent will seek to adapt her life so that such dispositions (or
friendships, or friendly acts) are no longer a part of it.
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Cocking & Oakley conclude that insofar as the consequentialist regulative ideal
guides behaviour through the consequentialist counter-factual condition (even if only in the
background) a sophisticated consequentialist’s relationship with others will always include
‘optimality’ among its terminating conditions. But the readiness to end a friendship or to
refuse an act of friendship because it is recognized as being less-than-optimal is in direct
opposition to the kind of readiness and commitment necessary for genuine love and genuine
loving relationships. So, according to Cocking & Oakley, consequentialism will seem to
reliably prevent or terminate instances of love/loving relationships (if consistently followed),
and so there is a reasonable and sufficient ground for rejecting consequentialism.

3.5.2

Elinor Mason’s Response to Cocking and Oakley: The Counter-factual
condition only supplies terminating conditions for pro-love dispositions and
not particular loving relationships or acts typical of them.

In “Can an Indirect Consequentialist be a Real Friend?” Elinor Mason argues that Cocking
and Oakley misinterpret Railton’s account of the counterfactual condition and its guiding
role when they suggest that it applies directly to loving relationships or loving acts and when
they claim that it introduces a terminating condition into our relationships that is
incompatible with the governing conditions typical of love. Mason notes – correctly, I think
– that Railton’s position is founded upon the assumption that human behaviour is very
difficult to guide or change.62 Most of our actions occur as a direct result of settled
dispositions to respond to the world in certain ways. This means that, oftentimes, merely
acquiring a desire, intention, or motivation to ‘act differently’ than one has in the past is not
sufficient to alter such deeply embedded action-guiding habits. In attempting to improve and
adjust our behaviour, most of us have surely experienced situations where good intentions
and motivations are present but are too weak to overcome well-established dispositions to
do otherwise.63 The best way to guide behaviour, then, is to focus on the level of
dispositions. This, combined with previous observations about the problems involved with
Mason, “Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Real Friend?” pp. 388-389; see also, Railton, “Alienation,” pp.
144-146 & 153-154. In these passages Railton describes complex strategies and processes designed to alter
one’s dispositions. These clearly imply that changing human behaviour is difficult and must focus on the
dispositional level: “People can learn to avoid certain characteristically self-defeating lines of thought – just as
the tennis player in an earlier example learned to avoid thinking constantly about winning – and the
sophisticated consequentialist may learn that consequentialist deliberation is in a variety of cases self-defeating,
so that other habits of thought should be cultivated” (154).
63 The phrases “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,” (Mark 14:38) and “what I do is not what I wish to
do, but something which I hate,” (Romans 7:15) succinctly capture experience of the difficulty involved in
changing one’s behaviour that Mason and Railton allude to here.
62
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appealing to consequentialist principles at the level of deliberation, leads Railton to restrict
higher-order C-dispositional endorsements to first-order dispositions and not to particular
relationships or actions.
Mason also notes that a particular situation would have to be extremely abnormal to
bring about a state of affairs where a pro-love disposition would not be optimal (perhaps
some pathological psychological condition would result in a ‘perverted’ set of loving actions
or perhaps an extreme state of anarchy would make the person endorsing pro-love
dispositions extremely vulnerable to abuse). The higher-order C-disposition to endorse prolove dispositions would be established based on the vast majority of normal instances of
love/loving relationships and so we would not be disposed to question it unless we
experienced a radical and thorough change in circumstances. This means that it is very
unlikely that the counterfactual terminating condition typical of consequentialism would
result in a disapproval of pro-love dispositions and so impede any loving
relationships/loving actions depending on them.
Since it is not the loving relationships themselves that are subject to consequentialist
terminating conditions, Mason concludes that these relationships can have the typical
governing conditions required for love. Therefore consequentialists can and should have
the kind of commitments required by genuine loving relationships. Practically, this means
that a consequentialist friend should stay committed to particular relationships even if they are
sub-optimal in some cases and should keep commitments to their beloved even if doing so
would be sub-optimal in some cases because in the long-run having stable dispositions to
keep and not challenge these commitments is required for living the most virtuous life
possible (understood as an objectively consequentialist life which maximizes that good,
impartially understood).

3.5.3

Badhwar, Card, and Tedesco: Defending Consequentialism against NLBO:
The counter-factual condition required for sophisticated consequentialism
represents a terminating condition legitimately applicable only to objects that
have mere instrumental value.

In her article entitled “Why it is Wrong Always to be Guided by the Best: Consequentialism
and Friendship,” Badhwar indicates another direction for criticism. There are a number of
issues identified in her article, but one in particular seems to present a serious problem for

106
Railton. Apart from Robert Card and Matthew Tedesco, it is not clear that many defenders
of consequentialism have fully appreciated this particular aspect of her criticism.64
Badhwar summarizes her own conception of “end-friendship” which is consistent
with the characterization of love presumed throughout the debate: one ought to act for the
sake of and out of direct concern for the beloved and one ought to value the beloved as an end-inherself. Both the beloved and the loving relationship itself are acknowledged to have both
intrinsic and instrumental value. There is nothing problematic about recognizing both kinds
of value or valuing beloveds/loving relationships in both ways (as Railton himself
emphasized throughout his article). Nonetheless, our commitments to our beloveds and to
our loving relationships must be such that they always reflect a commitment to the beloved
as an end in herself and never merely as a means to something else. This is a structural feature
of our commitment. So our commitment to our friends must not only be strong, it must be
the right kind of commitment.
The counter-factual condition, however, seems to Badhwar to be inconsistent with
the kind of commitment necessary for love. Love requires that “I place special [intrinsic]
value on you out of friendship and not out of consequentialist considerations,”65 and
consequentialism requires that “I place special [instrumental] value on you only so long as, all
things considered, valuing you promotes the overall good.”66 Badhwar appears to be
claiming that the counterfactual-condition could be represented as follows:
If a pro-love disposition (L) is no longer a reliable means to maximizing
goodness (R), then this is sufficient reason to terminate L in favour of what
is the (best) means to R.
If L also had intrinsic value in addition to its instrumental value as a means to R, then merely
lacking that instrumental value should not be a sufficient ground for terminating L. If L has
intrinsic value but has lost all of its instrumental value, then its overall value will be
decreased by this loss, but insofar as it still has value there are at least prima facie grounds for
not terminating it. It is possible that there might be overriding reasons to terminate L despite
its intrinsic value if, for instance, some other good (G) had value that significantly
outweighed the intrinsic value of L and was not compatible with L. But if this is the case,
Card, “Consequentialism,” 149-172: see especially pp. 151-154 & 161-166; Tedesco, “Indirect
Consequentialism,” pp. 567-577.
65 Badhwar, “Always Wrong,” p. 493.
66 Badhwar, “Always Wrong,” p. 493.
64
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then ‘lacking instrumental value’ is not the sufficient condition; rather, the sufficient
condition is ‘lacking enough intrinsic value in comparison to another option (G)’. If the counterfactual condition applies directly to loving relationships, loving acts, or the value of the
beloved, then this counterfactual condition would reliably and significantly interfere with
love/loving relationships and would therefore provide reasonable and sufficient grounds for
rejecting consequentialism.
I think that Badhwar is right to observe that the counterfactual condition, in its
original formulation, can only be applied legitimately to objects having mere instrumental
value. Yet, if Mason interprets Railton correctly, which I think she does, the object of the
counter-factual condition is not a loving relationship, a loving action, or a beloved person;
instead, the object is a pro-love disposition. Therefore, if pro-love dispositions are
intrinsically valuable, adopting such an attitude towards them is an inappropriate way to
value them. It seems that for those who want to defend a version of sophisticated
consequentialism along Railton’s lines there are only two options.
First, one could maintain the counter-factual condition as formulated and merely
accept that ‘dispositions’ are not intrinsically valuable. Those attitudes, actions, or emotions
that we are disposed to have can be acknowledged to have intrinsic value, but the disposition
to have them (the ‘persistent readiness’ that is the essence of a disposition) is not itself
intrinsically valuable.
There are some problems, however, with this option. First, if one acknowledges that
certain conscious states having intentionality, such as emotions and desires, are intrinsically
valuable, it seems merely ad hoc to rule out assigning intrinsic value to other similarly
structured conscious states such as dispositions merely to avoid the problem identified here
by Badhwar. Some philosophers have suggested that since emotions and volitions can be
described as pro-/con- attitudes towards intrinsically good/bad objects, we can understand
the intrinsic value of such conscious states as being a function of the kind of attitude they
take up towards the object (pro- or con-) and the intrinsic value of the object. Emotions and
desires, on this view, are higher-order intrinsic goods.67 Could not one apply the same
account of intrinsic value to dispositions? It seems that one could plausibly claim that that
value of a disposition is a function of the mode of dispositional attitude (‘disposed to’ vs.
‘disposed against’ certain desires, emotions, actions, etc.) and the intrinsic value of its object.
67

The concept of a ‘higher-order intrinsic good/evil’ was discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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For example, if I am disposed to have intrinsically good desires, then this disposition is
intrinsically good; if I am disposed against having certain intrinsically good emotions, then
this disposition is intrinsically evil. The degree of value (goodness or badness) might also be
a function of the ‘stability’ or ‘strength’ of the disposition: having a disposition not to lie that
usually overcomes competing motivations to lie is good but having a disposition not to lie
that almost always overcomes such temptations is better. Based on their structural features
alone, it is not clear how one could deny attributing higher-order intrinsic value to
dispositions in this way while still asserting that it is okay to do so in the case of emotions
and desires. So if one is going to deny dispositions intrinsic value (yet keep it for other states
such as emotions and desires), one will bear the burden of proof for why it is that
dispositions cannot have this kind of value, and merely asserting that they don’t to avoid a
potentially devastating problem will not be sufficient justification (it seems).
Furthermore, if one insists that pro-love dispositions are merely instrumentally
valuable, then that seems to imply that other dispositions, such as a pro-virtue disposition (a
standing readiness to desire the good in proportion to its absolute and relative value) are not
intrinsically good either. But virtuous dispositions are widely accepted to be intrinsically
good: a morally good character (which is often described – at least partly – as a collection of
virtuous dispositions) is widely held to be an intrinsic good that ought to be pursued for its
own sake and that warrants commitment for its own sake. Insofar as denying loving
dispositions intrinsic value potentially calls into question the intrinsic value of virtuous
dispositions – and so threatens to conflict with widely and strongly held intuitions – there
seems to be good reasons not to pursue this line of defense.
The alternative option is to revise the counterfactual condition. Is there a way to
phrase the counterfactual condition so that it both expresses one’s overarching commitment
to do what is objectively morally right (maximize overall goodness) and expresses one’s
intrinsic valuation and (prima facie) commitment to the intrinsically good dispositions (such as
love) that are subject to the counterfactual condition? I want to suggest that the following
formulation is able to do this:
If a pro-love disposition (L) is no longer a reliable means to maximizing
overall goodness (R), then this is a sufficient reason to suspend/supress L until
conditions change such that L is once again a reliable means to attaining the
best possible state of affairs in the long run (R).
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What is expressed in this formulation is the fact that, though some disposition (love) is
valuable in itself, its value can be outweighed by other goods (or other combinations of
goods) and so we might have to turn our attention from our commitment to that pro-love
disposition in favour of other commitments. Yet, even though one’s (prima facie)
commitment to loving dispositions may be outweighed by one’s other (prima facie)
commitments to other intrinsic goods, this does not mean that one’s commitment to love is
terminated. In other words, it does not require that one completely give up one’s
commitment to loving dispositions; one still acknowledges that the pro-love disposition is in
itself valuable and that there are still reasons to seek to promote and preserve it for its own
sake. This is captured by the inclusion of the “until” clause. Once more favourable
conditions avail themselves, the agent will immediately re-instate pro-love disposition. Such a
re-instatement of “suspended” loving dispositions is not the result of a new commitment to
love; rather, the re-instatement occurs because of a pre-established and persistent
commitment to love that has merely been overruled by other concerns due to an imperfect
state of affairs. This formulation acknowledges that since loving emotions and loving
relations are intrinsically good there is always a prima facie obligation to create/preserve
loving dispositions where possible. This implies that even in an imperfect world where
(extreme) conditions require that one’s commitment to promoting loving dispositions be
suspended, there is still always a moral reason to try to reform the world such that one’s
commitment to loving dispositions is no longer overruled. In other words, there is always a
moral reason to make those conditions which require overruling one’s commitment to
promoting love in favour of one’s commitments to alleviating other evils (or promoting
other important goods) are temporary. Fortunately, however, the actual existence of the kind
of state of affairs bad enough to require suspending one’s pro-love disposition (or at least
one’s commitment to it) is so extreme, rare, and improbable, that this is unlikely to be an
issue for almost all moral agents.68
If the counter-factual condition is understood in this way, then it seems that one does
not inappropriately value pro-love dispositions. One does not value them merely as a means,
but instead one values them as an intrinsic good that may (under certain imperfect
conditions) happen to be outweighed by other intrinsic goods that also legitimately demand
Mason, “Can an Indirect Consequentialist Be a Friend?” pp. 392-393, (393n18); Mason, “Do
Consequentialists Have One Thought too Many?” p. 258; Tedesco, “Indirect Consequentialism,” p. 570.
68
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my commitment towards them (as valuable in themselves). This seems to address Badhwar’s
concerns about the way pro-loving dispositions are valued and also seems to capture the core
insight of Railton: that consequentialists have a persistent overarching commitment to do
what is best. This means that a sophisticated consequentialist is not only able acknowledge
that loving emotions, loving relationships, and beloved persons are intrinsically valuable, but
is able to acknowledge pro-love dispositions are intrinsically valuable as well. It therefore
seems that sophisticated consequentialism, with the necessary adjustments outlined here, is
able to overcome the various components of the love-based objection that have been raised
over the last forty years.

3.6 Summary of the New Love-Based Objection (NLBO) and the
Defense of Sophisticated Consequentialism against NLBO
The various insights captured by Cocking & Oakley and Badhwar can be compiled to
produce the following comprehensive version of the New Love-Based Objection (NLBO):
P1: Love and loving relationships are highly important and valuable intrinsic
goods (i.e., highly valuable in-themselves). [Assumption]
P2: Love-based Adequacy Test (LBAT): If a moral theory – like
sophisticated consequentialism – can be expected to reliably and
significantly impede, interfere, or terminate instances of loving
emotions/relations, then there is a sufficient and reasonable ground for
rejecting it. [Assumption grounded in P1.]
P3: If it is not the case that a sufficient terminating condition treats the loving
relationship and the person loved as valuable as ends-in-themselves and never
merely as means to some other end, then it is incompatible with the
terminating conditions characteristic of the commitment required by
love. [Grounded in P1: Cocking & Oakley; Badhwar]
P4: The counterfactual condition characteristic of the sophisticated
consequentialist’s dispositional structure expressed as a terminating
condition (CTC): if x will not result in an objectively consequentialist
life, then the sophisticated consequentialist will terminate x in favour of
y which will result in an objectively consequentialist life (x≠y). [Railton]
P5: (Because of CTC’s structure) if CTC represents a sufficient terminating
condition for x, then x is merely instrumentally valuable (as a means to
an objectively consequentialist life). [Badhwar; Cocking & Oakley imply
in P4]

111
P6: The CTC represents a sufficient condition for terminating love or loving
relationships. [Cocking & Oakley’s interpretation of Railton]
C1: Therefore CTC treats love and loving relationships as merely
instrumentally valuable. [P4,P5,P6]
C2: Therefore CTC is incompatible with the terminating conditions
characteristic of the commitment required by love [P3,C1]
C3: Therefore there is a sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting
sophisticated consequentialism. [P2,C2]
The defense of sophisticated consequentialism against NLBO can be summed up as
follows. Mason rejects P6 as a misinterpretation of Railton; I think she is right. Railton does
not claim that CTC should be applied to particular instances of love or loving relationships;
instead he only claims that it applies to pro-love dispositions. The rejection of P6 would
block conclusions C1, C2, and C3 and so the reasons outlined in the new LBO do not
provide a sufficient and reasonable ground for rejecting sophisticated consequentialism. P6
should read: “The CTC represents a sufficient condition for terminating pro-love
dispositions.”
If, however, one includes pro-love dispositions among those aspects identified as
intrinsically good in P1 and P3 (love and loving relationships), then, as I have suggested,
NLBO does lead to C3. In order to avoid the new version of LBO, someone who wants to
adopt an ethical view similar to Railton’s version of sophisticated consequentialism would
have to do one of two things: either one would have to come up with a new formulation of
the counterfactual conditions such that it avoids treating what is subject to it as merely
instrumentally valuable or one would have to accept that pro-love dispositions are not
intrinsically valuable (though one would still accept that love and loving relationships are
intrinsically valuable). I have argued above that denying pro-love dispositions intrinsic value
may involve strongly counter-intuitive implications. Instead, I argued that if we revise the
counter-factual condition such that it both recognizes the intrinsic value of loving
dispositions (along with the kind of prima facie commitment proper to intrinsic goods) and
allows for this commitment to be outweighed by other legitimate commitments to other
intrinsic goods under certain conditions, then the revised counter-factual condition
(provided above) would not result in the CTC included in the NLBO. The new counterfactual condition does not represent a terminating condition; rather, it might be better
described as a ‘suspending’ or ‘overriding’ condition. On the revised version, the agent does
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not terminate her commitment to promoting intrinsically good loving dispositions; instead,
the agent pursues other commitments (when one is forced to choose and the other
commitments are overriding). Once the conditions are such that agent’s persisting (though
suspended) commitment to loving dispositions are no longer outweighed, the agent will
immediately resume promoting loving dispositions out of that commitment once again.
Since my proposed revision to the counterfactual condition no longer implies the CTC, P4
and P6 are removed from the argument and the conclusions (C1-C3) do not follow.

3.7 Summary of the Requirements Necessary for a Consequentialist
Ethical Theory to Overcome the Love-Based Objections
The previous discussion has outlined various objections to consequentialism that have been
advanced based on the nature of love and our intuitions about love’s value and its role in
morality. Various philosophers have responded to these objections in order to defend
consequentialism and in this process each one has proposed a feature that a consequentialist
theory must adopt in order to meet the love-based challenges raised against it. The final
result of this forty-year debate is a list of characteristics that any consequentialist theory must
have in order to avoid the various versions (LBO and NLBO) of the love-based objection
discussed here. In summary, any consequentialist theory must have at least the following
features to be plausible:
1. Value Pluralism: any plausible version of consequentialism must recognize a
plurality of intrinsic goods and in particular it must recognize that love, loving
relationships, and the person loved are intrinsically valuable.
2. Love-Based Adequacy Test: any plausible version of consequentialism must
ensure that the motivations and reasons endorsed by/required by consequentialist
ethics will not reliably and significantly impede the highly valuable and important
intrinsic goods of love or loving relationships.
3. Harmonious Integration Requirement: any plausible version of consequentialism
must ensure that our motives embody our reasons and that our reasons are
embodied in our motives. In other words, consequentialist agents must be “moved
by our major values and we should value what our major motives seek.”69

69
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4. Sophisticated Consequentialism: a plausible consequentialist ethical system must:
a. Distinguish between a ‘criterion of rightness’ and a ‘decision-making
procedure’ and it must acknowledge that dispositions may function best as
‘decision-making procedures’ even though they do not involve any explicit
process of deliberation.
b. Adopt a multi-level account of the motivational/dispositional structure of
moral agents that meets the following counter-factual condition: One does not
always act for the sake of maximizing goodness, since one may develop/maintain certain
dispositions which lead one to do various things for their own sake or for the sake of others,
but one would not develop/maintain a certain disposition (and so act as one does) if it were
not compatible with one leading an objectively consequentialist life (that life of those
available to the agent that would bring about the best outcomes).
c. Only apply the sophisticated consequentialist counter-factual condition to
pro-love dispositions and not directly to love or loving relations. (This
implies that a sophisticated consequentialist will accept that one has reason to
adopt pro-love dispositions as ‘decision-making procedures’ even though
they will sometimes (and rarely) result in individual actions that are
objectively morally wrong).
In what follows I will argue that McTaggart’s moral theory, when combined with
observations he makes in his philosophical account of love, has most of these features and
can be supplemented to include others without detracting from any of his positive claims
about love or morality. This is important because though Railton identifies the necessary
structural features for a plausible version of consequentialism, he does not himself provide a
detailed account of what such a theory might look like. In order to assess the actual
plausibility of sophisticated consequentialist theories, it will be necessary to work out a
substantive version so that theorists can assess whether or not it is plausible in other ways.
McTaggart’s version of consequentialism provides a starting point from which theorists can
work from to address other issues facing consequentialism. This will lend support to the
overall claim of this dissertation: that McTaggart’s moral philosophy and philosophical
account of love successfully anticipated a number of issues raised by later philosophers and
offers important insights as to how those complications can be addressed. McTaggart’s
moral philosophy, though less systematically worked out than his metaphysical work, merits
contemporary attention. The final two chapters of this dissertation will present McTaggart’s
value theory and moral philosophy and assess to what degree his theory (with some
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supplementation from the work of other Ideal Utilitarians of his time) is able to successfully
avoid the concerns raised in the versions of LBO raised here.

115

4 McTaggart’s Version of Ideal Utilitarianism: The
Importance of Promoting Love

4.1 General Introduction to Chapters Four and Five
The previous chapter concluded that any (consequentialist) moral theory must have at least
four features if it is going to be able to overcome the Love-Based Objection (LBO):
1)
2)
3)
4)

Value Pluralism
Passes the Love Based Adequacy Test
Meets the Harmonious Integration Requirement
A Form of Sophisticated Consequentialism

The first characteristic related exclusively to the axiological basis of the proposed moral
theory. The final three relate to the hierarchy or structure of commitments, motivations, or
dispositions necessary to accommodate the demands of the moral theory.
In the next two chapters, I argue that McTaggart’s Ideal Utilitarian moral philosophy
(with some supplementation) is able to integrate love and loving relationships in a way that is
consistent with many of our pre-theoretical opinions about the role and value of love in a
good and moral life and in creating a good and moral community of persons. This
reconciliation of love and morality is very difficult to achieve, and even if McTaggart’s
account of moral philosophy (as a whole and in its details) would have to be significantly
updated in order to serve as a plausible ethical theory in the contemporary context – which it
would need to be – the version of consequentialist ethics that he outlines can serve as a
foundation upon which those working on contemporary formulations of consequentialist
moral theories (or moral theories in general) can build.
This chapter will focus on McTaggart’s value theory. I will show how it is that
McTaggart attempts to defend the claim that love is intrinsically valuable, that it can
outweigh other intrinsic values (including the intrinsic goodness of ‘virtue’), and why it is not
unreasonable to think that love ought to be considered among the most important goods.
The next chapter will explain how it is that McTaggart’s moral philosophy incorporates the
final three characteristics.
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4.2 Introduction to Chapter Four
Proponents of the LBO noted that there is a widely held pre-theoretical belief that love is
intrinsically valuable and that when we love someone, we love them for their own sake, and
not merely as some means to something else considered good.1 An implication of this was
that any value theory that denied intrinsic goodness to love, loving relationships, and the
beloved person necessarily conflicted with these intuitions; therefore, such theories ought,
on these grounds, to be rejected. Since proponents of the LBO also widely believed that
happiness and virtue are also intrinsically good, the only plausible moral philosophies will be
those that are founded on pluralistic theories of value. Proponents of the LBO also noted
that love is widely believed to be a highly important intrinsic good. They observe that while
there are clearly cases where moral demands may require us to sacrifice some acts of love, in
other cases the value involved in preserving or promoting love can plausibly outweigh the
disvalue of doing something wrong (a vicious act). Therefore, they argue, any plausible moral
theory must also allow for the possibility of genuine conflict between love and morality
(though of course it is not necessary that they must always, or even normally, conflict).2
There is no doubt that McTaggart endorsed value pluralism. This chapter will argue
that the value pluralism that McTaggart does endorse is the right kind of value pluralism to
overcome the various axiological concerns underlying the LBO. I will begin by identifying
the various intrinsic goods McTaggart considers in both the early and later works of his
career. Next, I will explain the two main categories of intrinsic goods that he outlines in
Studies in Hegelian Cosmology: goods of happiness and goods of perfection. After this, I will
make the case that in addition to recognizing intrinsically good states of consciousness, there
is some textual evidence that suggests that McTaggart also believed that the person itself has
intrinsic value in relation to autonomy, virtue, and subjectivity (rational consciousness and
agency). Next I will look at the kind of intrinsic value virtue and love have for McTaggart. I
will suggest that his description of the value of virtue and love is consistent with
understanding them to have higher-order intrinsic value in the sense outlined by Hurka in
Virtue, Value, and Vice. Finally, I will consider how it is that McTaggart thinks that love can
outweigh other intrinsic goods – including virtue – and why it is that he thinks that love
Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 456; Stocker, “Value and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of
Friendship,” The Journal of Philosophy 78.12 (December 1981): pp. 750, 754ff.
2 Stocker, “Friendship and Duty,” pp. 223, 228-232; Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy 79.8
(August 1982): pp. 419-439. Passim.
1
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ought to be considered one of the most important (if not the most important) intrinsic
goods that can be included in a good life. Before addressing these main issues, it is important
to explain why McTaggart should be taken seriously as a moral philosopher. It is also
important to briefly summarize the Ideal Utilitarian moral philosophy.

4.3 McTaggart as a Moral Philosopher
McTaggart is not usually recognized by contemporary historians of moral philosophy as
having significantly contributed to developments in moral philosophy. This oversight,
though understandable, is not totally justified and so is worthy of being addressed at the
start. As a student at Trinity College Cambridge, McTaggart studied for the Moral Tripos
Exam (1885-1888). In 1888, he achieved “First Class” status on the Mental and Moral
Sciences Tripos, earning Distinction in Metaphysics.3 He was also awarded the Marshall
Prize in Political Economy.4 As a student he was deeply influenced by Henry Sidgwick, who
at the time was (arguably) the most prominent living moral philosopher of his day (T. H.
Green having died in 1882). After graduating, McTaggart served as a Fellow and Lecturer in
Moral Sciences at Trinity for almost all of his adult life (1897-1923). As a Fellow and
Lecturer, he profoundly influenced his student and future colleague G. E. Moore and was
also in correspondence with Hastings Rashdall; both Moore and Rashdall would go on to
provide the most complete and systematic accounts of Ideal Utilitarianism during this
period. Throughout his life, “Moral Sciences” at Trinity included the philosophical
disciplines of Psychology, Metaphysics, Logic, Moral and Political Philosophy, and Political
Economy. Both contemporary and historical works were studied under each discipline. Even
though McTaggart clearly dedicated most of his professional publications and teaching to
Metaphysical topics – such as time, matter, and immortality – such work was seen to be a
division within Moral Science at Cambridge and not a topic completely separate from it.
Much contemporary scholarship on McTaggart focuses on some of his arguments related to
McTaggart’s examiners are listed as: W. E. Johnson (King’s), W. R. Sorley (Trinity), A. Caldecott (Joh.), and
G. F. Stout (Joh.). See The Cambridge University Calendar for the Year 1888 (Cambridge: Deighton Bell and
Company, 1888), p. 266.
4 Rochelle, Gerald. The Life and Philosophy of J. M. E. McTaggart (Lewiston: Edwin Mellon Press, 1991), p. 57; G.
L. Dickinson, J. McT. E. McTaggart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). Rochelle and Dickinson
both note that the Headmaster of Clifton, Canon Wilson, had strongly suggested to McTaggart’s mother that
McTaggart study the more practical branches of philosophy especially “political economy in its larger aspects as
the basis of social philosophy and finally of ethics.” (Dickinson, McTaggart, p.18.) This no doubt had some
influence on McTaggart’s early interests in philosophy and he continued to be interested in political and
economic issues throughout his life.
3
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the ‘unreality’ (or mind-dependence) of time considered in isolation from the larger context
or projects within which they were formed. However, a survey of McTaggart’s metaphysical
work clearly shows that moral and value considerations were never far from his mind. In
many cases, claims about value play important roles in his metaphysical arguments.5 So while
McTaggart was a ‘specialist’ within the discipline of Metaphysics, Cambridge’s
‘interdisciplinary’ orientation to “Moral Sciences” clearly permeates McTaggart’s
philosophical project on the whole.

4.4 Note on Methodology
McTaggart did write a number of papers and chapters in his books that were directly
dedicated to the study of value and the ethical problems prevalent in his day, in addition to
his metaphysical works (which are more widely known to contemporary scholars). These
works on moral philosophy will be the focus of this chapter and the next. The fact that
McTaggart never attempted to provide a complete and fully systematic account of Ideal
Utilitarianism poses a significant challenge to an attempt to provide a coherent summary of
his views. To overcome this difficulty, in some cases I will draw upon the work of other
Ideal Utilitarians published during his lifetime to fill in the gaps where necessary. I will draw
especially upon the work of Hastings Rashdall because McTaggart was familiar with his work
on ethics (he provided extensive comments on a pre-publication manuscript of Rashdall’s
Theory of Good and Evil) and because Rashdall’s version of Ideal Utilitarianism appears to be
largely consistent with McTaggart’s, at least on many of the foundational points.6 When I
introduce such supplementation, however, I will explain how it merely adds needed details
or can be understood to extend insights or arguments that McTaggart has already
established.

4.5 McTaggart and Early Ideal Utilitarianism
McTaggart espoused a form of consequentialism called “Ideal Utilitarianism.” The theory
emerged as a distinct form of moral philosophy at the end of the nineteenth century. The
first systematic accounts of it were produced by G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica (1903) and

Mander, British Idealism: A History, p. 375-376; 466-467.
The philosophical views of McTaggart and Rashdall seem to have converged on a number of issues. This is
especially true about their versions of “Personal Idealism” which stressed the priority of the existence of
‘persons’ in Metaphysics, Axiology, and Ethics. See Mander, British Idealism, pp. 376, 40.
5
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Hasting Rashdall’s Theory of Good and Evil (1907). In this book, Rashdall finally settled on
“Ideal Utilitarianism”7 as the name for this new theory and succinctly summarized it as a
theory that held that
the way to find out whether an action is right or wrong, when we are forced
to consider such a question for ourselves without reference to some
established rule, is to consider whether it will tend to produce for society in
general a Well-being or εύδαιμονία or good which includes many elements
possessing different values, which values are intuitively discerned and
compared with one another by the moral or practical Reason. The right
action is always that which (so far as the agent has the means of knowing)
will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole. … This view of
Ethics, which combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be
teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end, I propose to call
Ideal Utilitarianism. According to this view actions are right or wrong
according as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal end or good,
which includes, but is not limited to, pleasure.8
Ideal Utilitarians, therefore, accepted the Classical Utilitarian view that one’s duty is always to
do that action which will result in the best possible overall state of affairs for the aggregate.
As a theory it is both teleological and maximizing. It departs from classical forms of
utilitarianism – such as those proposed by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick – by rejecting their
monistic theory of value which had recognized only pleasure or happiness as an ultimate
intrinsic good. Ideal Utilitarians agree that pleasure (or happiness) is an ultimate intrinsic
good worth pursuing for its own sake, but they also recognize that there are additional
ultimate intrinsic goods (whose value is irreducible to pleasure or the ability to produce
pleasure) that we also ought to pursue for their own sake, such as knowledge and virtue.
Oftentimes these non-hedonistic goods are human capacities that are represented as fully
developed or perfected and such goods are often referred to, severally, as ‘ideals.’9
Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), pp.
216-217. Other candidates he considered were: “non-hedonistic utilitarianism,” “idealistic utilitarianism,” and
“teleological ethics” (Paulsen, A System of Ethics (Trans. F. Tilly, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co.,
1899)). Rashdall also gives a kind of genealogical account of this view through the history of philosophy. He
explicitly identifies McTaggart and Moore as proponents of Ideal Utilitarianism: 217n3.
8 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 184.
9 Most ideal utilitarians limited the bearers of intrinsic value to conscious beings or states of consciousness;
however, Rashdall allows for the possibility that certain kinds of acts might have intrinsic value: “We emphasize
the fact which eudaimonistic systems of Ethics are apt to overlook – that acts are the objects of moral
judgements as well as consequences. … but many, nay most, of the acts which do conduce to further ends have
a value (positive or negative) of their own ; and this value must be taken into account in estimating the
rightness or wrongness of the acts.” (TGE1, pp. 96-97) This suggestion was taken up in more detail by
philosophers such as O. A. Johnson (Rightness and Goodness: A Contemporary Ethical Theory (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1959)). Since McTaggart was one of the main defenders of the restriction of intrinsic value to
7
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4.6 McTaggart’s Axiology
While all Ideal Utilitarians accept the basic elements outlined by Rashdall above, various
versions of Ideal Utilitarianism can be differentiated according to the particular axiological
theories each one adopts. While all Ideal Utilitarians agree that we ought to promote as
much overall good for the aggregate as possible, the kinds of intrinsic goods and the
rankings of those goods will affect the moral directives and judgements produced by their
theory. In order to understand McTaggart’s particular system it is important to understand
his axiology, especially the prominent role granted to love.

4.6.1

The Restriction of Value to Conscious Beings and States of Conscious Beings

McTaggart strongly supported the claim that only conscious beings or the states of
conscious beings are bearers of value. An implication of this assumption is that all nonconscious beings, considered in themselves apart from any consciousness directed towards
them, have no intrinsic value. They can, and do, have important instrumental values, but
these are always relative to the existence of some conscious beings. As a result, the list of
intrinsic values (goods and evils) that McTaggart provides is restricted to those that can be
attributed to conscious beings or their conscious states.
The claim that only conscious states have value appears to have been an assumption
shared by many ethicists during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and
McTaggart states that he accepts it as an assumption because “rightly or wrongly, there is a
large consensus of opinion in favour of this view.”10 It was proposed by Sidgwick in Methods
of Ethics,11 and it was also accepted by Rashdall.12 Moore, however, challenged the
assumption in Principia Ethica by suggesting that one could conceive of a ‘beautiful’ world
containing no consciousness in it at all and so he proposed that while moral value would still
be restricted to conscious beings or their states, aesthetic value might not be.13 However,
neither McTaggart nor Rashdall seemed convinced by the thought experiment that Moore
conscious beings and states of consciousness, I do not take up this aspect of Ideal Utilitarianism here. If it was
allowed, however, this might add additional support to McTaggart’s claim that love is intrinsically valuable by
also assigning intrinsic value to acts of love (done out of love and for the sake of the beloved).
10 McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” p. 434.
11 Sidgwick, ME, Bk I., Ch. IX, §4, pp. 112-115. Also, in Bk. III, Ch. XIV, §§4-5, pp. 398 – 407. Sidgwick
maintains that value is restricted to conscious states/beings, but ultimately denies the Ideal Utilitarian position
in favour of Hedonism.
12 Rashdall, TGE1, p.152. “The ethical judgement pronounces that something has value, and we do not on
reflection pronounce that anything can have value except some state of consciousness.”
13 Moore, Principia Ethica, §50.
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introduces here.14 McTaggart claims that the answer as to whether non-conscious beings or
states can bear value can only be the result of an ultimate judgement of value – it cannot be
deduced from more basic judgements. McTaggart admits that he is “unable to give any
arguments for my view as Mr. Moore is to give any arguments for his contrary view,” and he
also admits that this claim must be treated as a foundational assumption. 15 While some of
McTaggart’s claims stand or fall based on this assumption,16 his claim that love is a highly
important intrinsic value does not; the fact that McTaggart’s recognized list of goods might
turn out to be too short does not mean that his judgements about the goods he does
recognize are therefore incorrect (though it may have some implications for his ranking of
values if it turns out that certain non-consciousness related values are also considered to be
highly important – such as the good of a fair distribution of benefits and burdens, for
instance).
McTaggart suggests that ethicists may make this assumption purely on moral
grounds (i.e., based on surveying the most plausible axiological and moral theories proposed
in the past) and he warns against associating this assumption with any form of Idealism
(epistemic or metaphysical). He notes that even ‘materialists’ classify some physical
phenomena as “mental” or “conscious” and insofar as they also hold that value only pertains
to this kind of physical phenomena, they too can accept this axiological assumption.17
I mention this assumption here for two reasons. First, it was clearly important to
McTaggart since he explicitly mentions it at length in all of his works on moral philosophy
and value. Secondly, it is important to note this assumption in order to understand why
some states of affairs widely thought to be prima facie plausible candidates for intrinsic goods
– such as justice – are not even entertained by McTaggart. McTaggart never claims to have
provided a complete list of goods,18 and so the fact that the list could (and perhaps should)
be expanded should not distract us from appreciating the valuable insights he does offer
about the intrinsic values that he does recognize.

McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” pp. 434-437; McTaggart, NE2, §788; Rashdall TGE1, 152.
McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” p. 437.
16 McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” p. 434.
17 McTaggart, NE2, §788.
18 McTaggart, NE2, §786.
14
15
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4.6.2

The Early Works

In Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1901), McTaggart identifies two main classes of intrinsic
goods: Pleasure (or Happiness) and Perfection. Contained under the ‘Goods of Pleasure’ are
an individual’s pleasant conscious experiences or – more importantly – one’s consciousness
experienced as pleasant on the whole. McTaggart seems to reserve the term ‘happiness’ for a
more global assessment of the overall pleasantness (or painfulness) of a person’s
consciousness on the whole, either at a given moment or as an historical whole.19 It is a
necessary part of the essence of these kinds of goods that they be experienced positively or
negatively.
As explained in Chapter One, on McTaggart’s early psychological theory we can
never have a direct or pure experience of pleasure or pain. Instead, we always experience
pleasure/pain as supervening on another conscious state (cognitions or desires).
Pleasure/pain supervenes on such states, we saw, insofar as a harmony was achieved
between one’s ideas/ideals and facts about the world. McTaggart called such states of
consciousness “tinged with feeling [pleasure/pain]” emotions.20 This means that all hedonic
goods will be emotional states of consciousness, and pre-eminent among these is the
emotion of love. As we saw, love is the emotional state resulting from the pleasure that
supervenes upon our states of knowing and desiring related to another person when such
knowing and desiring are in harmony with the facts about that person. Other emotions will
arise in analogous ways in regards to the harmony achieved between our ideas/ideals and
that actual state of affairs of the world. This means that overall happiness (or suffering) will
always comprise various emotional states. Considerations about hedonic goods, such as love,
will therefore be considerations about positive or negative forms of emotional conscious
states.
McTaggart’s account of the second category of goods – the goods of perfection –
imports many of the core axiological insights characteristic of the Ethics of Perfection

Bosanquet, “Hedonism Among the Idealists,” in Science and Philosophy: and Other Essays (Freeport, N.Y.: Books
for Libraries Press, Inc., 1927), p. 201. Bosanquet claims that McTaggart accepts the “the immediate
identification of Happiness with the greatest quantity of pleasure,” and criticizes him for this. Bosanquet wishes
to reserve the term ‘happiness’ to “complete satisfaction” of desires and capacities (201). I mention this only to
clarify the sense in which McTaggart uses the term and to distinguish it from other meanings assigned to it by
his contemporaries.
20 McTaggart, SHC, §282
19
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endorsed by most British Idealists such as F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, and J. S. Mackenzie.21
In direct opposition to classical utilitarianism, proponents of this view rejected the claim that
pleasure was the only ultimate intrinsic good. Instead, they argued that what persons ought
to ultimately seek for its own sake is the development of human persons and of human
society such that they more perfectly instantiate our ideal conceptions (i.e., the ideal of a
community of mutually supporting fully developed and integrated human persons).
According to Perfectionist Ethics, ‘ideals’ are representations of the way that individuals or
societies ought to be and so they provide the ultimate ends of moral action and they serve as
norms according to which any existing state of affairs, character, or action is morally
assessed.
Ideals, however, are not innate nor are they immediately obvious. Perfectionist
ethicists, such as Green, often observe that since humans are still discovering new truths
about the world and about the practical capacities of persons all the time, our understanding
of human nature is not determinate and so our ideals are not determinate. Oftentimes, our
assessment of actual conditions merely leaves us with the conviction that persons and our
society as a whole could be better, but it does not provide any complete description of what
these better people or communities would actually be like. For instance, many people
recognize that perpetual global peace is an ideal all of us ought to strive to approach as much
as possible (i.e., minimize war as much as possible), even if we have serious doubts that it
could be fully attained without drastic changes in global circumstances and human attitudes
and dispositions; however, the exact nature of the kinds of persons and political institutions
required to attain this ideal are difficult to formulate, predict, or express. Therefore, ‘ideals’
must be discovered, and constantly revised, through the experience of individuals and
communities seeking to develop the best persons and society possible.
Yet, ideals need not be (and are not, according to T. H. Green) fully determinate in
order to serve as norms or ultimate ends in ethics. While our ideal of the perfect person or
community may only provide an incomplete sketch of the way things ought to be, through
While various forms of Perfectionist Ethics, such as the one proposed by Green, are teleological in nature,
they reject the claim that one has a duty to ‘maximize’ good; at most one has a prima facie duty to increase
good where such increase is not prohibited or restricted by other non-teleological duties (such as the duty to
never treat a person merely as a means but always also as an end). See Mander, British Idealism, pp. 203-204; T.
Irwin, Development of Ethics, Vol. III (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 582, 615-618. So while I am
suggesting that McTaggart draws upon some of the Perfectionist’s claims about what has intrinsic value, I am
not claiming he is not accepting their claims about moral rightness or obligation.
21
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reflection on past experiences and on past struggles, humans can identify patterns of
improvement relative to the previous set of beliefs, practices, and institutions and these can
indicate the direction of improvement towards the ideal.22 For instance, while philosophers
may not be able to provide a completely determinate and substantive account of moral and
political ‘autonomy’ (a widely accepted ideal in contemporary political and moral philosophy)
ethicists can look at events such as the abolition of slavery and conclude that such
movements were improvements towards the ideal of autonomy and claim that such
experiences provide hints as to how to fill in the remainder of the conception in more detail.
Therefore, the general trend or direction of improvement is accessible, even if the final
destination is not.23
Perfectionist ethics strongly emphasized that human beings are fundamentally social
in nature. The attainment of ideals cannot occur in isolation, and many of our capacities –
such as the capacities for sympathy and benevolence – presume the existence and
improvement of other persons. On this view, the imperfection of an individual, or group of
individuals, threatens the perfection of all others. It is therefore of utmost importance to
ensure that development is encouraged and that persons are provided the resources and
skills necessary to develop their own capacities (if they choose to utilize them). Therefore,
according to perfectionist ethics, the fundamentally social nature of persons means that
“common goods” will play a central role in our conception of the ideal of perfection.
The fact that ideals must be discovered and developed led Perfectionists to also
conclude that a certain amount of individual freedom is necessary to ensure that people can
discover better (yet previously unconsidered/tested) ideas, moral rules, or institutions for
organizing society. It is also important to note that Perfectionist Ethics also recognized that
though all of us can encourage and support each other’s development, the capacities for
knowing and willing can only ultimately be developed by the agent herself and no one else.
Nobody can force another person to see the truth and no one can be externally compelled to
assent to it. Also, no one can be externally compelled to have the particular intentions
essential for virtue (i.e., to seek the good for the sake of the good, do the right for the sake
of the right). Idealists (especially Green) therefore afforded a central place to a kind of
‘liberalism’ within Ethics and Politics. In order to attain Perfection, individuals had to be
22Green,
23Green,

Prolegomena, §172; §§353-354.
Prolegomena, §172; §§353-354.
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given space to exercise and improve their own intellectual and moral capacities. In order for
a person to come to her own understanding of what is ultimately good and her own desire to
do what is good/right, she must be allowed to reject the resources and services offered to
her if she so chooses; also, she must be free to make mistakes (though under the condition
that she knows she may be legitimately subjected to punishment for some of these mistakes).
That McTaggart accepted certain ‘perfectionist’ intrinsic values proposed by British
Idealists is clear throughout his works. McTaggart does not provide a clear or complete list
of intrinsically good capacities in Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, but refers to a number of
"ideals,” throughout the book. He identifies ‘virtue’ (desiring good as good),24 benevolence
(desiring the good/happiness of others),25 knowledge (the attainment of correspondence
between one’s ideas about what exists and what actually does exist),26 and the contemplation
of and production of beauty.27 He also describes overall states of ‘painlessness’ and ‘pleasure’
as ideals.28 He also identifies what might be called an ideal of ‘awareness’ when considering
choices to be made between relieving intense suffering through mind-numbing drugs vs.
preserving conscious awareness by not taking drugs and enduring intense suffering.29
Furthermore, Chapters V and VI (on ‘punishment’ and ‘sin’ respectively) seem to
identify the unique intrinsic value of autonomous moral agency and its improvement
(especially in children). I will not be addressing the particular arguments made there in detail;
however, each of those chapters seeks to establish the best way to foster the development of
moral agency, especially in those cases where part of the development may (perhaps
necessarily) involve moral ‘failures’ on the part of the developing agent. The aims and
restrictions proposed for punishment and for child development clearly represent the moral
agency of the developing person as an end to be promoted and protected for its own sake
(and so as intrinsically valuable). His repeated emphasis on the importance of the individual
person qua individual,30 the acknowledgement of the modern ‘discovery’ of the importance

McTaggart, SHC, §§125-127.
McTaggart, SHC, §125.
26 McTaggart, SHC, §125.
27 McTaggart, SHC, §125.
28 McTaggart, SHC, §128.
29 McTaggart, SHC, §129.
30 See especially McTaggart, SHC Chapter VI: “Sin,” and Chapter VII: “The Conception of Society as an
Organism.”
24
25

126
of autonomy,31 and the importance given to the freedom to make (some minor) moral
mistakes (combined with the experience of moral contrition) as an essential part of the
process for developing moral agency,32 all give evidence to McTaggart’s agreement with the
British Idealists emphasis on the intrinsic value of the moral perfection/improvement of the
individual person.
Since utilitarians have sometimes been criticized for ignoring the importance (and
intrinsic value) of moral autonomy or of the individual person (qua individual person) in
ethics by focusing merely on aggregate good, it is important to recognize that even in
McTaggart’s earliest writings on ethics, the intrinsic value of autonomy and individuality
(separateness) plays a central role in his characterization of consequentialist ethics. There is
no doubt that his exposure as a student, fellow, and teacher at Cambridge to the work of
John Stuart Mill, ‘liberal’ economics (David Ricardo and Alfred Marshall), and T. H. Green –
all of whom (consistently or not) emphasized the central importance and value of
individuality and autonomy in ethics and politics – had a profound influence on the
formation of his value theory and his moral philosophy.
Finally, it is important to note that while McTaggart recognizes many of the same
goods/ideals as those identified in Perfectionist Ethics, his account of their goodness is
importantly different and so fundamentally distinguishes his axiological view from theirs. On
perfectionist accounts what is intrinsically valuable is the perfection (or realization to a high
degree) of capacities that are in some way essential for being the kind of thing that one is.
Perfectionist accounts start with judgements about the ideal of human nature and then
determine what is intrinsically good based on such judgments.33 According to McTaggart’s
axiological position – and most Ideal Utilitarian theories – one starts with judgements about
what things (including capacities) are intrinsically good and then forms a conception of an
ideally good person (or ideally good society) by identifying the best possible combination of

31See

especially McTaggart, SHC, §§ 156-157: “But why should the modern citizen regard the state as
expressing the moral law? He does not regard it as something above and superior to himself, as the ancient
citizen regarded his city, as the child regards his parent, and as the religious man his God. The development of
the individual conscience and responsibility has been too great for such an attitude. … Not only does he not
feel bound, but he does not feel entitled to surrender in this way his moral independence. He must determine
for himself what he is himself to hold as right and wrong. The result of this is that, if he sees for himself that
his action was wrong, he will repent without waiting for the state to tell him so, and if he does not see it for
himself, the opinion of the state will not convince him.”
32 SHC, Chapters V and VI, passim.
33 Hurka, Perfectionism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 3-5.
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these goods given the actual nature of things in the world (including the nature of human
persons).
This is an important difference because on perfectionist accounts, the development
of any essential capacity is intrinsically good; however, on views like McTaggart’s, it is
possible that the development of some capacities that are judged to be ‘essential’ to
something can also be judged to be intrinsically neutral or intrinsically bad. For instance, it
seems that an essential part of being human involves being capable of desiring someone
else’s suffering, even if one chooses to never exercise this capacity. McTaggart acknowledges
such a capacity (a capacity for “malevolence”) in his works and, yet, he judges that exercising
or developing this capacity is intrinsically bad.34 What a person does with such a capacity
determines whether that person/action is morally good or morally bad (whether that
person/action is a virtuous or vicious); however, so long as a person has such a capacity, the
person’s decision about what she does with it cannot change her essence. It seems that a
perfectionist would either have to deny that a capacity for malevolence is essential for being
human, or (if the perfectionist admits that it is essential) would have to deny that exercising
such a capacity is intrinsically bad. One benefit of such a view is that McTaggart has a
principled explanation of why some seemingly ‘essential’ capacities ought to be fully realized
and others to be realized as little as possible. However, all of the problems related to a nonreductionist account of value remain: i.e., there is ultimately no derivative justification (from
more basic premises) for value-judgments and so instead such judgements must meet certain
criteria of ‘self-evidence.’

4.6.3

Later Work: The Nature of Existence

4.6.3.1 Five Kinds of Values
In his later work, McTaggart provides a list of intrinsic goods (and evils) but does not
distinguish between hedonic goods and perfectionist goods. Instead, he identifies five basic
kinds of value.35 According to McTaggart, the assignment of value to an object – intrinsic
goodness or badness – is always connected to the object’s possession of a characteristic
McTaggart, NE2, §832. (McTaggart lists “malignancy” as an intrinsically evil emotion.)
McTaggart, NE2, §813. McTaggart initially lists six candidates but rejects one of them (“harmony”) because
he “can see no good or evil under this head which does not come under one of the other five.”
34
35
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(quality or relation). This does not mean that the different kinds of value (goodness or
badness) attributed to an object are equivalent to these characteristics nor does it mean they
can be defined in terms of them. For McTaggart, as for Moore, “goodness” and “badness”
are indefinable qualities. Nonetheless, McTaggart asserts36 that that we can (and do) make
“universal synthetic propositions” that establish necessary links between possessing some
characteristic “C” and possessing some intrinsic value “V.” 37 If “x has C” correlates to our
judgement that “x is intrinsically good/bad,” then C can be described as a “valifying
characteristic” (to borrow a term that Broad used to explain McTaggart’s value theory).38
McTaggart leaves it open as to what kind of necessary connection is involved and how it is
established.39 The connection between Gx (x is good) and Cx (x has characteristic C) occurs
either through some kind of immediate synthetic a priori intuition/judgement (it is selfevident that x(Cx→Gx)) or through some inductive reasoning from particular judgement
(the judgement that, in carefully observed experience, Gx reliably corresponds to Cx). Once
it is established that the attribution of a particular kind of value G correlates in a law-like way
with possessing C one can infer Gx from any instance of Cx. Today, we might describe this
connection (however it is established) by saying that the quality of ‘goodness/badness’
“supervenes” on certain properties of the good/evil object in a regular way.
According to McTaggart, the five irreducibly different kinds of values correspond to
irreducibly different kinds of ‘valifying characteristics.’ The valifying characteristics
corresponding to each intrinsic value are described in pairs (except for one kind of value):
one valifying characteristic corresponds to the positive form of that kind of intrinsic value
(goodness) and the other corresponds to the negative form (badness). Based on this general
understanding of value, McTaggart proposes the following five kinds of value:

According to McTaggart, if judgements of the form ‘x is good’ did not correlate to any patterns in ‘x,’ then
each judgement of value would have to be a particular and unique judgement. If this were not possible there
could be no systematized science of axiology or ethics. (McTaggart, NE2, §801.) However, McTaggart believed
that systematic axiology and ethics existed (even if it was highly imperfect) and so he just rules out any form of
moral particularism on these grounds. Since he is concerned with improving systematic ethics, he is surely
entitled to the working assumption that such a project is in fact legitimate (even if he is overlooking this
question too quickly here).
37 McTaggart, NE2, §787.
38 Broad. Examination of Mr. McTaggart’s Philosophy, Volume II: Part II. p. 663-665.
39 McTaggart, NE2, §801n1.
36
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Table 2: Five Kinds of Value in The Nature of Existence

Kind of Value40

Kind of Conscious State
Bearing Value
('goods' or 'bads')

Correlated Positive
Correlated Negative
Valifying-Characteristic of Valifying-Characteristic of
the Value-Bearing
the Value-Bearing
Conscious State
Conscious State

Intellectual
Value

Cognitions

True

False

Moral Values

Conations

Virtuous

Vicious

Emotional
Value

Emotions

loving, affectionate, selfreverential, complacent
(§832), etc.

hateful, repugnant,
malignant, vengeful,
regretful, remorseful,
jealous, envious, fearful
(§832), etc.

Hedonic Value

"Feelings"

Pleasant

Painful

Value of
Consciousness

States of Consciousness
(or a Conscious Being:
Person/Self) (§840)

Mental Vivacity: "Fullness"
or "Intensity" of
consciousness: degree of the
clarity, distinctness, and
intensity of one's
consciousness.
(States 'lacking' this quality:
'feeble-mindedness' resulting
from drugs)

[No negative characteristic
and no correlated 'evil': to
lack consciousness
altogether is to be the kind
of thing that cannot bear
value (only conscious beings
or conscious states can bear
value)]

4.6.3.2 Value Bearers: States of Consciousness and Conscious Beings
Each kind of value also corresponds to a different kind of value-bearer. Of the five kinds of
value, three (Intellectual, Emotional, and Hedonic) clearly have conscious states as their
value-bearers (cognitions, emotions, and feelings), but not conscious beings. Moral value
(virtue and vice), however, is sometimes described in terms of individual desires for what is
believed (correctly) to be good and at other times as values attributed to the person as a
whole in respect of having such desires (and in proportion to the ‘resolve’ of such desires). 41

These names for “Kinds of Value” are not provided by McTaggart; they are my own contribution.
McTaggart merely lists the valifying characteristics lawfully correlated with different kinds of value, but he does
not actually provide names for each kind (NE2, §813). He does, however, clearly link virtue and vice to moral
value in many places (which is not unique to McTaggart).
41 McTaggart, NE2, §815. “If by calling a man virtuous we mean no more than that he always desires what he
believes to be the good, and that he always carries it out, so far as depends on his will, then … Even if we
should add that, to be perfectly virtuous, a man must not only desire what he believes to be right, but must have
correct beliefs as to what is right …” It is clear from this passage, and others where virtue is brought up, that
the proper bearer of moral value is a person. Particular desires/volitions for what is (correctly) believed to be
good might also be said to have moral value, but it also seems clear that a stable/constant volition/disposition
to have such desires and to act on them is what is really meant in the fullest sense of ‘virtue.’
40
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Also, the value of consciousness is described both as an element of value borne by any
particular conscious state, but also as a value borne by persons. Of this fifth kind of value he
says that “If amount and intensity of consciousness is a good, it is a good which every self
must have in some degree, since every self is more or less conscious.”42 McTaggart’s language
here is important. He introduces a very strict distinction between saying that something has
value (the value of x) and saying that there is value in (the value in x). According to his
terminology, only value-bearers (goods or bads) can be said to have value. Aggregated
collections of value-bearers, such as a community of persons, which is not itself a conscious
being, or state of a conscious being) are not proper bearers of value; nonetheless we can
represent the combined value of each person (and their conscious states) in the community
as having a total quantity, and this aggregated sum is the value in the community.43 The
language used in relation to moral value and the value of consciousness refers to both
persons and conscious states of persons as “having” such value and this strongly suggests
that the proper value-bearers for these two kinds of values may be either conscious states or
conscious beings. This means that, insofar as persons have (or are the bearers of) the valifying
characteristics of consciousness and virtue, persons also have (or are the bearers of) intrinsic
value. In other words, insofar as persons have some degree of clear and intense
consciousness or have virtuous dispositions, the person is (to some degree) intrinsically good
and is not merely a container/collection of intrinsically good states. While McTaggart
explicitly claims that conscious states have intrinsic value in the Nature of Existence, he
explicitly remains agnostic as to whether or not “selves” (individual conscious beings) have
intrinsic value.44 However, his attribution of value to ‘consciousness’ in this passage,
combined with his earlier claims in Studies in Hegelian Cosmology and “The Individualism of
Value,” strongly suggests that (despite his proclaimed agnosticism) it is reasonable to believe
that ultimately McTaggart would ultimately sympathize with the view that individual persons
do have intrinsic value, even if he felt that he could not provide (or that it was not necessary
to provide) a decisive argument in favour of this view in Nature of Existence.45 Such an
McTaggart, NE2, §840. My italics.
McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” p. 433; McTaggart, NE2, §§788-790.
44 McTaggart, NE2, §792-799.
45 McTaggart, NE2, §799: “I am unable to come to any definite opinion on the point. Nor is it necessary for
our present purposes. … And it will not make any difference to the conclusions we reach in the rest of the
work [dedicated to showing that there is reason to believe that there is proportionally more good than evil in
the universe considered as a whole] whether the values are values of selves, or values of their parts.”
42
43
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interpretation is consistent with the view expressed by other commentators on McTaggart’s
work; for instance, Mander classifies McTaggart as a Personal Idealist because he takes the
claim that “that nothing is ultimately good or bad except conscious beings and their
conscious states” to be a core element of McTaggart’s philosophy.46 Even if McTaggart is
agnostic about whether persons can be bearers of value, it is clear that he thinks it is a
possibility (and hence why he leaves it an open question). So, at the very least, it is clear that
McTaggart’s axiology is therefore consistent with one of the axiological demands of
proponents of the LBO: To love someone is to value them for their own sake, and so any
plausible moral philosophy must adopt a value theory that allows for persons to be bearers
of intrinsic value.

4.6.4

Love is Intrinsically Good
For the purposes of this dissertation, it is most important to note that McTaggart

(and other Ideal Utilitarians, such as Moore and Rashdall), recognized that virtue is
intrinsically good and that emotions such as love are intrinsically good. This puts them in
opposition to certain passages of Methods of Ethics, where Sidgwick denies that virtue has
intrinsic value.47 In that work, Sidgwick also argued that it is morally permissible to allow for
motivating “affection for special individuals [love and friendship],” over “a feeling more
universal in scope – charity, philanthropy, or (as it has been called) ‘Enthusiasm for
Humanity,’”48 insofar as such loving emotions involve pleasure (the only intrinsic good for
Sidgwick) and insofar as they are conducive means for promoting a surplus of aggregate
happiness; nonetheless, it does not appear that such emotions, in themselves (apart from
their pleasantness/painfulness), are intrinsically valuable on Sidgwick’s axiology. 49
McTaggart’s version of Ideal Utilitarianism (as well as Rashdall’s) directly opposes these
implications of Hedonistic Utilitarianism. McTaggart wants to claim that virtue and love are
good in themselves, independent of any pleasure they may involve or produce. It is therefore
reasonable to pursue these goods for their own sake. This is exactly the kind of attitude that
proponents of the LBO argue is required in order to be consistent with our widely held
belief that love (in addition to other goods such as happiness or virtue) ought to be pursued
See Mander, British Idealism, pp. 375-376, 464-467.
Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book III, Ch. XIV, §§1-5, pp. 391-407; and Book IV, Ch. III, §2, pp. 426-430. See
also: Rashdall, TGE1, pp. 61-62 and pp. 63-76.
48 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, pp. 433-434.
49 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, Book IV, Ch. III, §3, pp. 433-436.
46
47
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for its own sake and not merely as a means to some other end and that in some cases the
value of love can outweigh the value of other goods. In order to show that McTaggart’s
claims about the intrinsic value of love do match these intuitions – and so meets the first
requirement necessary to overcome the LBO – it is useful to consider the nature of the
intrinsic value that he assigns to virtue and emotions.
Virtue, according to McTaggart (and other Ideal Utilitarians like Rashdall and
Moore), consists in desiring that what is good be preserved or promoted and that what is evil
be minimized or destroyed; also, vice consists in desiring that what is evil be preserved or
promoted and that what is good be minimized or destroyed.50 Also, on McTaggart’s
terminology, only ‘volitions’ are called ‘virtuous’ or ‘wicked.’ 51 As explained in Chapter Two,
on this account virtue can be understood as a higher-order intrinsic good in the sense Hurka
outlines in Virtue, Vice, and Value. The quality “virtuous” can be attributed both to particular
volitions for or against good/evil or it can be applied to stable dispositions of the moral
agent (the character) from which particular volitions or actions arise. A virtuous ‘character’
consists in having reliable (and ideally permanent) dispositions to have virtuous desires.
Virtue and morally right action have a particular kind of intrinsic good identified as ‘moral
goodness.’ All other types of good are non-moral. Virtue must ultimately involve taking up
pro-attitudes towards some non-moral goods (in addition to moral goods) and so always
presupposes the existence of irreducibly non-moral goods. Virtue (moral goodness)
therefore, cannot be the only intrinsic good and vice (moral badness) cannot be the only
intrinsic evil.52 McTaggart adopts such an account of virtue when he describes the ideally
McTaggart, NE2, §§ 813, 815, 828-829; Rashdall, TGE1, 123; Moore, PE §107. McTaggart, Some Dogmas of Religion (London: Edward Arnold, 1906), §124, p. 152n.1: “I use virtuous and
wicked as synonyms of moral good and moral bad when the objects spoken of are volitions.” In §124,
McTaggart distinguishes between volitions and desires insofar as desires are not restricted by what one actually has
the capability to do or bring about, whereas volitions are: “And, again, no man can will anything (though he
may desire it) if he knows that he cannot possibly have any influence over the matter. I should not will that an
eruption of Vesuvius should cease, though under certain circumstances I might desire it most passionately.”
Also, volitions involve choice (among other things) (§113) whereas desires do not.
52 McTaggart, NE2, §§828-829. While one can take up a virtuous attitude towards virtue (in oneself or in
others), virtue cannot be the only intrinsic good. Since the intrinsic value of any higher-order good (such as
virtue) always depends on the intrinsic value of its object, there must be some ultimate base-level good that
determines the intrinsic value of the first higher-order level of virtue. If this was not the case, a vicious infinite
regress would occur. In the indicated sections, McTaggart defends the claim that moral goodness always
presupposes the existence of non-moral goods. He acknowledges that it could be logically possible for virtue to
be the only good if virtue only requires desiring what one believes to be good. If we hypothesize a world where
virtue is the only good, where everyone falsely believed that other things were good (e.g. pleasure), and where
people desired these ‘false goods’ because they (falsely) believed they were good, then virtue could exist as the
only good. However, McTaggart thinks that this is implausible since it would require that no one recognizes the
50
51
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virtuous person as one who “always desires what he believes to be good, and that he always
carries it out, so far as depends on his will,”53 and that “in order that a self should be
virtuous, his volitions must be directed towards what is good, or at least, to what appears to
him to be good."54
In addition to choosing to act out of considerations of what is good (bad) or right
(wrong), one can also be motivated to act without any regard for the value of the motivating
object. In such cases a person is motivated to act out of direct concern for the object (or
some property of the object). For instance, one might act directly from a desire to win some
competition (regardless of whether winning is or is not intrinsically good, in this instance or
any other). Alternatively, one might be emotionally motivated to act directly out of loving
concern for an individual person (without thinking of whether the beloved is morally
good/bad or perhaps even in spite of such considerations). Such motivations technically
cannot be classed as ‘virtuous’ for at least two reasons. First, thoughts about the goodness or
rightness of some object or act are not necessary to move us to action in these cases (our
actions are not necessarily the result of deliberations about the goodness or badness of the
object moving us). Secondly, motivating states, such as love, are not volitions.55 Do these
motivations have intrinsic value on McTaggart’s view? Is it the case that the only desires that
have moral value are those that are directed at the object qua the object’s goodness/badness of
the object and never desires that are directed at the good or bad object as the object that it is
regardless of its value?
While McTaggart does not explicitly claim that desires can have intrinsic value apart
from any explicit consideration of the ‘goodness’ of their object, his account of the object
and causes of love shows he accepts this idea for emotions like love. As was discussed at
length in Chapters One and Two, McTaggart thinks that the object of love is an individual
person qua individual person; so, while persons can bear value (or have states that bear
(assumed) true nature of the good (i.e., that virtue is the only good) and it would also imply that anyone who
knew what virtue was (i.e., the only good) could not be virtuous. McTaggart concludes that if virtue (moral
goodness) involves desiring what one believes to be good, then it is more plausible that virtue ultimately must
involve desiring non-moral goods (in addition to moral goods).
53 McTaggart, NE2, §815.
54 McTaggart, NE2, §828.
55 McTaggart, SDR, §§124, 129. “But what in this case are we to say about a loving disposition, a fervent
patriotism, or a passion for humanity? They are not volitions, or tendencies to volitions, or habits of volition.
They are not volitions, or tendencies to volitions, or habits of volition. Nor can they be obtained by willing.
(They must of course, be distinguished from resolutions to act in certain ways. A man’s will can cause him to
act as if he loved his wife, or country, or mankind, but it cannot make him love them.” (§129, pp. 158-159.)
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value), the object of love is not a value-quality like ‘goodness’ or any particular good state
(this would be “admiration”). Also, the sense of intimate union that is a necessary and
sufficient condition of love need not necessarily involve any explicit awareness of the
intrinsic value of the person loved. Once that attitude of love arises, one possible result of
love is that we come to a deeper appreciation of the intrinsic value and importance of the
beloved, but this valuation of the beloved is not included among the necessary and sufficient
conditions for loving. On his view all emotions and desires will have some object and all will
involve some pro- or con- orientation towards that object. The intrinsic value of such an
attitude (as was demonstrated in Chapter Two) is a function of the objective value of its
object and its appropriateness/proportionality in relation to its object. It is not necessary,
however, that the person having the attitude recognize the object as good or bad or
recognize the attitude as appropriate or inappropriate in order for the attitude itself to be
intrinsically good or bad.
Hurka has distinguished two alternative accounts of higher-order intrinsic goods: the
‘emotionalist’ and the ‘intellectualist’ accounts.56 Intellectualist accounts take the object of
the pro-orientation to be (at least partly) the goodness/badness of the object. Such
intrinsically good attitudes, on this view, always involve a judgment that ‘x is good/bad.’ Any
conative or emotional response lacking this value judgment about the object cannot count as
virtue higher-order intrinsic good. On the other extreme is the ‘emotionalist’ account that
holds that the object of the intrinsically valuable pro-attitude is a particular thing or quality
(other than goodness or badness) itself, independent of any judgment of its value. It is
desired as the thing that it is, and not because that kind of thing is also judged to have value.
Between these two extremes are mixed views: these accept that both kinds of pro-attitude
can have higher-order intrinsic value. One might hold that the ‘intellectualist’ orientation is
relatively more valuable, or that the ‘emotionalist’ orientation is more valuable, or that they
are equally valuable; whichever it may be, both kinds of attitude are acknowledged to be
higher-order intrinsic goods. Insofar as the goodness of an object can be (and sometimes is)
the object of an intrinsically good desire (virtue) and insofar as the object of some desires
and emotions are objects considered independently of their value, McTaggart clearly propose
a hybrid emotionalist-intellectualist view.

56

Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value, pp. 173-180.
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4.7 McTaggart’s Defense of the Claim that Love has a “Unique and
Supreme” Goodness (Value)

4.7.1

The Nature of Existence

McTaggart believed that, apart from quantitative considerations (amount, intensity, duration,
etc.), there was no general rule or principle to guide the selection of one good over another
in cases where pursuing/promoting both goods is not possible under the circumstances. If
two courses of action would produce results containing roughly the same amount of value of
two different kinds, the preference of one option over the other would be ‘a particular
ultimate judgement of value,’ that could not be universalized.57 All values, however, are
commensurable: they can be meaningfully compared in terms of their relative quantity of
value. For any quantity of a valifying characteristic (pleasure, knowledge, virtue, love, etc.,)
there will be a quantity of value (net goodness or badness) assigned to the bearer of that
characteristic (the good/bad conscious state or conscious being). For example, if there are
roughly58 x units of pleasant feeling, then there will be roughly y units of goodness/badness
correlated with that pleasant feeling; and, if there are roughly x units of loving emotion, then
there will be roughly y units of goodness/badness correlated with that loving emotion. One
implication of this is that for some amount of love, there will presumably be some quantity
of knowledge or virtue having a value that is greater than the value of that quantity of love.59
Yet despite his strict commitment to aggregation and commensurability, McTaggart
was perhaps best known for his claim that love (of persons) ought to be ranked highest
among all intrinsic values. Such a view claims that love is the most important good and
ought to be treated as such when comparing it to other values in practical reasoning
(prudential or ethical). For an Ideal Utilitarian, this implies that the promotion or
McTaggart NE2, §813.
McTaggart does not think that these quantities will be as precise as other quantitative
measurements/comparisons (such as our quantification of surface area or temperature, for example). All that
he requires are estimates that generally clear enough to allow for meaningful comparisons. This is discussed in
more detail in Chapter Five.
59 McTaggart, NE2, §§ 869-870: McTaggart imagines two lives: 1) a life containing every kind of good
(knowledge, virtue, pleasure, love, etc.) in some large (but finite) amount and lasting for some long (but finite)
amount of time. 2) a life containing only a slight surplus of pleasure over pain (and no other good or evil). He
concludes that at some point there will be a lifespan for the second kind of life that will have a greater sum of
value than the first life. The length of this second type of life would have to be very long, but such an amount
is conceivable. McTaggart accepts that implications of strict aggregation, like this, may be “repugnant” to some,
but he still insists that there is no a priori reason to rule out such conclusions.
57
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maintenance of love (whether the instance of love in question involves me or not) ought to
have pro tanto priority over considerations of other values in ethical evaluations and any
proposed decision-making procedure. It also implies that an ideal world would be the one
conducive to the most love possible (all things considered). Yet, given his commitment to
aggregation and commensurability, how can he defend his claim that love is the “highest” or
“most important” intrinsic good?
It is noteworthy that, at least in The Nature of Existence, McTaggart does not claim to
“prove” that love is the highest ranked good. He thinks that this is a judgement that is
“ultimate.” It cannot be inferred from more basic premises; instead, it is experienced as selfevident after careful reflection on the nature of love and all other kinds of goods and values.
Though McTaggart claims one cannot prove that love is the most important good, he does
think there are indirect ways to defend this hypothesis. Without appealing to any
metaphysical conclusions about the universe, he proposes a defense of the possibility of this
hypothesis solely on considerations about the nature of each kind of value.60
McTaggart considers a number of possible avenues for defending the logical
possibility (conceivability) of the hypothesis that love has ‘supreme and unique’ value only to
reject them.61 First, he notes that his value pluralism rules out claiming that love is ‘unique
and supreme’ because it is the only intrinsic good. Next, he rules out defending the
hypothesis by claiming that all other goods are dependent on love. This defense would claim
that insofar as love is a necessary condition for the possibility of other values, it is the most
important value.62 McTaggart rejects this option because he observes that at least some
intrinsic values can be conceived to exist independently of the existence of love. In particular
McTaggart does provide a metaphysically based argument supporting the view that love is the highest value,
but I will not consider this here. (See NE2, Chapter LXVII: “Total Value in the Universe.”) Dennis McKerlie,
considers the metaphysical argument in his recent article “McTaggart on Love,” especially pp. 73; 77-86.
61 McTaggart, NE2, §850.
62 c.f. Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), §246, p.
609-610. Perry links the meaning of ‘importance’ in comparisons of value to the concept of ‘causal relations.’
Insofar as a cause [or condition] is necessary for an effect, it is ‘important,’ and insofar as a ‘cause’ makes a task
easier or it has more effects, it can be relatively ‘more important,’ than other ‘causes’ [conditions] which do not.
His example states that a laboratory’s ‘mechanic’ is more important the laboratory’s ‘director’ in this sense. It is
interesting to note that, intuitively, there is also another sense in which the director is more ‘important’ insofar
as she has more authority. Joseph Butler clearly outlines a distinction between the ‘importance’ related to
‘strength/power’ and the importance related to ‘authority.’ The first is a purely descriptive sense of ‘important’
(what is in fact the most powerful element at issue) and the second sense of ‘important’ is normative insofar as
something ought to be ranked the highest (on some criteria), whether it is ranked this way or not as a matter of
fact. The relation McTaggart rejects here is not ‘causal,’ but it does involve a kind of conditionality that makes
it analogous to ‘causal’ connections.
60
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he suggests that the values that correlate to the valifying characteristics of knowledge,
fullness of life, and virtue are all possible independent of love. One can conceive of
conscious states that are true, vivid, and virtuous independent of whether or not one also has
emotional states towards persons that are loving. Thirdly, McTaggart rejects defending the
supremacy of love on the grounds that love is “eternal,” and all other values are not.
McTaggart seems to reject this view on the grounds that any considerations for thinking that
love is eternal (or not) will also apply equally to the other values making all other values
equally eternal (or not) and thereby making a ‘ranking’ on these grounds impossible.
Fourthly,

McTaggart

entertains

the

strategy

of

claiming

that

love

is

“incommensurably” better than all other goods. He states,
Can we say that love is incommensurably [lexically] better than any other
good? This seems attractive, but I cannot think it is correct. If it were so, it
would follow that, starting from any standpoint – my own at present, for
example – the smallest conceivable increase in love would be better than the
greatest possible increase in knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life.
And it does not seem to me that this is true.63
He identifies this option as “attractive,” but ultimately rejects it because he suggests
it results in judgements that are counter-intuitive. He thinks that if love is ranked infinitely
higher than all other goods, then no matter what one’s current condition is, we would be able to
judge a priori that it will always be better to select the smallest possible increase in love over
the greatest possible increase in knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life;64 he thinks it
is absurd to claim a priori that it is always better to choose this way, regardless of the relative
quantities of value involved for each kind of good. If one is undergoing great suffering, it
seems absurd to claim, a priori, that the smallest possible increase of loving emotions in that
person will always outweigh any possible relief that could be granted to them.65

McTaggart, NE2, §850.
McTaggart, NE2, §850. The inclusion of ‘no matter what one’s current condition is’ is important to keep in
mind in what follows. McTaggart is emphasising that one’s current condition does (at least sometimes) make a
difference. Clearly, if one is suffering greatly, the smallest possible increase of love will not outweigh the value
of any amount of relief from suffering (§853). However, if one already has a large amount of ‘happiness,’ or
‘knowledge,’ or ‘virtue,’ or ‘fullness of life’ it is possible that the value of any increase in these goods will not
have the value that the smallest increase of love can offer. This is important to note in order to see how
McTaggart can make his statements about quantification and aggregation (in the ‘oyster-life’ examples above)
consistent with the argument he advances below.
65 This, of course, ignores any additional instrumental value that love might have in causing ‘distraction’ from
pain or in allowing the discovery of some additional ‘meaning’ in painful situations. In both of these cases it is
not love’s intrinsic value that outweighs the pain, but its value combined with the value (intrinsic and
instrumental) the effects it potentially causes. Yet even if there is also some instrumental value to a small
63
64
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McTaggart offers one last possibility for accounting for the supreme and unique
importance (rank) of love in relation to all other intrinsic goods. He insists that to be ranked
as supreme it will be necessary that “no possible goodness arising from knowledge, virtue,
pleasure, or fullness of life could equal it,” and one way to conceive of love in this way is to
think that “when love reached or passes a certain point, it would be more good than any
possible amount of knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life could be.” 66 He makes it
clear that it is not necessary to believe that I (or anyone) has actually reached such a point in
order to conclude that the value has a supreme ranking; rather, he insists that this idea
“follow[s] from contemplating the nature of love, on the one hand, and of the other
[valifying] qualities on the other hand.”67 McTaggart thinks that if we look at the relation
between incremental increases in the quantity of valifying characteristics and the correlated
value of each increase for each kind of value, then love will stand out as having a unique
kind of relation between increases in valifying characteristics and the resulting overall value.
He explains this idea as follows:
For, as was pointed out in the last chapter (p. 413), it does not follow that,
because the good increased with the increase of each [valifying] quality, it
increased proportionately to it. If, in the case of the other [valifying] qualities,
the good [total value], after a certain point, should only increase
asymptotically – each successive increment of the [valifying] quality yielding a
smaller increment of good [total value] – then, in the case of those other
[valifying] qualities, there would be a limit to the good [total value] it yielded.
The good [total value] would never be complete, for another increment
would always be possible. But these increments, continually diminishing as
they would be, would never raise the [total] amount beyond the limit. And if,
on the other hand, the goodness [total value] of love did not increase
asymptotically, but directly in proportion to the love, then a certain
[threshold] amount of love would be more good than any amount of the
other qualities could be.68
So, whereas all other types of value are subject to something like ‘diminishing marginal
value,’ McTaggart suggests that the intrinsic value of love is not, and therefore this unique
feature of love justifies granting it an importance that other values lack.
McTaggart suggests that there are similar differences that exist between different
kinds of intrinsic evils. It seems plausible to him that there might be a certain point at which
increase in love, it is still implausible to claim that the intrinsic value of love (combined with this instrumental
value) will always outweigh any other increase in some other good or any other decrease in some other evil.
66 McTaggart, NE2, §851.
67 McTaggart, NE2, §851.
68 McTaggart, NE2, §852.
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love will outweigh any possible amount of error or possibly even vice. He doubts, however,
that this can ever be possible in the case of pain and suffering.69 Also, McTaggart explicitly
notes that “there is no reason to suppose that hatred has a unique position among evils, even
if love has a supreme and unique position among goods.”70 Broad suggests that McTaggart’s
claims about intrinsic badness are best understood if one assumes that McTaggart believed
that the value of painful states has a similar form of direct proportionality to the quantity of
pain as proposed for love and if one assumes that the relation between the quantity of all
other bad valifying characteristics and their value is asymptotic, just like all the ‘goods’
besides love.71
The chart below summarizes the kinds of relationships that exist between increases
in the quantity of a valifying-characteristic and increases in the corresponding quantity of
value for every kind of value (positive and negative):72

McTaggart, NE2, §853. See also McKerlie, “McTaggart on Love,” p. 76.
McTaggart, NE2, §853.
71 Broad, Examination of Mr. McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. 2, Part 2, pp. 680-681.
72 For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that the asymptotic function of the quantity and value of all nonlove gods and all non-pain evils is the same. I have also tried to capture the idea that the disvalue of a certain
amount of pain can outweigh the disvalue of similar amounts of love by making the ratio between the quantity
of pain and its value be 2:1 as opposed to the ratio of 1:1 used for the quantity of love and its value. Love, if
there is enough of it, could always outweigh certain finite amounts of pain (and vice versa), but representing
their functions this way represents the intuition that ‘relieving pain’ is generally more important than promoting
love, an implication which I think is consistent with McTaggart’s treatment of pain and will make his overall
ethical theory much more consistent with common sense moral views.
69
70

Total Value Attributed to the Value-Bearer
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Diminishing Value of Increases of Valifying Characteristics
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Figure 2: The relationship between the quantity of additional goods and the value of those additional
goods as proposed by McTaggart in the Nature of Existence for each kind of intrinsic good.

If we assume that the blue line [the line second from the top: “Other Intrinsic Goods”]
represents knowledge, this graph shows that as one adds more knowledge to existing
knowledge, the increase in overall value will eventually approach a limit. Each increase to the
total quantity of knowledge will still increase the total intrinsic value, but the amount of this
increase diminishes as the total ‘pool’ of previous knowledge gets larger. So while the
amount of new knowledge that can be produced in the universe is never ‘complete’ there is a
limit to the total intrinsic value that can be assigned to any amount of knowledge, no matter
how much knowledge is introduced.73 The amount of value that results from each increase in

This seems plausible if we first learned the core facts about the world and then moved on to learn about the
details. At some point any addition to knowledge will be some piece of ‘trivia.’ McTaggart suggest that the
value of additional knowledge diminishes like this in Nature of Existence, Volume I¸§88: “It is true, no doubt, that
the occurrence of these [derivative] qualities and relations becomes of less and less interest and importance as
we go down the series. It may be very important that ‘A is good.’ But the additional fact that A has the quality
of ‘being a term in a relationship of inherence between himself and goodness’ could scarcely be interesting to
73
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the amount of love is directly proportionate to the quantity of love introduced at each point.
This is represented by the red line [the top line: “Love”]. Given this relationship between the
quantity of loving emotion and the resulting value it adds to the universe, there is no limit to
the amount of value that can be produced by introducing more love. On McTaggart’s
proposal, love is supreme because for any non-love good there is a certain quantity after
which any addition of love to a life (or to the world) would have more value than any further
addition of that non-love good. Presumably, this importance is grounded in the idea that at
some ideal point – once a sufficient level of certain kinds of goods (and lack of evils) has
been attained – promoting love and relieving suffering will always be the most efficient ways
to make things better and are therefore entitled to special prima facie standing in moral
deliberations (even in imperfect conditions where maximizing or reducing other kinds of
goods may actually make things better overall). Another way to explain this idea would be to
say that for some definite quantity of each good (except for love) the world reaches a value
“saturation point” at which no further amount of that good will make the world significantly
better.
McTaggart does not explain why the value of each increase of love to the universe
does not diminish as love accumulates. Presumably, he must be assuming that if it is possible
to bring about new love or deepen existing forms of love, then the mere fact that a certain
amount of love has already been attained (by myself or others) does not necessarily
‘trivialize’ or diminish these additions. For instance, it would seem odd to say that the fact
that a grandparent already loves her existing ten grandchildren means that her love for the
eleventh is only trivial, or somehow diminishes in value. One might grow suspicious of the
authenticity of someone’s love if they claimed to love too many people as ‘close friends,’
(given the actual physical, temporal, and psychological limitations of human beings there
seems to be a limit on how many people an individual can authentically love in this way);
nonetheless, if it is assumed that someone does actually have authentic love for a new friend,
in addition to the many friends they already have, it would be odd to say that this new
friendship would be trivial in the way that accumulating more information becomes trivial at
a certain point.

any sane man, except as an example of a derivative quality. But a fact does not cease to be a fact because no
sane man would be interested in it.”
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The most daunting challenge facing this proposal is that in order to maintain that
love has ‘supreme’ importance, McTaggart would have to show that only love can have this
kind of proportional relationship between the amount of love and the value of love.
McTaggart does not provide any reason for thinking that love is actually the only good to
have this characteristic. Presumably, some might think that increases in virtue (virtuous
desires, dispositions, or acts) do not diminish in value the more virtue there already is in the
world. I am not sure how McTaggart could possibly defend the claim that love is the only
good that has this feature and so I do not think this argument can establish that love is
supremely important.
This, however, may not be a problem in relation to addressing the love-based
objection. Those who advance the LBO are primarily concerned with ensuring that love is
duly recognized as highly important; there is no reason to think that the LBO requires that
love be recognized as supremely important.74 If other goods, such as virtue, turn out to also
have the same kind of proportional relationship as love does, then one could conclude the
both virtue and love are among the ‘most important’ kinds of goods and including love
among those values at the top is surely a good starting-point for assuring the love-based
critic that love is being given its proper axiological due. Of course, the proponent of the
LBO will also require that one’s ethical theory does not, by the very nature of its structure,
prejudice against love. Even if one’s axiology acknowledges that love is important, one must
also ensure that one’s criteria for moral rightness and one’s decision making procedures do
not systematically discriminate against or prevent love (even if unintentionally). This aspect
of the LBO is addressed in the next chapter.

4.7.2

1906 Correspondence with Hastings Rashdall

In an unpublished correspondence with Rashdall, McTaggart also proposed that love is the
most important good. In Theory of Good and Evil (1907), Hastings Rashdall claimed that it is a
“simple and ultimate deliverance of the moral conscience [rational capacity for moraljudgment]” that virtue is the “greatest of goods,” and the “most important element in the
good [ideal objective well-being,]” and claims that it “must always be paramount in the ideal
Insofar as proponents of the LBO, such as Stocker, take issue with ethical systems that exhibit “moral
chauvinism” (i.e. that assume that virtue/doing what is right (moral value) always trumps other values) it would
be inconsistent for them to arbitrarily grant other values absolute supremacy instead. For example, see: Stocker,
“Friendship and Duty,” pp. 224-225.
74
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man.”75 This clearly conflicts with McTaggart’s claim that love ought to be recognized as the
most important intrinsic good. If virtue is the most important good for Rashdall, then where
does ‘love’ fall in his rankings? He argues that though virtue holds the highest rank among
intrinsic goods, love may be closely linked to the actual exercise and attainment of virtue and
is therefore very important and intimately linked to moral goodness. According to Rashdall,
a virtuous person will be someone who is able to correctly identify what conscious states are
best for a person to have (whether the person in question is oneself or others) and who
reliably seeks to promote such intrinsically good states whenever doing so is in her power.
For Rashdall, the best possible objective combination of intrinsically good states for a
person is that person’s [objective] “Well-being.”76 Rashdall concludes that ideal virtue is
expressed in the form of “ideal love of mankind” or “rational love of persons (including in due
measure self-love),” so long as “this love of persons be taken to include a desire of various
goods for them [the beloved] in proportion to their [the goods] relative value, and in
particular a predominant desire for their [the beloved’s] moral Well-being.”77
McTaggart had been asked by Rashdall to review a draft of Theory of Good and Evil,
and in 1906 McTaggart provided a series of detailed comments in response. In one
comment, McTaggart challenged Rashdall’s claim that it is self-evident that virtue is the
highest ranked intrinsic good as follows:
I admit that goodness of conduct [virtue] has worth. But the “highest
absolute worth”? It seems to me, at any rate, clear that it would be better that
a man should be rather less virtuous in heaven than rather more virtuous in
hell (assuming that the universe was ruled by the Devil who damned the
exceptionally virtuous.) Again, it seems to me clear that love is higher than
Rashdall, TGE1, 107. Rashdall uses a number of different terms for ‘virtue’ that he appears to treat as
synonymous in this passage: “morality,” “goodness of conduct,” “performance of duty, “and “sense of duty” I
have opted to just use ‘virtue’ to cover all of these phrases for simplicity’s sake.
76 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907),
pp. 57-60. “Happiness represents satisfaction with one's existence as a whole with the past and the future as
well as with the immediate present. Happiness certainly cannot be identified with pleasure, not even with the
higher or more refined kinds of pleasure. It is possible to get an enormous amount of pleasure into one's life of
pleasures that are recognized as having a value and even a high value and yet to be on the whole unhappy
through the presence of desires which are unsatisfied, dissatisfaction with the past , anxiety as to the future,
unfulfilled aspirations, baffled hopes and the like. … Perfect happiness is no doubt an ideal, but it is a different
ideal from that of perfect Well-being. It is an ideal which, at least for people who have in their way higher
desires and aspirations, is closely connected with the highest elements in life, but still it cannot safely be made
the sole and direct object of pursuit by each individual for himself. Perfect Well-being would doubtless include
perfect happiness, but it would include much more than we ordinarily mean by happiness. The idea of
happiness can no more be dispensed with in any concrete account of the ideal life than the idea of pleasure,
and can equally little be identified with that of value.” See also: TGE1, p. 123.
77 Rashdall, TGE1, 128.
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virtue (although perhaps, for that very reason, requiring virtue as a stepping
stone.) It seems I can no more argue these points than you can. They are
ultimate for me.78
The challenge asks the reader to imagine alternative states of affairs and make comparative
value judgements. The argument is not as complicated as that put forward in Nature of
Existence; instead, it merely asks the reader to carefully consider one’s own intuitive
preferences when presented with a choice between to different goods. McTaggart thinks that
it is possible to imagine a world having slightly less virtue for the sake of more happiness or
more love (perhaps this is a world where people break promises in order to attend to the
person she loves) that is, on the whole, more intrinsically valuable than a more ‘virtuous’
world having less happiness or love in it (perhaps a world where all promises are kept but
the number/intensity of loving relations between people drops as a result). McTaggart and
Rashdall both agree that virtue and love are core components of well-being (in Rashdall’s
sense of the term) and both agree that at some point some quantity of one good would
outweigh the value of the other good; nonetheless, they disagree on the ranking and relation
between the two. For Rashdall, virtue is the highest ranked good. Love will be required to
attain and express the most perfect form of well-being, but for Rashdall, virtue is the most
important good a person ought to desire. For McTaggart, love is the highest ranked good.
Virtue may be required in order to attain and express love in its most perfect form, but love
is the most important good. In this regard it does seem that each philosopher has reached a
point where the reader must assess the ‘self-evidence’ of each philosopher’s claims and see
how those claims fit with the rest of their intuitions. If one cannot decide with certainly
between the two, it seems to me that one might also take a kind of middle ground and
recognize the weaker claim that (at the very least) love and virtue are two of the most
important intrinsic goods while remaining agnostic about whether one is ‘more important’
than the other.79

McTaggart. “Comments on Rashdall’s Theory of Good and Evil.” Letter: April 28, 1905. Pg. 81. This
comment was made available to me by my supervisor, Anthony Skelton, who had access to the original
comments through “Papers of Hastings Rashdall,” pp. 79-127, at the Special Collections at Bodleian Library,
Oxford University Library Services.
79 Alternatively, one could question the plausibility that some intrinsic goods are more important than others.
For instance, one might acknowledge the legitimacy of a plurality of intrinsic goods (and evils) but deny that
there is any possible ranking of such values independent of considerations of actual quantity. Since both
Rashdall and McTaggart both assume that such rankings are at least prima facie plausible, I do not pursue this
option here. I am grateful to Anthony Skelton for pointing this out to me.
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4.7.3

Other Considerations in Favour of Ranking Love among the Most Important
Intrinsic Goods

In addition to describing love as a pleasant emotion (and so as a hedonistic good as he does
in the early works), McTaggart sometimes seems to describe love as a perfectionist intrinsic
good. As an intrinsically good capacity, the fullest development and exercise of each person’s
capacity for love ought to be promoted as much as possible (in a way that is compatible with
the fullest development and exercise of other intrinsically good capacities). Love, however, is
not a purely isolated or private phenomenon: through loving we establish a certain kind of
intimate relationship, unity, and bond between individuals and so love produces a certain
kind of society between individual persons. Mander interprets McTaggart as describing love
as the capacity for establishing a unique subject-subject approach to others as opposed to the
subject-object approach that is established through other attitudes of knowing, willing, or
emotion.80 The nature of this relationship is such that it is highly conducive to the highest
appreciation and development of intrinsically good capacities in persons (both the lover and
the beloved, and possibly those who witness their love). For example, McTaggart states
We have now determined the nature of perfected knowledge and volition, as
far as the formal conditions of perfection will allow us to go. What is the
concrete and material content of such a life as this? I believe it means one
thing, and one thing only – love. … And I do mean passionate, all-absorbing,
all-consuming love. … [In a perfectly conceived community of persons] [w]e
should find ourselves in a world composed of nothing but individuals like
ourselves [perfected persons]. With these individuals we should have been
brought into the closest of all relations, we should see them, each of them, to
be rational and righteous. And we should know that in and through these
individuals our own highest aims and ends were realised. What else does it
come to? To know another person thoroughly, to know that he conforms to
my highest standards, to feel that through him the end of my own life is
realised – is this anything but love?81
And later,
It is clear that no emotion can be the ultimate form of spirit, unless it regards
all objects as individual spirits. For the dialectic shows us that, till we regard
them thus, we do not regard them rightly. And the dialectic shows us, also,
that we do not regard them rightly till we know them to be in complete
harmony with ourselves, and with one another. To regard all that we find
round us as persons, to feel that their existence is completely rational, and
that through it our own nature is realised, to experience unalloyed pleasure in
80
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Mander, “McTaggart on Love,” pp. 144-146.
McTaggart, SHC, §271.
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our relations to them this is a description to which only one emotion
answers.82
Love both brings about perfection in the lover and at the same time also relates the lover
towards the beloved in a way that recognizes the beloved’s capacity for (and/or achievement
of) her own intrinsically valuable perfection. In other words, love is one of the most
important ways through which persons can relate to each other as ends-in-themselves. Love,
therefore, will be an important and core element for forming a perfect community of perfect
persons.83 That love produces a relationship allowing for the instantiation (in persons) of the
intrinsic good of love, and that it is conducive to the more general perfection of persons on
the whole gives it a uniquely important kind of instrumental value in addition to its uniquely
important intrinsic value. In summary, love is essential to both the perfection of individuals
and the perfection of society.
The fact that the promotion of loving emotions in individuals (and the loving
relationships through which they are expressed) is both compatible with the perfection of
others and may actually contribute positively towards the improvement of intrinsically good
capacities in others, means that love has features that would qualify it as a kind of “common
good” as understood by Perfectionists like T. H. Green. The exact meaning of the common
good in Green (and his followers) is highly disputed among interpreters of his work.
Nonetheless, in general it seems that the supreme good, or ultimate aim, of ethics can be
understood as the attainment of certain goods that are (among other things) nonexclusive/non-competitive and social/common.84 Goods are non-exclusive/non-competitive
when the attainment of that good by one person does not necessarily deprive another person
of equal (or even greater) opportunities to attain the same good. These types of good are

McTaggart, SHC, §283.
McTaggart, “Individualism of Value,” p.443. While love forms this kind of relationship, it is important to
note that McTaggart insists that the value of love does not inhere in the relationship existing between two
people, but in the person in whom the capacity for love is active and in the person who is loved. He says: “But the
[loving] relation is not good, though both of the terms are good because they have this relation. And though
there is only one relation, there are two goods. It is good that A should love [B]. It is good that B should be
loved [by A]. And these goods are two and not one, thought they are causally connected.” That love produces a
relationship that allows for the instantiation of the intrinsic good of love in individuals, and that it is conducive
to the more general perfection of persons on the whole gives it a uniquely important kind of instrumental value
in addition to its uniquely important intrinsic value.
84 Thomas, Geoffrey. The Moral Philosophy of T. H. Green. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. Pp. 249-255; Brink,
David O., “Self-Realization and the Common Good,” in T. H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy,
Ed. Maria Dimova-Cookson and W. J. Mander. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. 17-46.
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therefore ‘compossible.’85 Goods are social/common if the attainment of that good by one
person is intimately linked to the good of at least some other persons and so cannot be
pursued without some direct concern for the good of another.86 According to the
perfectionist systems, any goods lacking these qualities cannot be counted among the most
important intrinsic goods that comprise the ultimate aim of all ethical actions. Love, as
described by McTaggart, is both compossible with the promotion of love (and other
important intrinsic goods) in others and by its essence links the good of the lover directly
with the good of the beloved. Therefore, it could be argued on these grounds that love
qualifies as one of the most important intrinsic goods because it has the features Green and
other Perfectionists identified as indices of the most important kinds of goods (as opposed
to other goods which are more exclusive/competitive and less social).
In my opinion, this final option is the most plausible way to defend the idea that love
is one of the most important goods we ought to pursue as part of a good and moral life
based on McTaggart’s conception of love, his value theory, and his Ideal Utilitarian moral
framework. Emphasizing the non-competitive and social aspects of love can help capture
the intuition that increases in love do not seem to diminish in value the way that some other
goods might. I think that it also helps explain why love and virtue seem so intimately
connected, as is evidenced in the aforementioned disagreement between Rashdall and
McTaggart over which good (love or virtue) was ‘supreme.’ It is clear that both philosophers
wanted to claim that love and virtue were related; where they seemed to differ was in their
emphasis as to which should ultimately be preferred over the other if forced to choose.
Thinking of love as one of the ways through which persons are able to mutually engage each
other as ends-in-themselves and through which each can establish stable motivations to
promote the perfection of oneself and the other (for the sake of the other) intimately links
love and morality, even if conflicts between them are still possible. I think that the most
plausible conclusion is that love and virtue are both highly important goods that are linked in
a very intimate way. Any plausible moral philosophy will have to ensure that both values are
given due priority and consideration, and it will have to ensure that there is a minimal
amount of conflict between the two goods in its dictates. I will try to make the case in the

85
86

Thomas, The Moral Philosophy of T. H. Green, pp. 253-255.
Brink, “Self-Realization and the Common Good,” pp. 38-39.

148
next chapter that McTaggart’s Ideal Utilitarianism (with some supplementation) does allow
him to do this in the way required to overcome the LBO.
So, though McTaggart cannot prove that love is the most important and highest
ranked good, he does identify a number of distinctive features of love that distinguish it
(positively) from other goods. It seems to me that the fact that love and loving relations
provide a way to value individual persons in their uniqueness; provides a way to value
persons as intrinsically important; springs forth from, maintains, and strengthens an intimate
bond between individuals; provides motives and reasons to promote the good of those we
love; exercises a human capacity to respond to what is good with an intense and deeply felt
pro-attitude; and provides us with one of the most intrinsically satisfying, pleasant, and
positive emotional experiences possible, are all reasons to at least recognize love as one of
the most important intrinsic goods alongside happiness, autonomy, virtue, and achievement.

4.8 Summary of Chapter Four
In conclusion, it is clear that McTaggart proposed the kind of value pluralism required for
overcoming the LBO. McTaggart clearly recognizes love as one of the most important
intrinsic goods (even though, perhaps, his more ambitious claim that love is the ‘supreme’
good is untenable). Since the proponents of the LBO are primarily concerned with ensuring
that love is granted proper weight and importance in axiological and moral considerations,
there would be no grounds for objecting to McTaggart’s view in this regard. I have also
suggested that there is reason to think that McTaggart recognizes the intrinsic value of
persons (and if he did not actually adopt this view, that his work as a whole strongly points
in this direction). The discussion of McTaggart’s philosophy of love in Chapters One and
Two also showed that through love we come to value the beloved person for their own sake
and that through love the beloved is recognized as having an intrinsic importance
comparable to that each of us assigns to ourselves. Again, since proponents of the LBO are
concerned to prevent the “dehumanization” of the beloved by reducing them to a mere bearer
of value (having no intrinsic value of its own) or a mere means to some other good, there
should be no grounds for criticizing McTaggart in these regards. Finally, McTaggart
explicitly recognizes that while both love and virtue are components of a good and moral
life, he also recognizes that it is possible that the value of love can outweigh the value of
virtue (i.e., what one ought to desire from the impartial perspective of morality). In such
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cases, love and morality genuinely conflict and yet the goodness of love is not thereby
threatened. Again, proponents of the LBO want to allow for reasons of love to potentially
outweigh certain moral demands and they also want to allow the possibility of some form of
conflict between virtue and love. So, finally, in these regards it seems there are no grounds
for objecting to McTaggart’s moral philosophy either.
Nonetheless, having a moral philosophy based upon value pluralism is only a
necessary condition for overcoming the LBO; on its own it is not sufficient. It remains to be
shown that there is no reason to think that genuinely following McTaggart’s version of Ideal
Utilitarianism in living one’s life will systematically prejudice against the goods of love and so
reliably reduce or prevent occurrences of love in one’s own life or the lives of others. The
next chapter will look at how a version of McTaggart’s Ideal Utilitarianism, supplemented
with insights from Rashdall’s own Ideal Utilitarian theory, has the remaining three features
required to overcome the LBO.
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5 Sophisticated Ideal Utilitarianism and Overcoming the
Love-Based Objection
The last chapter argued that there is good reason to interpret McTaggart’s axiological theory
as assigning love, loving relationships, and the person loved the kind of intrinsic value that is
required to accommodate our intuitions about the importance of love in living a good and
moral life. It therefore has the first feature required for overcoming the love-based objection
(LBO) to consequentialism:
Value Pluralism: any plausible version of consequentialism must recognize
a plurality of intrinsic goods and in particular it must recognize that love,
loving relationships, and the person loved are intrinsically valuable.
Nonetheless, as the proponents of the love-based objection have observed, we think that
acting for the sake of the beloved and acting out of direct concern for the beloved are deeply
important parts of living a good life and, so, such reasons and motives ought to be integrated
harmoniously with one’s moral motives and reasons. These critics, however, also noted that
it is not possible to integrate the motives and reasons of love with the motives and reasons
of consequentialist morality (‘for the sake of doing what is right/best’ and ‘out of concern
for doing what is right/best’) at the same level and in the same actions. Defenders of
consequentialism have suggested that such problems can be resolved through a recognition
of the distinction between the ‘criterion of rightness’ and the ‘decision-making procedures’
and by adopting the moral psychology outlined in theories such as Peter Railton’s account of
‘sophisticated consequentialism.’ Is McTaggart able to distinguish between a criterion of
rightness and a decision-making procedure? And is his system consistent with the moral
psychology outlined in sophisticated consequentialism? Ultimately, is McTaggart able to
overcome the LBO in the way that contemporary philosophers have suggested?
In this chapter I will argue that McTaggart’s moral philosophy (supplemented at
times with Rashdall’s account of ideal utilitarianism) is a form of sophisticated
consequentialism and is therefore able to overcome many of the love-based objections. In
the first section, I argue that McTaggart does make the required distinctions, and that if his
theory is supplemented by observations made by Rashdall, one can account for how one can
embody consequentialist aims and reasons in the agent’s overall dispositional structure while
also recognizing that loving dispositions are reliable optimizing decision-making procedures.
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In the last section I will bring together the various conclusions from the previous chapters of
this dissertation and argue that a version of sophisticated Ideal Utilitarianism based upon
McTaggart’s moral philosophy is able to overcome the LBO to consequentialism in the way
proposed by contemporary philosophers such as Peter Railton and Elinor Mason.

5.1 McTaggart’s Argument for a Multi-Leveled (Indirect) Version of
Ideal Utilitarianism: A Summary and Assessment
According to Ideal Utilitarianism, the criterion of rightness states that an action is right
insofar as it contributes to the best possible state of affairs (maximizes net aggregate good).
As we have seen, according to McTaggart’s value theory, the best conceivable state of affairs
(the “supreme good”) will include a plurality of goods and (according to the early works)
these goods can be divided into two kinds: hedonistic goods and perfectionist goods.
However, as McTaggart (and many others) observed, identifying intrinsic values and
providing a criterion of rightness is not sufficient for constructing an adequate ethical theory;
one must also provide a criterion that will allow us to guide our conduct or behaviour:
It does not follow, however, that, because we have determined the supreme
good, we have therefore determined the criterion of morality. They can be
identical, no doubt, but they need not be so. The object of a criterion is
merely practical – to guide our actions towards a good.1
The main reason that the criterion of goodness is not necessarily identical to the criterion of
moral rightness is that the criterion of rightness is limited by considerations of what human
agents can actually (at least partially) cause. Axiological systems seek to identify and
systematize (as much as possible) all possible kinds of intrinsic value and all possible kinds of
value-bearers. They therefore aim at providing criteria for identifying valid forms of
axiological judgements. McTaggart notes that value judgements can be made about any
conceivable state of affairs. He states that “[t]he idea of the good comes from that
paradoxical power which is possessed by every conscious member of the universe – the
power to judge and condemn part or all of that very system of reality of which he himself is
a part.”2 Many moral philosophers during McTaggart’s time thought that value judgements
that ‘x is good’ are always also correlated (somehow) with normative judgements that ‘x
ought to exist.’ Rashdall described both kinds of judgments as ‘correlative’ or mutually
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implying concepts, which would suggest that they are equally fundamental3 and Moore seems
to suggest something similar at one point.4 Sorley suggests that, “[w]hen we predicate worth
or value we assert or imply that the object is worth being or ought to be5.” Yet, regardless of the
exact nature of the necessary relationship, it is clear that for these philosophers value
judgements always involve normativity in some sense: axiology is a normative discipline and
not merely a descriptive science. Both judgements that “x is good’ and that “x ought to
exist” cannot be derived from any claim about what ‘is.’ Also, whether a state of affairs is
actual, possible, necessary, contingent, near, far, past, present, or future, we can judge that it
is (overall) good/bad in itself or better/worse than some other state of affairs and so judge
that it ought/ought not exist. Such judgements can be made regardless of whether or not
any agency is involved in bringing about, sustaining, preventing, or destroying any state of
affairs. For example, even if we knew for certain that it was the nature of the currently
existing universe to produce significantly more evil than good for every being that ever lives
in it, we could judge that this is evil (in itself) and worse than other conceivable worlds. This
is true even if the universe was merely the result of purely impersonal natural forces (not
created by any agency) and even if it was clear that the nature of the universe could not
actually be otherwise than it is.6
However, when one moves from merely axiological judgements to ethical
judgements about what one ought to do McTaggart observes that:
We must remember, also, that for a satisfactory criterion of morality we do
not require a sure test of all good, but only a sure test of such good as can
possibly be secured by our voluntary efforts to secure it. If we find a criterion
which will tell us this, it will be unnecessary to reject it because it is not also a

Rashdall, TGE1, 138; Rashdall, Ethics (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913), pp. 14: “For both notions [‘right’
and ‘good’] really involve the fundamental conception of an ‘ought.’ If we accept this view, we shall say that the
notion of good is the notion of something which ought to be or which possesses intrinsic value the notion
‘right’ will then imply a voluntary act which ought to be done as a means to this ultimate good, whatever that
may be. The two terms will be correlative terms which mutually imply one another (just as the convex implies
the concave, or as the term ‘father’ is only intelligible if we know the meaning of ‘son’): right acts will then
mean acts which are means to the good; the good will mean an end which ought to be realized, and which
every right voluntary action tends to realize.”
4 Moore, PE, §13.2, p. 68. “Whenever he thinks of ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that a thing
‘ought to exist,’ he has before his mind the unique object – the unique property of things – which I mean by
good.”
5 W. R. Sorley, Moral Value and the Idea of God: Gifford Lectures 1914 and 1915 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1918), p. 77.
6 McTaggart, SHC, §97.
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satisfactory test of some other element of good, which we may enjoy when
we get it, but cannot get by our own action.7
And later on, that
the object of a moral criterion is strictly practical. Its object is to guide our
action. It follows from this that it is comparatively unimportant if it fails to
indicate which of two events would be the better in those cases in which our
action cannot bring about or hinder either alternative. It is no doubt
convenient to know what would be gain and what would be loss, but the real
need to know arises only when our knowledge can help us to bring about the
gain or avoid the loss.8
A unique criterion is provided by ethics and it aids in identifying what an agent ought to have
done. The ‘ethical ought’ is limited to the actual capability of an actual agent in actual
circumstances to produce the results in question (‘ought implies can’). This distinguishes the
ethical level from the axiological level since, as was just explained above, the ‘axiological
ought’ does not imply this sort of ‘can.’ In his recent book British Ethical Theorists from Ewing
to Sidgwick, Hurka notes a similar distinction in Sidgwick’s moral philosophy.9 What I am
calling the “axiological ought” is described by Hurka as the “wider sense of ought” and what
I am calling the “ethical ought” is described by him as the “narrower sense” of ought. Hurka
describes this distinction in terms of the applicability of the “ought implies can” restriction:
the wider sense (which refers to a state of affair’s correspondence to an “ideal”) is not
subject to this restriction, but the narrower sense is subject to it since this sense must
“presuppose voluntariness.” Hurka observes that for the wider sense of ‘ought’ it is difficult
to distinguish any meaningful difference between the judgements “I ought to x” and “x is
desirable/good.”10 Perhaps the best way to understand how the axiological criterion is
normative (the criterion of goodness) is to describe its dictates, as Sidgwick did, in terms of
“desire.” The criterion of goodness tells us what persons “ought (ideally) to desire”: “ideally”
because its judgments are made independent of any person’s actual capability to choose the
object of desire or to choose to have the desire at all. The ethical criterion (criterion of moral
rightness), on the other hand, tells us what persons “ought (morally) to do” and such

McTaggart, SHC, §100. (My emphasis).
McTaggart, SHC, §132, p. 125. (My emphasis.)
9 Hurka, British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to Ewing, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 44-45.
10 Hurka recommends, therefore, that the use of the term ‘ought’ in the wider sense be dropped in order to
preserve the important distinction between “normative concepts that do and do not presuppose voluntariness.”
(British Ethical Theorists, p 45.) I agree with Hurka’s reasons for restricting the term in this way in contemporary
usage. However, insofar as the ‘wider sense’ was used by McTaggart and his contemporaries I am using it here.
7
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judgements depend in an essential way upon what the person subject to the ‘ought’ is
actually capable of doing in the situation.
A third kind of criteria appears to be at work in the fourth chapter of Studies in
Hegelian Cosmology. I will call it the “criterion of choiceworthiness.” It is used to help identify
which act-option we ought, morally, to choose under highly imperfect conditions of actual
situations of choice. Unlike evaluations of objective rightness – which can be carried out by
anyone who can understand the various goods at stake and compare them and which can be
postponed until sufficient information is forthcoming – a decision must ultimately be made
solely by the decision-maker11 and cannot be postponed until better information is available
(as many philosophers have noted, postponing a decision is choosing the act-option of
‘postponement’). Furthermore, human decisions are more limited by our highly imperfect
capacities for predicting future results of our decisions and their values than is the case with
making judgements about moral rightness. Actual moral judgements about objective
rightness are only really possible after the act has been done and the resultant state of affairs
has been sufficiently realized (and even in these cases it is still difficult). In situations of
choice, one could attempt hypothetical forward-looking moral judgements about the
objective moral rightness of various potential outcomes, but this process would take a fair
amount of imagination and calculation of probabilities (formal or informal) and so it would
be very demanding on the attention and time of the evaluator – resources that are usually
much more limited under actual conditions of moral choice. So, unlike assessments of the
moral rightness/wrongness of actions, which can be done with the benefit of hindsight,
decisions that will impact the future can only be made in the highly uncertain conditions of
the present moment.
These special epistemic limitations therefore require a criterion of choiceworthiness
that will necessarily have to take into account more limitations than the criterion of rightness
and so (by the same reasoning used in regards to the goods involved in the criterion of
rightness as opposed to the criterion of goodness) it cannot be assumed that the same
intrinsic goods will be used in both of them. Moral agents in situations of moral choice
require one of two things: either 1) they need a criterion that will allow them to pick out the
option which reliably (though perhaps not infallibly) tends to be objectively right, or 2) they
Clearly, the decision-maker can seek advice in some cases, but it is ultimately up to the decision-maker
whether they will do what is advised or not. If one merely defers to an authority (which is not seeking advice,
but seeking orders) then one still ultimately decides to single out an act-option this way.
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need a procedure which will allow them to immediately/habitually respond to circumstances
in such a way that they reliably (though perhaps not infallibly) tend to do the act that is
objectively right. The criterion of choiceworthiness, or the decision-making procedure, will
only incorporate those goods that will reliably guide agents to objectively right actions.
McTaggart only considers the first option; it is not clear, however, that awareness of, or
deliberation about, every kind of good will reliably guide agents to the objectively right
action. Thinking about, or responding to, certain kinds of goods may – as a matter of fact
given human nature – tend to reliably impede objectively right action. In other cases, it
might be unreasonable to expect that we could have enough information or awareness of
certain types of goods or their effects on future states of affairs in moments of decision to
make meaningful comparisons or evaluations. An ethicist, therefore, must justify the kind of
goods that they include in their criterion of choiceworthiness by showing that considerations
about the kind of good will not prevent the decision-maker from reliably selecting the
objectively morally right act from among the various choice-options. I will consider the
justification of the kind of goods McTaggart includes in his criterion of rightness in Studies in
Hegelian Cosmology in the next section. For now it is important to note that no matter what
goods turn out to be appropriate for inclusion in the criterion of choiceworthiness, one
cannot assume that they will necessarily be the same goods contained under the other criteria
because different epistemic limitations are at play.
It is worth noting that McTaggart’s original presentation of this insight is more
confusing than it needs to be because McTaggart seems to use the term “moral criterion”
ambiguously to refer to either the criterion of rightness or the criterion of choiceworthiness.
Without careful consideration of McTaggart’s use of the term “criterion” throughout the
fourth chapter of Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (considerations which I have tried to provide
through the interpretative work here), it may not be obvious that McTaggart is actually
talking about three different criteria. He does not explicitly outline the distinction between
the criterion of rightness and criterion of choiceworthiness; however, he assumes it
throughout his argument.12 McTaggart states that his argument assumes that the agent is
already motivated to do what is ‘right’ and so presumably already has a (Ideal Utilitarian)
conception of the criterion of rightness in mind. The problem he is seeking to address arises
McTaggart only explicitly identifies the first and third of the three levels I describe here (though he only
introduces the levels as he goes along throughout the chapter). The second level is implied by McTaggart as will
be explained below.
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when an agent desires to do the right thing (i.e., the action that will contribute to the best
possible state of affairs) but is forced to choose between options where it is not immediately
obvious which option will lead to the objectively right action.13 The problem does not arise
due to a lack of good intentions in the agent, or even a lack of understanding about what is
right. What is causing the problem is that under the existing conditions it is not obvious to
the decision-maker which of the options is perfect or right. Each option seems to have some
features that indicate it might be the right option, and each has some features that indicate it
might not be the right option. So what is needed is some criterion, method, or habitual
response that will reliably result in the agent selecting what they ultimately seek – the
objectively right option – in situations of choice that, by their very essence, involve a unique
kind of uncertainty. Given that the distinction between the criterion of rightness and the
criterion of choiceworthiness is assumed throughout the chapter, and since he is clearly
seeking to identify a criterion of moral choiceworthiness and not a criterion of rightness, I
have introduced these terms to help differentiate the various kinds of ‘moral criterion’ at
issue.
In summary, these observations about the different sorts of limitations and criteria
involved in various aspects of morality result in McTaggart describing a multi-level form of
consequentialism. McTaggart identifies three distinct normative levels that can be present in
Ideal Utilitarian systems: the axiological, the ethical, and the deliberative. Each level
introduces its own criterion: the criteria of goodness (badness), the criterion of moral
rightness (wrongness), and the criterion of moral choiceworthiness. Each level is
distinguished from the others by considerations of the imperfect epistemic and volitional
capacities of actually existing moral agents. While the Ideal Utilitarian criterion of rightness
plays an overarching normative role in ethics, there are other criteria besides the criterion of
rightness to which an agent might refer such as the criterion of choiceworthiness. Insofar as
it is not necessary that an agent refer directly to the criterion of rightness, but may refer
directly to some criterion derived from it instead (such as the criterion of choiceworthiness),
McTaggart’s version of consequentialism is a form of indirect consequentialism.

“The practical use of ethics – and it is this we are considering – can only occur, then, when a man has resolved to
act in conformity with duty, and is not certain what course duty prescribes. Two courses of action may each be in itself
morally desirable, and may be incompatible, so that we are in doubt which to pursue.” (McTaggart, SHC¸§105.
Emphasis is mine.)
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5.2 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology: The Hedonic Criterion of
Choiceworthiness and its Justification
Since, as McTaggart observes, one cannot merely assume that the goods appealed to in the
criterion of rightness will also be included in the correct criterion of moral choiceworthiness,
he will have to provide an argument for the goods that should be included in the criterion of
choiceworthiness. In Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, he argues that even though perfectionist
goods and hedonistic goods must both be included in an Ideal Utilitarian criterion of moral
rightness, there are good practical reasons for excluding perfectionist goods from the
criterion of choiceworthiness. McTaggart’s argument is best understood as proceeding in
two stages, with the first stage divided into two parts. In the first stage, he assesses each kind
of good to see if it qualifies as a candidate for inclusion in the criterion of choiceworthiness.
Three options are considered: 1) a combination of perfectionist and hedonistic goods (as is
the case in the Ideal Utilitarian criterion of rightness); 2) solely perfectionist goods; and, 3)
solely hedonistic goods. To qualify, a particular kind of value must allow us – under
imperfect conditions – to sort and rank imperfect options in terms of that particular kind of
value. McTaggart argues that perfectionist goods are not eligible but hedonistic goods are.
Since perfectionist goods are ruled out, this means it also cannot be the case that both kinds
of goods can be included in the criterion of choiceworthiness. So, in the first part of the
argument McTaggart rules out options 1) and 2). By the process of elimination, this leaves
hedonistic goods alone as possible candidates. In the second stage of the argument,
McTaggart attempts to show that in addition to being an eligible candidate for a criterion of
rightness, hedonistic values provide us with a “correct” criterion of rightness. In order for a
criterion of choiceworthiness to be “correct” it must reliably (though not infallibly) direct the
agent towards the objectively morally right option.
McTaggart first considers perfectionist values to see if they are eligible to be included
in the criterion of choiceworthiness.14 He ultimately concludes that these kinds of values are
ineligible as criterion for guiding deliberation and action because our conceptualizations of
the various goods or ideals included in this category of value are too indeterminate to allow
us to identify any single act-option as better than another. Each perfectionist good is a
representation of a fully developed and fully exercised capacity. Such ‘ideals’ are rarely, if

14
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ever, fully realized in actual experience. This has two relevant implications. First, ‘ideals’ are
always represented either as goals to be attained, or as norms according to which various
options can be assessed according to degree to which each option more or less corresponds
to the norm. Secondly, as noted in Chapter Four, our conceptions of ‘ideals’ are usually only
vague representations of the direction in which improvement lies and not a fully worked-out,
clear, and distinct idea of what the perfect state is actually like. Both of these aspects of
perfectionist goods cause problems when we attempt to compare and distinguish act-options
on the basis of these values.
In regards to the first implication, problems arise from the fact that in most (or all)
cases the probability of any particular action of any particular individual fully realizing the
ideal in the foreseeable future are extremely low. At best, any particular action will be just
one of many events in a very long series of events that eventually lead to the full realization
of ideals (if they are ever fully realized at all). This means that for most act-options available
to an agent, the probability that any single option will ultimately lead to the full realization of
any ideal or combination of ideals is so low as to make all options practically equal on these
grounds. Such standards do not provide us a way to identify any options as better than
others nor any option as the best. McTaggart therefore rejects using perfectionist goods as
the goals according to which the instrumental value of each option is determined and
compared.
McTaggart also considers the possibility of using perfectionist ideals not as goals to
be attained, but rather as patterns or standards according to which each act-option is
compared. The agent would judge to what degree each act-option approached/fell-short of
the relevant set of ideals. Each option could then be assigned a certain degree of
imperfection and this would allow one to identify some option as ‘the least imperfect’ and so
provide moral grounds for choosing to do that action over the others. This bypasses the
problem introduced by the fact that the full realization of ideals is likely only to occur as a
result of a complex, dynamic, and long series of events in the very distant future. If each
agent always attempts to select the currently least imperfect option in each case, then it
seems plausible that doing so would be one of the best ways to ensure that things are always
improving as much as possible (or at least not getting worse). McTaggart notes, however,
that a serious problem still remains. He suggests that if we assume that we are able to
compare each act-option to the ideal standards contained under perfectionist values, each
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act-option will be perfect in some sense and imperfect in another (since presumably no actoption completely instantiates all of the ideals). One might be able to rank act-options
according to how imperfectly each instantiates one particular ideal, but it seems very unlikely
that it would ever be the case that only one ideal was at stake for any decision. The more
plausible scenario is that each act-option will imperfectly instantiate a number of different
perfectionist ideals each to a different degree. So while one act-option may be ranked highest
in terms of the way it contributes to the overall amount of virtue in the world, it might be
ranked lowest in terms of overall amount of autonomy that it allows. An alternative actoption available to the same agent in the same circumstances might be the highest in terms
of the degree to which it contributes to the instantiation of autonomy in the world, but the
lowest in terms of virtue. (Perhaps one could choose to make people do what is right
through terror and coercion or one could instead choose to try to convince people to do
what is right.) McTaggart suggests that the very kind of cases that will require the most
deliberation will be those cases in which each option, though imperfect, seems to be the least
imperfect in some regards (otherwise we would presumably reject it immediately in favour of
some other option). His concern is that it is too easy to engage in sophistical or rhetorical
reasoning where each ‘side’ of the deliberation only focuses on the particular perfection
involved in each option and ignores the fact that each is also imperfect (or alternatively each
only criticizes the other in terms of its imperfection). Even if such sophistical reasoning is
avoided, McTaggart still seems to think that in many cases the degree to which each option
is imperfect overall in terms of all ideals will be practically identical and will not allow one
sufficient grounds to explain why one act-option (though least imperfect in some regards) is
clearly better than the other available act-options.
Finally, McTaggart focuses on the Perfectionists’ own admission that our
representation of any ideal (and so also our representation of the supreme good) is
indeterminate. As noted above, though we often have a sense of the direction of
improvement, in many cases we do not have a fully worked-out positive account of what the
full realization of a particular capacity (or group of capacities) would be like. We do not have
experience of absolute perfection (either of individuals or a society which would foster such
individuals) and so it is difficult to imagine, conceive, or describe what exactly an ideal state
would be like. This adds further doubt to our ability to use perfectionist ideals in either of
the ways discussed above (as goals or as standards). If our representations of ideals are
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vague, it will be very difficult to determine – to the degree required to meaningfully compare
act-options – how imperfect any particular option actually is. While we might be able to rule
out some options which clearly move ‘in the wrong direction,’ if we are choosing between
act-options which all seem to point roughly ‘in the same way,’ how will we know which way
most resembles the ideal if we only have a rough sketch of this ideal in the first place? All of
these considerations lead McTaggart to conclude that perfectionist goods cannot be
candidates for criteria of choiceworthiness. Perfectionist ideals do not allow us to compare
and rank act-options in a way that would provide clear and decisive reasons for choosing to
do one act-options over others on moral grounds.
McTaggart considers hedonistic values next.15 McTaggart concludes that our
conceptions of ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ are determinate enough for us to compare and rank
different act-options. His arguments in support of this conclusion are primarily based upon
appeals to introspection.16 McTaggart observes that everyone has experiences of pleasure
and pain (to some degree) and we are able to make estimates about various quantities (which
are a function of durations and intensities) with a fair amount of ease through our
sympathetic and imaginative capacities (at least relative to the amount of effort required for
the estimation and comparison of ideally perfected and exercised capacities). This is in stark
contrast to our vague conceptions of perfectionist ideals. McTaggart also points out that we
actually do compare and rank both past experiences and act-options according to their overall
pleasantness or painfulness all of the time. Furthermore, such comparisons appear to be
quite meaningful. McTaggart grants that the degree of precision involved in hedonic
comparisons and rankings is not very high, but nonetheless we are able identify some
options as clearly better or worse than others. He also notes that in those cases where we
cannot discern any difference in the overall hedonic value of two act-options, it is plausible
that any actual difference (if one does exist) will not be morally significant.17 While the lack
of precision in the measurement of hedonic values might introduce some indeterminacy,
McTaggart argues that this is a different kind of indeterminateness. He states that in cases of
indeterminacies involved in hedonistic comparisons and rankings:
[t]he impossibility of decision arises, then, not from the facts of the case, but
from our ignorance about them. … There is only one difference between the
McTaggart, SHC, §§111-123.
McTaggart, SHC, §116.
17 McTaggart, SHC, §§112,123.
15
16
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difficulties I have described above as arising on my theory and these others
which exist on any theory. The latter [the difficulties related to hedonic
goods] are merely quantitative. They arise from the complexity, or the
equality, of data whose nature is not incompatible with a reasoned choice,
and which admit of such choice when the instance is simpler or less evenly
balanced.18
The vagueness involved in comparisons of perfectionist goods was rooted in our ignorance
about the ideals (the standards or goals) themselves and not merely in our inability to
precisely measure act-options according to them. Here, if doubt or disagreement arises, it
will be focused on the tools and procedures used to apply the standards (pleasure and pain)
and not on the particular understanding of the standards themselves. McTaggart argues that
any plausible criterion will result in cases where it will not be possible to rank one option
above another. The way that such cases arise for the hedonic criterion is importantly
different for McTaggart, and presumably much less likely to occur given our proficiency at
carrying out such comparisons constantly in everyday experience.
McTaggart concludes that hedonic values are therefore a candidate for a criterion of
moral choiceworthiness since it is possible to compare and rank act-options fairly often, with
relative ease, and presumably with an adequate degree of accuracy and competency. What
McTaggart must show next is that there is the right kind of connection between act-options
that are the best on hedonic grounds and act-options that are objectively morally right
according to the criterion of rightness. If hedonic values are not the most19 reliable (though
not necessarily infallible) index of right action, then they will not be a ‘correct’ criterion.

5.2.1

Pleasure is the Correct Criterion for Moral Deliberation

In the second part of “The Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion,” McTaggart argues that
the hedonic criterion is a “correct” criterion for choiceworthiness.20 To do this, he says that
we must show that the hedonic criterion will reliably (though not infallibly) select that
option which is objectively right, even though we do not have enough information in
situations of choice to know with certainty that our choice is actually objectively right for any
McTaggart, SHC, §134.
Since hedonic values are the only remaining values, what is really at issue is whether they are reliable (correct
more often than not); so, technically including ‘the most’ here is superfluous. However, if it turned out that
there were other candidates, it would be the ‘most reliable’ candidate that was the correct one, so it is
worthwhile to include it here in case it turns out that there are other options that McTaggart has not considered
or in case his case against perfectionist good is not as strong as he thought.
20 McTaggart, SHC, §§ 124-136.
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particular decision. McTaggart agrees that both perfectionist and hedonistic values are what
we might call determinants of the overall value of any action and so are both determinants of
which action is the best/morally right. However, since conditions of choice generally limit
our ability to meaningfully compare and rank act-options according to perfectionist value,
we are denied the ability to rank various act-options according to all of the determinants of
each option’s overall value. Decision makers are therefore forced to look for a “mark” or
“index” that tends to track the objectively morally correct action. By selecting options that
bear this index, one can be assured that one is making the best possible choice given the
limited information at one’s disposal in any situation of choice.
He explains such a ‘mark of choiceworthiness’ by comparing it to the advice of a
stockbroker in relation to the objective likelihood of a stock being a good investment.
A stock is not made safe by a stockbroker’s belief in it. But an ordinary
investor will find the opinion of a good stockbroker a much surer test of the
safety of a stock than could be made by his own efforts to estimate the
forces, which will be the real causes of safety or danger.21
While referring to a stockbroker’s opinion cannot be the criterion for assessing the objective
status of an investment, it can be the criterion of for choosing how to best invest one’s
money. The objective status of a stock could be established only by looking at the
determinants of its market value (for instance, market factors like supply and demand); it is
this kind of consideration that would form the basis of the stockbroker’s opinion in the first
place. “Market factors” might therefore be said to provide a criterion for ‘objectively correct
investment.’ This criterion, however, may not necessarily be the best criterion for aiding the
average investor in selecting the best stock to invest in because attempts to engage in
considerations about the determinants of market value (market forces) may be more likely to
result in monetary losses due to the average investor’s lack of the necessary amount of data
or calculating skills required for these kinds of evaluations. While no one would fault the
average investor for following good financial advice provided by a good stockbroker – even
if it turned out that the stock recommended was, as a matter of fact, not the objectively best
investment in the long run – one might still find fault with an investor who tried to assess
the merit of a stock using the highly imperfect information available to and using the highly
imperfect skills of the average investors. This means that the ‘criterion of objectively correct
investment’ is not necessarily identical to the ‘criterion for investment choiceworthiness’ for
21
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the average investor. Therefore, just as the wise investment requires a criterion of
choiceworthiness based upon an index of overall market value, McTaggart wants to argue
that something analogous to this is required in Ideal Utilitarianism; Ideal Utilitarians need to
identify an index of objective moral rightness.
McTaggart proposes that the index of the option which is objectively morally right is
the quality of ‘being that option which appears most likely to maximize net aggregate
happiness.’ In actual fact, the hedonic value of an act-option is not merely an index – it
(alongside perfectionist values) is one of the determinants of the act-option’s overall value;
however, under limited conditions of choice it must be treated merely as an ‘index’ of its
overall value since the perfectionist determinants of value are not available under these
conditions. If we are forced to make a decision between two options, making a decision
according to this ‘‘index’ will be the ‘morally correct decision.’ Making decisions based on
the ‘criterion of moral choiceworthiness’ ensures that one makes a ‘morally correct decision,’
even if it turns out that the normally reliable index failed in this particular case and led one to
select an act-option that was not actually objectively morally right. This does not imply that
McTaggart is a subjectivist about moral rightness (that he believes that moral rightness is
determined by what one believes one has most reason to do or what it is reasonable to
believe will promote the best outcomes). The moral rightness/wrongness of the act is still
determined by establishing whether or not as a matter of fact (independent of the agent’s actual
beliefs) the act performed, out of those options open to the agent, resulted in the objectively
best state of affairs. Whether my choice was “morally correct or incorrect” will be a separate
consideration, and it is only here that my actual beliefs and expectations come into play.
Insofar as I believed that the choice-option I selected had the index of moral
choiceworthiness (i.e., insofar as I reasonably believe that that option can be expected to
maximize net aggregate happiness), then I made the morally correct choice under those
conditions (even if it turned out that I did the objectively morally wrong act).22
Is it possible for ‘moral choiceworthiness’ and ‘moral rightness’ to conflict if we
assume a solely hedonistic criterion of choiceworthiness? Is it actually conceivable that the
act-option which we have reason to believe is the best in terms of aggregate happiness will
not result in the action which is best in terms of overall good (hedonistic and perfectionist)?
An implication of this is that it may make more sense – at least sometimes – to say that one has made a
choice that is blameless but which is nonetheless wrong.
22
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If the two criteria could never produce different directives, then a hedonistic criterion of
choiceworthiness would be an infallible index and therefore the argument for adopting it as
the criterion of choiceworthiness would be very straightforward. If, however, it turns out
that the ‘happiest’ option is not necessarily the morally right option in all cases, then one will
have to show that ‘happiness’ tends to be a (sufficiently) reliable index to morally right
actions, even if it is not an infallible index. It turns out that McTaggart must admit that
happiness is not an infallible index, and so must advance the more complex defense of the
hedonic criterion as the criterion for moral choiceworthiness.

5.2.2

A Limitation of the Hedonic Criterion: A Fallible Index to Objectively Right
Action

McTaggart observes that the criterion for moral deliberation (the standard of moral
choiceworthiness) and the criterion of moral judgement (the standard of moral rightness)
can diverge for the following reasons. According to McTaggart, the fullest possible
development and exercise of intrinsically good capacities in an individual person (i.e., ideal
perfection), will produce the greatest net happiness (the greatest pleasant consciousness) and
therefore the supreme good (the best state of affairs conceivable) will involve the most
complete and most harmonious attainment of both kinds of goods.23 McTaggart describes
“pleasantness” as a quality that results when some degree of harmony (correspondence) is
reached between a person’s ideas and the world, and ‘painfulness’ is a quality that results
from a degree of disharmony (non-correspondence) in this regard. The amount of
pleasure/pain is proportionate to the degree to which ‘idea’ and ‘fact’ approaches perfect
harmony or disharmony (though complete non-correspondence cannot be fully attained,
whereas complete correspondence can be).24 Such harmony is attained either through
adjusting one’s beliefs to more accurately represent the facts of the world or by acting to
change the world to more closely resemble one’s ideal representation of how the world
ought to be. Pleasant states of consciousness cannot be reduced to this harmony, but they
are the result of it. As was discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Four, love is sometimes
described as a hedonic good. In the early works, it results from pleasure supervening on our
states of belief or desire after the attainment of harmony between our ideas/ideals related to
a person and the actual facts about that person. Since love is the result of the attainment of
23
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such harmony, it is an index of it. Also, love is one of the most important kinds of good
included in our ideal of the supreme good, and so it is also a determinant of the overall
goodness of each life and that total goodness of the world.
Pleasure is therefore both an index of ‘correspondence’ or ‘harmony’ between ideals
and fact and a determinant of overall goodness. Here McTaggart identifies a uniform
relationship between two kinds of intrinsic good: pleasure and perfection. Pleasure results
from a certain aspect of perfection (the ‘satisfaction’ or fully engaged exercise of intrinsically
good capacities relative to their level of development). Therefore, fully attained perfection
(the Supreme Good) would necessarily result in the greatest possible happiness.
Nonetheless, while we can know that the perfect development of ideally good
capacities (such as knowing and willing) necessarily results in the greatest conceivable
happiness, it does not follow that under currently existing imperfect conditions (of ignorance
and volitional incontinence) any increase of happiness (or decrease in suffering) will always
indicate a corresponding improvement of intrinsically good capacities (an improvement in
perfection). He states that “it by no means follows that, if we aim at the greatest happiness
which we can perceive to be attainable by our present action, we shall be aiming in the
direction of complete development.”25 This is because “imperfection” is possible in two
ways (i.e., there are two ways to ‘fall-short’ of the Supreme Good).
First, there can be imperfect development of intrinsically good capacities. One of the primary
causes of this occurs when “the ideals of which we postulate the fulfilment are not
absolutely the same ideals which would be found in a [true] state of perfection.” 26 Perhaps
we think a capacity is intrinsically good when, in fact, it is not. For example, one might think
(falsely, I would argue) that one’s capacity for physical violence is intrinsically good and one
makes developing and fully exercising this capacity a central aim of one’s moral system.
Alternatively, perhaps one correctly believes a capacity is intrinsically good, but
underestimates the degree to which it can be developed and fully exercised, in human beings.
For example, perhaps one believes (correctly, I would argue) that the human capacity for
sympathy is good, but fails to realize that sympathy can be extended beyond one’s immediate
relatives to strangers (through the right kind of understanding of what it means to be a
person and through the right kind of emotional training). These imperfections are objective
25
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cognitive failures: one’s beliefs about what is intrinsically good (what ought to be) do not
correspond to the facts about intrinsic goods. These false beliefs will result in capacities that
are objectively intrinsically good not being as fully developed or exercised as they could be
with sounder ideals.
Secondly, there can be imperfect attainment/satisfaction/exercise of intrinsically good
capacities: “the ideals which we have are not completely satisfied.”27 Here the ideals of
perfection that we represent to ourselves (no matter how imperfect) are not fully attained.
Each agent’s experience of ‘satisfaction’ – a pleasant experience – will be relative to the
degree to which their represented ideal is attained. This experience of satisfaction is what
results in the states of consciousness contained under intrinsic goods of pleasure. Pleasure
and happiness are subjective experiences of the achievement of harmony between ideal and
fact; however, the experience of happiness itself cannot give any insight into the ‘objective
correctness’ of the ideal.
This has some practical implications. First, McTaggart notes that if one aims at
increasing (aggregate) happiness, one should normally tend to produce a greater amount of
true harmony between the objective nature of individuals and the objective nature of their
environment.28 Happiness is the result of harmony, so in order to attain happiness one will
tend to seek out the objective means/conditions (the knowledge and actions) necessary to
achieve it. In this regard, the hedonic criterion is a “trustworthy guide” towards right action
and decision. Happiness is a constituent of the supreme good and it is the result of the
attainment of the other perfectionist elements contained in it, and so pursuing the actual
attainment of (reliable, constant, and secure) happiness should motivate one to promote the
causes of happiness: the development and exercise of intrinsically good capacities.
Yet, because happiness has “no necessary or uniform relation” to the accuracy of our
represented ideals it is possible to experience happiness by satisfying an erroneous ideal. 29
For instance, if I believed that I was only capable of following the orders others gave me but
not of forming my own plans, I will represent ‘perfect obedience to others’ as an ideal.30 If I
succeed in always carrying out what I am told to do, I will experience satisfaction and
pleasure in doing so. Objectively, however, I am capable of experiencing a much richer and
McTaggart, SHC, §124.
McTaggart, SHC, §125.
29 McTaggart, SHC, §125.
30 To be totally consistent here, we would have to assume that someone told me to make this as my ideal.
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more stable sense of satisfaction if I also acknowledge that, as an autonomous moral agent, I
am capable of formulating and pursuing my own goals and actually set about to do so. The
fact that greater satisfaction is available if I improve my ideals does not change the fact that I
will experience satisfaction at the attainment of my ideals, even if my ideals are inaccurate.
In addition to satisfying false ideals, McTaggart notes that we might knowingly and
willingly choose not to perfect some intrinsically good capacity that we do (correctly)
represent as an ideal normally worth attaining. To support his idea, McTaggart refers to cases
of suffering (mental or physical) so extreme and long-term that the person suffering can only
experience relief through the use of powerful drugs that will certainly diminish the patient’s
capacity to know and voluntarily pursue ideals.31 The administration of drugs in this case
clearly increases aggregate happiness as it decreases the suffering in the patient and decreases
the sympathetic suffering in those who care for the one suffering. Yet, promoting happiness
in this case clearly results in a decrease in the capacity for moral improvement in the patient
by impeding the exercise of capacities for reflection, learning, autonomy, and voluntary
action in the patient (perhaps permanently if the disease is severe enough).32 In the first case
the cause of imperfection was the lack of perfect (objectively true) ideals. However, in the
second case the cause is not necessarily ignorance. Even if one assumed possession of
perfect knowledge of the capacities that ought to be developed in a person, in the face of
extreme suffering one might choose to relieve suffering even if this will clearly prohibit the
development of some of those capacities. In this case, therefore, the cause of the
imperfection is the informed and voluntary imperfect attainment of ideals, not necessarily
imperfect ideals.
It is therefore possible to both aim at promoting happiness and at the same time
prevent or impede the development and exercise of intrinsically good capacities. Given this
possibility, McTaggart acknowledges that one might ask why one should accept a criterion
that will always tell one that the moral choice is that option which maximizes happiness
when it seems clear that in certain kinds of cases alternative options could increase goods of

McTaggart, SHC, §127.
McTaggart ignores the possibility that relieving pain (though it reduces intrinsically good capacities in the
patient) might also increase intrinsically good capacities – such as the capacity for mercy – in those who care
for the patient. This means that we may, once we move beyond considerations of prudence to morality, have to
sacrifice the perfection of one person for the sake of promoting overall goodness in terms of the perfection
and happiness of all people involved (the patient and the caregivers) in cases of extreme suffering, for example.
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perfection instead.33 The hedonic criterion implies that in such cases choosing an option that
is not hedonically optimal would be an immoral choice, even if it may turn out to be the morally
right action once the full information about the actual effects of the action in terms of all kinds
of goods is available.

5.2.3

Argument: The Hedonic Criterion is a Reliable Index to Objectively Morally
Right Act-Options

For a criterion of moral choiceworthiness (the criterion for moral deliberation) to be
‘correct’ it must ensure that the option that it identifies as morally choiceworthy under the
epistemically limited situation of choice will reliably – though not infallibly – pick out the
option that the criterion of moral rightness identifies as objectively morally right. To show
that the hedonic criterion is correct, McTaggart outlines four possible situations a deliberator
might face if they were to adopt the hedonic criterion as their sole criterion for moral
choiceworthiness and then he assesses the reliability of the hedonic criterion for each case.34
For the first three, he argues that choosing the hedonically best option is always the most
reasonable and most reliable way to identify which action will ultimately turn out to be
objectively morally right. McTaggart’s arguments in regards to the first three cases are as
follows.
In the first option the person choosing has reason to believe that choosing the
option which will promote the most net aggregate happiness will also increase overall
perfection. In this case the hedonic criterion is “clearly binding” on the decision maker:
choosing it is consistent with both the normative criterion of moral deliberation (moral
choiceworthiness) and the normative criterion of moral judgement (moral rightness) and so
one has every relevant reason to choose the hedonically best option.
In the second option, the decision-maker has reason to believe that the option that
will most likely promote net aggregate happiness will probably make no discernable
difference to perfection, either positively or negatively. In such cases, McTaggart concludes
that the decision-maker can “safely abide” by the hedonic criterion since it measures the only
kind of good that seems to be at issue in this decision – pleasure. Again, decisions like this
seem to always be consistent with both kinds of good involved in the criterion of rightness
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and so the hedonic criterion for moral deliberation provides a reliable guide to morally right
action.
In the third option, the decision-maker has reason to believe that choosing the
option that best promotes net aggregate happiness “may” make a considerable difference to
existing levels of perfection, but cannot tell for sure whether it will be a positive or negative
difference. Here there seem to be serious doubts about the potential reliability of the
hedonic deliberative criterion. Though we are not certain of what kind of result may come
about in regards to perfection, there is a possibility of doing something objectively morally
wrong by decreasing perfection so significantly that it outweighs the significance of the
increase in happiness. To defend the hedonic criterion, McTaggart appeals to a kind of
‘Pascal’s Wager’ or game-reasoning to show that even if there are legitimate doubts about the
reliability of the criterion in such cases, the uncertainty surrounding the results on perfection
mean that it is always more reasonable to stick with the hedonic criterion for moral
deliberation, rather than depart from it. If one does not choose what one has reason to
believe will be the ‘happiest’ option, then in the best-case scenario only one kind of good can
possibly be optimized: only perfection turns out to be considerably increased, but people are
made less happier (or more miserable) than they could have been. In the worst-case scenario
for non-compliance with the hedonic criterion, neither kind of good ends up being
optimized: perfection is decreased and people are made less happy (or more miserable) than
they could have been. If one chooses what one does have reason to believe will be the
‘happiest’ option, then in the worst-case scenario only one kind of good could possibly be
optimized: perfection is considerably decreased but people are made as happy (less
miserable) as possible. However, in the best-case scenario both kinds of good could be
potentially optimized: perfection is increased and people are as happy (less miserable) as
possible.
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Table 3: Outcomes of possible criteria of choiceworthiness if there is reason to believe that
maximizing happiness may considerably affect levels of perfection but it cannot be known if such
effects will be positive or negative. (SHC, §131)
Case 3: I have reason to believe the action that maximizes happiness “may” considerably affect levels
of perfection but it cannot be known if such effects will be positive or negative.
Decision

Best Case Scenario

Worst Case Scenario

Choose the option I have reason to Both kinds of good optimized.
believe will produce the greatest
net aggregate happiness possible.
- Optimal Happiness: Probable
(Compliant with the dictate of the - Optimal Perfection:
Hedonic Criterion)
Probability Unknown

Only one kind of good is
optimized (happiness).
- Optimal Happiness: Probable
- Sub-Optimal Perfection:
Probability Unknown

Choose the option I have reason to
believe will not produce the
greatest net aggregate happiness
possible. (Non-Compliant with the
dictate of the Hedonic Criterion)

No good is optimized.

Only one kind of good optimized
(perfection).
- Sub-Optimal Happiness:
Probable
- Optimal Perfection:
Probability Unknown

-

Sub-Optimal Happiness:
Probable
Sub-Optimal Perfection:
Probability Unknown

This means that complying with the hedonic criterion offers a worst-case scenario
that is equivalent to the best-case scenario of non-compliance: we only have reason to
believe that one kind of good is optimized. In best-case scenario of compliance we have
reason to believe that optimization of both kinds of goods will probably occur whereas the
best-case scenario for non-compliance only allows for reasonable belief in the probable
optimality in terms of only one kind of good. The worst case scenario of non-compliance
with the hedonic criterion leaves us reason to believe that the results for at least one kind of
good (happiness) will be sub-optimal. McTaggart argues that given risks and uncertainty
associated with goods of perfection under these conditions, it is most reasonable to stick
with what one knows more certainly (goods of pleasure) and apply a hedonic criterion of
moral choiceworthiness. He concludes that we “do well” to follow the hedonic criterion
because “[s]ince the effect on development [perfection] is unknown, the only rational course,
if we must act, is to be guided by the effect on happiness, which is known.” 35 Since we know
that morality requires us to maximize goodness, but we are only able to determine optimality
for one of the determinants of overall goodness under the conditions of choice, it seems
rational to select that option which appears to be best given the limited knowledge that we
have, that we have reason to believe will prevent non-optimization of both goods, and that
35

McTaggart, SHC, §131.
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may (as far as we know) possibly result in the optimization of both goods. Therefore,
compliance with the hedonic criterion is the most rational choice. As we have seen above,
the third case must represent what McTaggart thinks almost all instances of choice are
actually like given his argument that we are always in a better position (epistemically) to
predict and determine which outcomes is most likely to result in the most amount of
happiness possible compared to our ability to predict and determine which outcome will
least imperfectly resemble the Ideal of Perfection or will be most likely to ultimately result in
the Ideal of Perfection in the very distant future.
In the fourth case, McTaggart considers situations where “the course to which the
hedonic criterion would guide us has in our judgment an unfavourable effect on the
development of ideals [goods of Perfection], as compared with the alternative [hedonically
non-optimal] course.”36 Here it is assumed that we have reason to believe that what will
optimize net happiness will not optimize perfection and what will optimize perfection will
not optimize happiness. The example of using strong and highly debilitating medication to
alleviate extreme physical or mental suffering seems to fall under this category. McTaggart
concludes that in the Fourth Case:
there seems to be no reasonable solution. For we cannot estimate the
quantity of loss to the development, and, if we could, we are ignorant of the
common standard by which this could be compared to the gain in pleasure.37
McTaggart is merely rehearsing his previous conclusions here. He has already argued
that due to the vagueness of our Ideal of Perfection, we cannot arrive at any definite estimate
as to the exact degree to which any choice-option either resembles the Ideal or is likely to
eventually produce it in the distant future. Also, since the Supreme Good contains the Ideal
of Perfection (combined with the highest quantity of goods of Pleasure conceivable) it will
suffer from the same vagueness. So, it will also be impossible to determine whether the state
of affairs that optimizes happiness or the incompatible state of affairs that optimizes
perfection least imperfectly resembles the Supreme Good or is most (un)likely to eventually
result in the Supreme Good in the very distant future. The only deliberative criterion

McTaggart, SHC, §131.
McTaggart, SHC, §131. It is worth noting that at the end of the fourth chapter of the 2 nd Edition of SHC
(1918), McTaggart rejects this claim: “I should now attribute more validity and importance to immediate
judgments as to the relative value of heterogeneous goods. (Cp. Sections 129-134.)” I will address this claim in
my assessment of the argument below.
36
37

172
available is the hedonic criterion, but it cannot help us to compare and rank non-hedonic
goods with hedonic ones.
Two sections later he states that:
it remains true that there are cases of the fourth class in which our decisions
will have a decisive effect on the [overall goodness of the] result [and
therefore fall under the scope of ethical theory], and that ethics offers us no
principle upon which to make the decision.38
Such cases, he thinks, will be rare given our limited ability to know or even suspect with any
reasonable degree of certainty the degree to which our isolated actions will ultimately
produce an objective increase/decrease of overall perfection. Nonetheless, McTaggart thinks
that in the fourth case it is possible that the criterion of moral deliberation and the criterion
of moral judgement can produce different results. He admits that it is impossible for any
ethicist to plausibly deny “that the best and wisest men were sometimes compelled to act
utterly in the dark,”39 when making some rare kinds of decisions and they must admit “that
there are some cases where it is impossible to see what the best course [in terms of both
kinds of good] is.”40 He concludes that any system that denied this fact would be “in glaring
contradiction to the facts of life.”41 Since situations like those in Case Four are rare and since
almost all other situations are like those in Case 3, the hedonic criterion is the most reliable
criterion for moral deliberation where deliberation is morally appropriate and so McTaggart
concludes that the hedonic criterion is therefore ‘correct.’

5.3 Evaluation of McTaggart’s Argument
This argument is highly complex and there are certainly some problems with it. G. E. Moore
and Bernard Bosanquet outlined some objections to various aspects of it in lengthy papers
published within two years of the release of McTaggart’s book.42 While I think that some of
their arguments are directed towards misrepresentations of what I take to be McTaggart’s
McTaggart, SHC, §133.
McTaggart, SHC, §134.
40 McTaggart, SHC, §133.
41 McTaggart, SHC, §134.
42 Bernard Bosanquet. “Hedonism among Idealists,” in Science and Philosophy and Other Essays. Freeport, N.Y.:
Books for Libraries Press, Inc. 1927. Pp. 182-222. (Originally published in two separate articles: “Hedonism
among Idealists (I.),” Mind. 12.46 (April, 1903), pp. 202-224; and “Hedonism among Idealists (II.),” Mind. 12.47
(July, 1903), pp. 303-316.); Moore, G. E. “McTaggart’s Studies in Hegelian Cosmology,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, New Series. Vol. 2. (1902-1902) pp. 117-214; Moore, G. E. “Mr. McTaggart’s Ethics,”
International Journal of Ethics. 13.3 (April, 1903), pp. 341-370.
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main point (especially in the case of Moore’s paper), many of their objections are important
and highlight problems or confusions in McTaggart’s presentation. I will not summarize
these criticisms here, but I want to acknowledge that I tried to keep them in mind when
providing a charitable reconstruction of McTaggart’s position. Trying to provide the most
charitable interpretation should help isolate what I think are the core problems with this line
of argument (problems which McTaggart must have been somewhat aware of given the
changes he adopts in his later writings on value theory). I want to briefly identify two issues
here. The first one I will mention in passing because I think it helps make sense about why
McTaggart seems to drop his language of “perfection” in Nature of Existence and just speak
about a list of commensurable intrinsic goods instead. The second relates to the extent to
which we should think McTaggart actually thought we should be deliberating and
consciously employing the criterion of moral deliberation in one’s everyday attempt to live a
moral life.
The first issue relates to the form of Perfectionism that McTaggart addresses in this
argument. One might ask whether it is really necessary to compare each option to the Ideal
of Perfection in order to figure out its ‘degree of perfection’ and only then be able to
compare it with other options that have undergone the same direct comparison to the Ideal.
Is it not possible to merely use the Ideal to identify certain capacities that would be fully
developed and exercised in the Ideal Person? One could argue that once the intrinsically
good capacities are identified, the role of the Ideal could fade into the background if we
proposed a maximizing and aggregating form of Perfectionism (somewhat in the spirit of
Hurka’s theory in his Perfectionism). Such a criterion would state that ‘one ought to choose
that option which would result in the greatest possible amount of perfection’ (the greatest
possible development and exercise of those various items on the list of intrinsically good
capacities). One would then estimate the amount of perfection in each option, aggregate
these (like different kinds of pleasant/painful states are aggregated), arrive at some kind of
judgement as to the total amount of perfection in each option, and then finally compare the
amount of perfection that each option will bring about through that action itself and in the
foreseeable future.43 For example, I might judge that having true beliefs about the safety of
child vaccination is many times more valuable than having true beliefs about the different
kinds of Vitamin B and I could guide my actions accordingly. Perhaps I am a health studies
43

Moore. “Mr. McTaggart’s Ethics,” p 360ff; Bosanquet, “Hedonism Among the Idealists,” p. 194.
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teacher at a high school with limited time left in the school year and I can only teach my
students about one of these things, so I let students know the true benefits, reliability, and
safety of the vaccines they can get for their future children. Such an action would not only
exercise my ability to teach (which either option would do), not only expand the scope of my
students’ understanding of the world, but also potentially ensure that more children live long
enough to develop all of their adult capacities and thereby increase the overall development
in the world in ways that teaching about vitamin B would not.
It also is not obvious that comparing options in terms of perfection would be any
more difficult or vague (as McTaggart claims they will be in his argument) than the kinds of
complex comparisons of net pleasure/pain we also have to make between options in actual
conditions of choice. McTaggart is surely far too optimistic about our ability to formulate a
clear and non-controversial criterion of pleasure/pain to be used for making decisions or for
justifying our decisions to others. While McTaggart is surely right that we are able to make
simple comparisons between similar act-options in terms of my pleasure and pain (e.g., which
entrée would I likely find more pleasant at dinner), making comparisons between act-options
that are very different or that will affect the pleasure/pain experienced by many other people
are surely much more difficult. It does not seem obvious to me how I could go about
comparing which of the following options would be more pleasurable on the whole:
attending my own convocation or attending my friend’s wedding. Both events would make
me very happy, but each for a very different reason. Each event will also involve the pleasure
of many other people (i.e., the pleasure that will accompany my family’s and friends’ pride in
my having completed my PhD and the wedding guests’ satisfaction in knowing that two
people have formed a deep loving relationship with each other). There does not seem to be
any grounds for thinking that when it comes to the kinds of decisions that matter the most
in life and in ethics our judgements about the relative net pleasure or pain of all those
involved for each option will be any more or less vague than our judgments about the effects
of those same act-options in terms perfectionist goods. It seems more plausible to say that
we are (roughly) equally good (or bad) at making comparisons of hedonistic values as we are
about perfectionist values.
I agree that the view of Perfectionism considered by McTaggart is not the most
plausible view available. Presumably it was what he thought was being proposed by
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Perfectionists such as Green, Bradley, and Mackenzie during his time.44 In fact, I suspect this
must be why ‘perfection’ is not mentioned in the Nature of Existence in his discussion of value
or while outlining his list of intrinsic goods. His list in that book clearly includes the
development and exercise of certain capacities (such as knowledge and virtue) in addition to
certain kinds of experience (such as feelings of pleasure and pain and the intensity [vividness
and clarity] of consciousness)45 but these are not classified under any basic ‘kinds’ or
‘categories’ of good as they were in Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. Presumably since all goods
are considered to be capable of quantification, aggregation, and comparison in the same way
in The Nature of Existence the need for such classification is removed. In fact, in the Second
Edition of Studies in Hegelian Cosmology (1918), McTaggart rejects the idea that we cannot
compare the relative value of heterogeneous goods: “I should now attribute more validity
and importance to immediate judgments as to the relative value of heterogeneous goods.”46
McTaggart’s mature axiology, and presumably his mature ethical theory, seems more
consistent with the alternative kind of conceptualization of commensurable heterogeneous
goods (perfectionist and hedonistic) outlined in the previous paragraph. So while it might
still be the case that not all of the goods listed in The Nature of Existence are appropriate for
inclusion in a criterion of choiceworthiness, it seems unlikely that a criterion of
choiceworthiness consistent with the later works can include only happiness/pleasure.
Nonetheless, the fact that the criterion of choiceworthiness proposed in the early works
might have to be adjusted in the later works (from what it was in the earlier works) does not
affect the insight that the criterion of choiceworthiness is distinct from the criterion of
rightness.
The second issue relates to McTaggart’s emphasis on moral deliberation. Is
McTaggart saying that Ideal Utilitarianism requires agents to constantly weigh every option
and to ensure that they are always guiding their decisions by reference to a criterion for
moral choice? Is he proposing a hedonistic version of what Railton called “subjective
Whether this is an (in)accurate representation of their actual views is far beyond the scope of this paper. For
an alternative conception of “Perfection” and the “Ideal of Perfection,” see Bosanquet, “Hedonism Among the
Idealists,” especially pp. 210-222. He describes Perfection/Development as “the resolution of contradictions.”
The “Ideal of Perfection,” is represented as a completely consistent, unified, and sound set of ideals, aims, and
desires. Attainment of this ideal will result in the complete satisfaction (=happiness) of all desires/capacities,
whatever these happen to be. As a formal concept of Perfection, this conceptualization of it is very different
than the more substantive (though indeterminate) concept considered by McTaggart.
45 Since emotions seem to involve both cognitive capacities for representation and also subjective qualitative
experiences of consciousness, they are hard to class under either view.
46 McTaggart, SHC (1918), p. 128.
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consequentialism”47 or what David Sosa has called “consequentialist deliberationism” which
holds that “all right action will include a component of consequentialist deliberation”48
where ‘consequentialist deliberation’ is understood as an “attempt to determine which act of
those available would most promote the good?”49
This form of consequentialism would be extremely demanding on one’s attention
and cognitive skills. Humans have a very limited capacity for extended periods of
deliberation (except for in a few highly gifted and trained minds). The time and energy
required to constantly deliberate in this way would ultimately also tend to cause the person
to be far less effective at promoting the good. It therefore seems that Hedonistic
Deliberationism can be rejected for the same reason that considerations about certain kinds
of goods may prevent them from being included in the criterion of choiceworthiness: the
limited conditions faced by the agent in most normal circumstances of choice make
demanding such considerations counter-productive to reliably selecting the morally right actoption and so is unreasonable
Also, as we have seen, consequentialist deliberationism seems to be subject to the
love-based objection to consequentialism. One of the most important elements in a
meaningful and good life is deep personal relationships. These often require that we act
directly out of love, friendship, concern, or sympathy for those with whom we are in
intimate relationships and so actions mediated through some explicitly deliberative process
that assesses act-options according to a criterion of moral choiceworthiness appear to be
alienating. If this is true then a consequentialist view that claims that loving/friendly
relationships are one of the most important intrinsic goods will be self-defeating. McTaggart
clearly thought that love was a highly important intrinsic good; so, does the fact that he
spends so much time defending a criterion of moral deliberation and describing how it can
be a reliable guide to right action mean that he endorses a kind of ‘direct’ form of
utilitarianism that has been widely thought by many contemporary scholars to be exactly the
kind of theory that cannot accommodate our intuitions about the role and value of love?
See Section 3.3.1 (p. 93) of this dissertation.
David Sosa. “Consequences of Consequentialism,” Mind 102.405 (January 1993): pp. 107.
49 David Sosa. “Consequences of Consequentialism,” Mind 102.405 (January 1993): pp. 106. Sosa is quoting
Peter Railton in this particular quotation (“Alienation,” p. 152). Railton is describing what he calls “subjective
consequentialism” but Sosa argues that that term is best reserved for another concept and he substitutes the
term ‘consequential deliberationism’ in its place. I am persuaded by Sosa’s reasons for adjusting this
terminology and adopt his convention here.
47
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Determining whether or not McTaggart actually requires consequentialist deliberationism is
very important.
While there is no direct evidence to refute the idea that McTaggart supports
consequentialist deliberationism, it is not necessary that he endorse deliberationism merely
because he identifies and justifies a criterion for moral deliberation. One can propose a
criterion for moral deliberation (a decision-making procedure) but restrict its use to a very
limited set of circumstances. One could acknowledge that there is a criterion for moral
deliberation, acknowledge that it can be (or is) distinct from the criterion of moral rightness,
but still hold that, on the whole, moral agents are more likely to do what is objectively
morally right if they keep explicit moral deliberation to a minimum (i.e., only those cases
where habit, direct emotional response, or following established moral rules result in
inconsistencies or conflicting directives). Such systems have been described by many
contemporary ethicists such as Peter Railton, David Sosa, William Shaw, and David Brink
(to name a few). If McTaggart were to reject consequentialist deliberationism, this would
remove at least one potential source of conflict between his life-long conviction that love is
intrinsically good, his detailed description of love, and his moral philosophy. If there is good
reason to think that engaging in moral deliberation in circumstances of love would interfere
with the maintenance or promotion of love, then one ought not to engage in moral
deliberations in such circumstances: instead one ought to act out of love so long as one does
not become aware of any potential conflicts with the promotion or maintenance of other
comparable intrinsic goods. Whether McTaggart actually endorsed such deliberationism or
not in the early works is not immediately clear, however rejecting consequentialist
deliberationism makes his philosophical thought on the whole more consistent and is
consistent with his reasons for rejecting the inclusion of certain goods (perfectionist goods)
in the criterion of moral choiceworthiness in the first place: including them makes the moral
criterion a less reliable way to arrive at morally right actions. The rejection of moral
deliberationism can be seen as a natural extension of the reasoning that rules out
perfectionist goods from the criterion of moral choiceworthiness: if there is reason to think
that something makes some decision-procedure a less reliable means to objectively morally
right actions, then that thing ought to be excluded from the decision-making procedure. So,
according to the hermeneutic principle of charity there is good reason to think that
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McTaggart would not endorse moral (consequentialist) deliberationism and would revise any
of his claims that implied it.
One way McTaggart can reject consequentialist deliberationism but still maintain the
consequentialist criterion of rightness would be to do as Railton suggested and outline a
“sophisticated” version of Ideal Utilitarianism. What might a version of “sophisticated” Ideal
Utilitarianism look like? An account of the kind of indirect form of Ideal Utilitarianism that
McTaggart would require to make his views on love and his moral philosophy consistent (a
form that explicitly rejects consequentialist deliberationism), is suggested by comments
Rashdall made in his The Theory of Good and Evil. McTaggart commented on drafts of this
work and so was surely familiar with Rashdall’s line of thought. Rashdall seemed to endorse
following a set of established rules as a criterion of moral choiceworthiness: one ought to
select that option that is most consistent with certain authoritative rules. In situations of
choice, one should not directly apply-cost benefit analysis in terms of net aggregate
goodness; instead, one should generally just follow rules. Such rules, however, must
ultimately only be accepted when an individual “comes to see and appreciate for himself the
reason, the ground, the principle of the maxims which he at first accepted on authority,” 50
(i.e., for Ideal Utilitarians, after considering the extent to which general adherence to such
rules is conducive to net aggregate goodness).51 It is at this reflective level that one makes a
direct appeal to the consequentialist criterion of rightness. So Rashdall clearly acknowledges
a distinction between the criterion of moral rightness and the criterion of moral
choiceworthiness. However, Rashdall also suggests that such evaluations in terms of overall
goodness ought generally to be limited to situations of moral reflection (when we are setting
out to assess/adopt a certain set of general moral rules to guide my behaviour) or to
situations where “we are forced to consider such a question [whether an action is right or
wrong] for ourselves without reference to some established rule.”52 The latter option
generally occurs because existing rules are too general to give clear guidance for the
particular situation, no general rule has been formulated yet, or the question is about the
Rashdall, TGE1, p. 156.
Rashdall, TGE1, Book II, Chapter V: “Authority and Autonomy,” passim.
52 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 184: “In previous chapters I have sought to show that the way to find out whether an
action is right or wrong, when we are forced to consider such a question for ourselves without reference
to some established rule, is to consider whether it will tend to produce for society in general a Well-being or
eudaimonia or good which includes many elements possessing different values, which values are intuitively
discerned and compared with one another by the moral or practical Reason.” (My emphasis.); See also: TGE2,
pp 154ff, p. 170, pp. 435ff.
50
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validity or rank of certain (conflicting) general rules themselves. Apart from these situations,
though, it seems best that most people, most of the time, do not too directly engage in
consequentialist deliberations to evaluate rules or act-options in situations of choice.53
Rashdall, therefore, suggests a multi-level form of consequentialism that reserves a restricted
role for explicit deliberations about the moral choiceworthiness of options, the moral
acceptability of a rule, or the moral rightness of a type of action. Such deliberative reasoning
about moral matters is limited to situations of careful, reserved, and controlled reflective
thought occurring outside of the regular circumstances of everyday moral life and decisionmaking. Rashdall, however, goes further and also suggests in some places that being directly
motivated by certain emotional responses may result in a world that is better on the whole
than one where people always act directly from explicit deliberations about what is best or
what is right. If this is true, then Rashdall is suggesting that there is a reason to reject
consequentialist deliberationism on consequentialist grounds: requiring deliberation
according to the criterion of choiceworthiness at all levels of decision-making will make the
world worse-off as a whole by preventing other kinds of intrinsically valuable motivation. It
is best if we allow people to guide their behaviour directly from emotional responses in some
situations. I will consider this further suggestion presently in order to fill in this aspect so
necessary for McTaggart’s moral position to be coherent and to overcome the LBO.
Early Ideal Utilitarianism accepted that certain conscious states are intrinsically
valuable, even if the person having them is not consciously aware that they are valuable; in
other words, it is not necessary that some agent be aware of, or (dis)approve of, the
conscious state in order for it to be intrinsically good or intrinsically valuable. This feature of
intrinsic value is acknowledged in Rashdall,54 Sorley,55 and McTaggart. Out of all of these

Rashdall, TGE1, p. 154. For example: “In view of all of these facts, it must appear that the attempt on the
part of the individual to think out his moral code a priori, in entire independence of his environment, in an
impracticable one, and one which would be disastrous, if it were practicable. That this is so with the great mass
of men is obvious. They have not the knowledge, the experience, the leisure to trace out all the advantages and
disadvantages of conflicting courses of action, whether in detailed circumstances or with regard to the general
principles of conduct.”
54 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 155: “The judgement that a certain emotion has value is a different thing from the mere
emotion itself.” Rashdall does not explicitly defend the claim that awareness of the value of a conscious state is
not necessary for a conscious state to have value, but it is clearly assumed in his discussion of the intrinsic value
of acts and emotions. In both cases, it is not necessary that the agent is aware that the act or emotion is good
for the emotion to be judged intrinsically good by reason (although, of course, the agent’s awareness of its
goodness would add additional intrinsic value to the act because of the added knowledge and virtue that would
be present in the agent). The citation here provides an example of the distinction in his discussion of emotion.
55 Sorley, Moral Value and the Idea of God, pp. 124-125.
53
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philosophers, McTaggart provides the clearest and most direct articulation of this claim. In
The Individualism of Value, he states:
In the first place, if I say that only conscious beings and their states have
value, I do not mean that they cannot have value unless the conscious being
knows them to have value. He might not know that the state in which he was
conscious of being had value, and yet it might have it. … In the same way,
the happiness of a kitten or a young child may be good, although they do not
judge themselves to be happy, and do not recognize that happiness is a good.
… We may, indeed, go further, and add that there is no necessity, in order
that a state should have value, that it should be recognized by anyone as
having value. If there were no omniscient being – a hypothesis which is at
any rate possible – many men must have acted generously or selfishly on
occasions when neither they nor anyone else recognized the generosity or
selfishness. But the acts would, all the same, be generous or selfish, and
would be good or evil accordingly.56
So on this view, for instance, any direct desire for something that is intrinsically good
will be intrinsically good. Desiring happiness for the sake of happiness is intrinsically good
because happiness is objectively intrinsically good. The value of the desire remains
unchanged by whether or not the person desiring comes to the higher-order realization that
‘happiness is good’ or that ‘desiring happiness is good.’ These higher-order beliefs also have
value, but having such higher-order beliefs is not a necessary condition for the lower-order
states (that are the objects of such higher-order beliefs) to have the intrinsic value that they
do. In the same way, some motivations can also be judged to be intrinsically good
independently of whether or not anyone explicitly acknowledges their intrinsic goodness.
Rashdall and McTaggart both reject the “Kantian” claim that the only morally good motive
is ‘duty for duty’s sake.’ It is not the case that the only actions that have moral worth are
those that are motivated from a ‘sense of duty.’ Rashdall observes that motivations, such as
‘direct concern’ for another are commonly judged to have intrinsic value and may, under
certain circumstances, even make an action morally better than if it was motivated by a sense
of duty. Rashdall argues that virtuous motives and desires (those related to ‘doing what is
right/best for the sake of doing what is right/best’) are extremely (or even ‘supremely’)
valuable, but he also maintains that they are not the only motives and desires having intrinsic
value. An ideally good person will have as many kinds of intrinsically good motives and
desires as possible and will be moved to action by those that are most appropriate to the
circumstances. This observation leads Rashdall to anticipate what would later be known as
56
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the “one thought too many” objection famously formulated by Bernard Williams.57 He
imagines that someone formulates the following challenge to the view that only acts done
for the sake of duty have moral worth:
It is nobler to be so fired by the thought of tyranny and injustice and
suffering, so to feel others’ wrongs as though they were one’s own, that the
question never arises at all whether it is a duty to fight against them, or even
whether it be καλόν to do so. Would it not show a positive defect in the
man's character if he should decline to make a sacrifice which the good of his
family demanded till he had calmly reflected that it was a dutiful or a
beautiful thing for him to do? Is it not better to be socially useful because
one loves one's neighbours as oneself than to regard them with indifference,
and yet to feed or serve them only because it is one's duty?58
Rashdall notes that having duty as one’s motive makes some actions worse than they would
have been if some other motive had caused them. For instance, Rashdall would agree that an
act of mercy (relieving suffering) towards one’s child, would have more moral worth if it was
done directly from a sense of love, concern, and sympathy for one’s child than if the
merciful action had been mediated through considerations of whether that action was one’s
duty (i.e., whether it was required/permitted by some rule (the criterion of choiceworthiness)
or whether it maximized net aggregate goodness (the criterion of rightness)). One can
conclude therefore, that motives such as love should play a large role in ethical theory and in
conduct than others.
Yet, as we have seen, being moved by a sense of duty is also an important (if not the
most important) intrinsic good for Rashdall. This leads him to conclude that the moral life
clearly requires both being motivated by direct concern, sympathy, or love for persons and
also motivations/intentions to do what is right and best. Rashdall observes that this leads to
a potential “antinomy” in moral philosophy:
On the one hand, it does seem nobler to love the things contained in the law
than to do good things unwillingly because we feel bound to obey the law as
such. On the other hand, it seems difficult to admit that there can be any
nobler motive than devotion to duty as such, or that there can be a perfect
character, or even a perfect act, in the inspiration of which such devotion has
no place.59

Rashdall, TGE1, Pp. 124-129; Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character, and Morality,” Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Pp. 17-19.
58 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 124. (My emphasis.)
59 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 125.
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It seems that in one sense, acting out of a sense of duty makes an action worse, but in
another sense acting out of a sense of duty is required for virtue (a highly important intrinsic
good). He proposes a solution to this antinomy based on accepting three claims. First, that
“an action may be good which is done [directly or solely] from the love of some good
object.”60 Next, it is true that “love of any particular object is always liable to interfere with
the promotion of some other and, it may be, more important good.”61 Thirdly, he explains,
“duty means, as we have seen, precisely devotion to the various goods in proportion to their
relative value and importance.”62 To be virtuous is to have a standing higher-order desire (or
disposition) that one’s motives and desires are proportionate to the value of their objects and
that the strength of those desires and emotions respect the relative worth and rank of their
objects. He goes on to say,
No one then can be trusted at all times and in all circumstances to attribute
to each good precisely its proper degree of worth in whom there is not
strong devotion to that supreme good in which all others are summed up. It
is not necessary that a man should make the sense of duty the sole motive of
all his conduct, provided it is always ready to inhibit an action the moment he
sees any reason for believing that it is contrary to his duty. The conscientious
man will not seek actually to substitute the sense of duty for other motives of
conduct, because he will recognize that many of the commonplace actions of
life are better performed from some other impulse, and that the cultivation
of altruistic or ideal impulses is actually a part of that ideal of human
character which duty bids him promote in himself as in others. He will eat
his breakfast from force of habit or because he is hungry; the sense of duty
will only be ready, in the background of consciousness, so to speak, to
stimulate him when appetite fails or to inhibit him when some call of duty
demands the suspension or omission of that meal on a particular morning.
… He will labour for the good of his family because he cares about it as
much or more than he does for his own good, but the sense of duty will
always be ready to remind him of the claims of the workmen or the
customers whom his methods of business may prejudice.63
So, Rashdall preserves motivations from a “sense of duty” and motivations such as direct
concern by placing the motive to do what is right at a higher-order background level. So
long as one has a standing higher-order disposition to do what is right, and so long as there
is a sensibility as to situations where direct first-order motivations might not provide
sufficient guidance towards actions that are objectively right, the sense of duty (an intrinsic
Rashdall, TGE1, p. 125.
Rashdall, TGE1, p. 125.
62 Rashdall, TGE1, pp. 125-126.
63 Rashdall, TGE1, p. 126-127. (My emphasis.)
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good) can still be present in the agent and at the same time other intrinsically good
motivations can be present as well. There are interesting parallels between this idea and
Railton’s account of “sophisticated consequentialism.”64 I think that Railton’s following
claim, in particular, captures the core idea Rashdall proposes in the quote above:
It is consistent with what he [the sophisticated consequentialist] says to
imagine that his motivational structure … meets a counterfactual condition:
while he ordinarily does not do what he does simply for the sake of doing
what’s right, he would seek to lead a different sort of life if he did not think
his were morally defensible.65
According to the counterfactual condition, the sophisticated consequentialist does not
always engage in explicit deliberative moral reasoning for every action, but has the ability to
do so if needed; furthermore, one will only exercise this capacity when it is not clear that
some already established dispositions are no longer reliable means to objective morally right
action. This seems to be very similar (at least in spirit) to Rashdall’s “sense of duty” which
stands-by “ready, in the background of consciousness,” in the passage above. On Rashdall’s
view, having motivations to do actions because they are right is very important and necessary
for any person to possess moral goodness. However, such conscious states need not be
front and center in every action. For him, one’s sense of duty (informed by the ideal
utilitarian criterion of rightness) must always be present as a background capacity capable of
successfully impeding and reordering intrinsically good motivations the might conflict with
each other in particular circumstances. On both Railton’s and Rashdall’s view acting
virtuously can involve a kind of ‘auto pilot-system’ as long at the pilot is the one that has
programmed the system and as long as the pilot is always ready to override the system when
she perceives that the flight is going off course.
So, as McTaggart argued above, just as we judge that only a limited set of the
possible ultimate ends (intrinsic goods) should be included in criteria of moral deliberation
(only those goods whose value we can estimate and compare under epistemically limited
situations of choice) so too, we can also judge that a certain set of non-deliberative
dispositions ought to be endorsed, promoted, and in most cases preferred over the exercise
of capacities for moral deliberation, in order to ensure we do the best possible actions (i.e.,
we do what is objectively morally right). Humans are not only limited in our ability to bring
64
65

Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and Morality,” pp. 151-153.
Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and Morality,” p. 151.
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about certain kinds of results and estimate the potential value of those results, we are also
limited in our ability to consciously guide our action at any given moment. Much of our
behaviour is the result of carefully (and often laboriously) formed local habits and
dispositions. Many activities would not be possible if they were not done habitually, such as
walking and riding a bike. This is why so many tasks have to be learned through ‘indirect’
methods. There seems to be no reason to expect that such limitations should not factor into
our judgment about the kinds of motivations and desires that have moral worth and ought
to be included among the means/procedures proposed by an ethical system for reliably
achieving morally right conduct. This is just what Ideal Utilitarians attempt to accommodate
for in their multi-level accounts of moral norms and moral motivations.
So, a theory like Rashdall’s or Railton’s leaves space for intrinsically valuable
emotions like love (emotions that do not move one directly out of concern for general
goodness or moral rightness) to motivate us directly by restricting explicit evaluations of
rules or act-options according to criteria of rightness or choiceworthiness to background
roles – roles which only come into effect in appropriate situations. Such multi-level accounts
of moral deliberation and motivation help us understand how McTaggart’s argument about
the important distinctions between the criterion of moral rightness and the criterion for
moral deliberation (the criterion of choiceworthiness) can be incorporated in a
“sophisticated” form Ideal Utilitarian system in a way that avoids consequentialist
deliberationism and so avoids the LBO in this regard.
To sum up, while McTaggart does not directly reject ‘consequentialist deliberationism,’
in his published works, his argument for restricting the deliberative criterion (the criterion of
choiceworthiness) to only those intrinsic goods that can be expected to reliably pick-out the
morally right act-option (whatever those goods happen to be) can be further extended to
show that there is reason to think that ‘moral deliberation’ should only play a limited role in
ethical theory since there is also reason to believe that moral deliberationism is not the most
reliable way to pick out the objectively morally right action. In other words, McTaggart’s
reasoning can be extended to make the case for adopting a “sophisticated” form of
consequentialism. The same kind of reasoning is present in Rashdall, even if he (like
McTaggart) did not fully realize this or explicitly develop this implication. Therefore, Ideal
Utilitarians have reason to believe that deliberation according to some criterion of
choiceworthiness (e.g. obeying rules (Rashdall) or maximizing happiness (McTaggart)) might
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be the best way to make decisions that will reliably pick out the objectively morally right
action. Nonetheless, there is also reason to believe that such explicit moral deliberations
should be restricted to only a few appropriate situations and in other situations there seems
to be reason to encourage agents to act directly from certain non-deliberative dispositions
that are required to attain the most important intrinsic goods such as love and loving
relations (goods that every consequentialist has reason to promote).

5.4 CONCLUSION: McTaggart’s Moral Philosophy Overcomes the
Love-Based Objection (LBO)
In this section I argue that McTaggart’s moral philosophy (supplemented at times with
Rashdall’s account of ideal utilitarianism) is able to overcome the love-based objection (LBO
and NLBO). McTaggart’s version of ideal utilitarianism clearly accepts a plurality of intrinsic
goods while offering some considerations for why love ought to be considered among the
most important goods. Insofar as his version of Ideal Utilitarianism directly acknowledges
that loving emotions and beloved persons are important intrinsic goods, the axiology
underpinning his moral philosophy does not necessarily demote love to being of mere
instrumental value (Chapter Four). McTaggart’s moral philosophy, therefore, clearly meets
the first conditions required to overcome the LBO. Of course, this alone does not show that
McTaggart’s system is consistent; he must also formulate an ethical system having structures
of valuing and motivation that do not treat love as merely instrumentally valuable and
thereby contradict its own axiological foundation. Defenders of consequentialism have
argued that in order to meet the Harmonious Integration Requirement (HIR) and the LoveBased Adequacy Test (LBAT) one’s ethical theory must acknowledge certain kinds of
motivational and valuational structures that are deeply integrated and unified, yet can keep
potentially incompatible psychic attitudes from interfering with each other by means of a
multi-level moral psychology. Each attitude or motive operates at its own level and each
level is directed towards and unified through a coherent system of intrinsically related values.
Railton describes one version of this theory and calls it ‘sophisticated consequentialism.’
There is reason to think that McTaggart also proposes an ethical system having a similar
structure making it able to overcome the LBO in a similar way.
As we have seen, a multi-level motivational and valuational system was outlined by
McTaggart when he argued that we ought to determine the appropriate criterion for
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choiceworthiness by determining which criteria are actually viable given the limitations of the
situation of choice and, of those viable options, which will be the most reliable (though not
necessarily infallible) guide to picking out the objectively morally right act-option. This
argument implicitly acknowledges the distinction between what contemporary philosophers
call ‘the criterion of rightness’ which is used to determine the objective moral rightness (or
wrongness) of an action and ‘decision-making procedures’ (criterion of choiceworthiness)
that are used to guide the behaviour of actual moral agents towards those act-options that
are objectively morally right. His system, I suggested, proposes an indirect version of Ideal
Utilitarianism. I have also suggested that McTaggart’s own argument for restricting the kinds
of intrinsic goods that ought to be considered in explicit moral deliberation to those goods
that will most reliably pick out the morally right act-option also support a further claim that
there may be good reason to opt for non-deliberative emotional/volitional dispositional responses to
states of affairs where such dispositions reliably pick out the morally right act-option;
furthermore, this is especially true if such dispositions are themselves among the intrinsic
goods that ought to be promoted by Ideal Utilitarians. I observed that Rashdall
acknowledged that certain kinds of direct dispositional responses are intrinsically good and
that these dispositional responses also rule out the motivations and aims required for virtue
(acting directly out of concern for/for the sake of responding appropriately to intrinsic goods and
maximizing overall good). He also acknowledged that in many cases engaging in cost-benefit
analysis about each particular act-option is not a viable option, nor is it as reliable at picking
out morally right act-options as established (and autonomously endorsed) moral rules or as
dispositions such as love or sympathy. The extension of McTaggart’s reasoning and the
inclusion of Rashdall’s observations about how an ideal utilitarian is best able to guide her
actions shows that McTaggart’s version of Ideal Utilitarianism need not be interpreted as a
highly problematic form of ‘consequentialist deliberationism;’ instead, I have made the case
that it is more akin to sophisticated consequentialism. McTaggart’s account, as he himself
presented it, falls short of sophisticated versions of Ideal Utilitarianism insofar as he did not
explain how it is that the motives and aims required for consequentialist virtue do not
interfere with the motives and aims required for intrinsically good dispositions such as love.
Again, I suggested that McTaggart’s commitment to the highly important intrinsic good of
love (and the beloved person) and his commitment to Ideal Utilitarianism can be reconciled
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by looking at how Rashdall restricted the role of the ‘sense of duty’ to the ‘background’ in
order to preserve intrinsically good dispositions.
Rashdall described virtue as a disposition to respond appropriately to various kinds
of intrinsic goods according to their absolute and relative value. It also involves having a
kind of sensibility for when one’s direct value-responses or one’s moral rules are providing
conflicting, unclear, or unreliable guidance and a further disposition to adjust those rules or
dispositions where doing so is necessary to promote overall goodness. However, if the agent
does not perceive any problems with the direct dispositional responses, the agent’s attention
remains directly engaged within those emotional/volitional responses and one’s ‘sense of
duty’ remains in the background. One might describe this ‘background’ as a kind of higherorder state of reflection. One could divide one’s dispositional states into two levels. Firstorder dispositions would be those dispositions that are directed immediately towards
intrinsic goods that are not themselves (emotional or volitional) dispositions. Love would be
an example of a first-order disposition. It is at this level of attention and consciousness that
one interacts directly with the world. Second-order dispositions are directed at first-order
dispositions (which may themselves have intrinsic value). Here, one’s state of consciousness
involves a kind of introspective reflection on one’s own dispositions and therefore presumes
some degree of removal from direct concerns about the world. Virtue – which involves
shaping one’s dispositions and actions out of concern for/for the sake of doing what is
morally right/best – is a second-order disposition. Humans can shift between these
positions, but one cannot operate at both levels at the same time. One can also, presumably,
develop an ability to operate at certain levels according to different circumstances and so one
can develop a disposition to switch to the second-order where one has a sense that the firstorder is not operating optimally. If one’s attention is engaged in first-order dispositions
themselves, but one still has the (inactive) capacity to engage in second-order reflection on
the first order – one has a virtuous disposition that operates in the ‘background.’
I suggested that Rashdall’s account is similar to Railton’s description of how one’s
commitment to consequentialism’s criterion of rightness can best be embodied as a
dispositional structure that meets a counter-factual condition informed by that criterion of
rightness; furthermore, I think that Railton provides a clearer account of how Rashdall might
have understood one’s ‘sense of duty’ to operate in the ‘background.’ McTaggart’s reasoning
about the various kinds of moral criteria – when extended and combined with Rashdall’s and
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Railton’s observations about the optimal role for a ‘sense of duty’ – is consistent with a
version of ideal utilitarian that is a form of sophisticated consequentialism.
An ideal utilitarian theory that both acknowledges that love is a highly important
intrinsic good and is also a form of sophisticated consequentialism meets the love-based
adequacy test66 – one of the two requirements I have suggested are at the heart of the
various forms of the love-based objection. McTaggart’s insistence that love is among the
most important goods that we can try to bring about in the world (for any person – me or
anyone else) means that we ought to adjust our commitment to consequentialism and its
criteria to allow for as much love as possible while at the same time attempting to promote
(me or others) doing what is right. If we are able to embody our commitment to
consequentialism and its motives and aims in the ‘background’ or as a ‘counterfactual
condition,’ in much the same way we embody the commitment to grammar (and its aims and
motives) in the background of speech, then there is no reason why love and morality will
necessarily be incompatible or that love will necessarily and reliably be prevented by the
pursuit of a virtuous life.
McTaggart’s philosophy of love also acknowledges a distinction that has important
implications for integrating love and moral philosophy: the distinction between motivation
and justification. McTaggart argued that love is justified according to its own intrinsic value
and not according to its causes. The explanatory reasons that we have for coming to love
someone (and perhaps even for continuing to love them) are based on qualities of the
beloved and do not, in-themselves, provide grounds for condemning an instance of love.
Love is intrinsically valuable, and so we ought – prima facie – to value and promote it. Love,
once it comes about, causes us to act out of concern for and for the sake of the beloved, and so it
provides the agent its own unique motives and aims; nonetheless, the motives and aims of
love are not necessarily the motives and aims that cause one to love or to continue loving
another person. I proposed that McTaggart’s argument that the object of love is always a
person and never the person’s qualities makes the most sense if we assume that he conceived
of love as a higher-order intrinsic good (as described by Hurka in Virtue, Vice, and Value). On
this interpretation, McTaggart thinks that love is justified because of its intrinsic value and it
has intrinsic value because it is directed towards a basic intrinsic good – the beloved person.
Love-Based Adequacy Test: any plausible version of consequentialism must ensure that the motivations
and reasons endorsed by/required by consequentialist ethics will not reliably and significantly impede the highly
valuable and important intrinsic goods of love or loving relationships.
66
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Love is ultimately justified, therefore, by being an appropriate (and so intrinsically good) proresponse to an intrinsic good. However, acting out of concern for love’s ‘intrinsic value’
cannot, by any reasonable stretch of the imagination, be an ordinary motive for loving
someone. It is clear, therefore, that McTaggart recognizes that in the case of intrinsically
good emotion one’s motives and one’s justifications need not be identical, and so there
seems to be no reason why this would not also be true of desires having higher-order
intrinsic value: one’s motive for doing the right thing need not necessarily be identical (in
every case) to the justification making that action objectively morally right. Therefore, one’s
motive for loving need not be understood as acting from an awareness intrinsic value of love
(or an awareness that “I ought to desire love”), nor the fact that loving dispositions are
reliable ways to pick-out objectively right act-options.
It is also worth noting that despite the fact that the motivation and justification for
love may not be the same, this does not necessarily imply any problematic forms of
alienation within the person who loves or between the person loving and the person loved.
Acknowledging (at a higher-order level of reflection) that my love is justified by the fact of
its own intrinsic goodness, and independently of my particular motives for loving, does not
necessarily threaten the strength or authenticity of my own love for another (nor would it
necessarily cause me to necessarily condemn another person’s love for me). In fact, this may
only strengthen my sense of love’s value and importance by fostering a sense that love is – in
a sense – always a greater good than anyone really deserves due to the inevitable selfishness
that taints anyone’s motives (even in the most genuine cases of love).
Recognizing that the causes and object of love are distinct and recognizing that the
motivations of love and the justifying grounds for love are not identical is an important
insight. It supports the idea that the motives, aims, and values of love and morality need not
necessarily conflict nor need they impede each other. This further supports the claim that
McTaggart’s moral philosophy, when combined with observations from his philosophy of
love is able to meet the LBAT.
Yet despite being able to avoid incompatibility between love and morality within the
moral agent, one must still show that it is possible to integrate one’s motives and reasons and
thereby avoid the problematic form of alienation that Stocker, and others, emphasized in
their versions of the LBO. McTaggart’s moral philosophy must therefore be shown to meet
the Harmonious Integration Requirement (HIR) that demands that ‘one is moved by one’s
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major values and that one values what one’s major motives seek.’67 Nowhere does
McTaggart explicitly endorse an ‘esoteric’ or ‘self-effacing’ version of ideal utilitarianism.
There also seems to be no reason to attribute such a view to him. He never claims that we
must ignore our commitment to a consequentialist criterion of rightness and his arguments
related to the criterion of choiceworthiness indicated that there is clearly some legitimate
(though perhaps limited) role for it in moral philosophy. So he is able to avoid the most
extreme version of alienation ruled out by HIR. I also think, however, that the more subtle
form of alienation – where a deep or essential connection between one’s recognized motives
and reasons/values is lacking – can be avoided.
To see how, first assume that one proposed a sophisticated version of hedonistic
utilitarianism where one ultimately endorses pro-love dispositions because they reliably
promote pleasure (the only intrinsic good) and also assume that one held McTaggart’s view
of love. On McTaggart’s view, love involves (in an essential way) a sense of a deep intimate
union with another person producing an emotional appreciation of the beloved. This loving
emotional appreciation of the beloved may then result in loving acts that are directly
motivated out of a direct concern for the beloved person (and not merely the beloved’s
pleasure) and are done for the sake of the beloved person (and not merely the beloved’s
pleasure). According to the axiology of hedonistic utilitarianism the beloved person would
be denied any intrinsic value and the loving disposition itself would be denied any intrinsic
value. One’s motives and reasons for loving actions would only be instrumentally and
extrinsically connected to the justification for love and loving actions: the pleasure they
produce. This is clearly the kind of non-integration that the HIR is meant to rule out.
In the case of McTaggart’s Ideal Utilitarianism, however, love and the beloved
person are both intrinsically valuable. I am motivated at the second-order level (my
commitment to live an objectively consequentialist life: to maximize net aggregate goodness)
to seek out (at least one element of) what I value most – loving relationships with the people
I love; furthermore, I am also motivated at the first-order level (through my experience of
love) to seek out (at least one element of) what I value most – loving relationships. The ideal
utilitarian also values what their major motives seek: the first-order loving motives are
Harmonious Integration Requirement: any plausible version of consequentialism must ensure that our
motives embody our reasons and that our reasons are embodied in our motives. In other words,
consequentialist agents must be “moved by our major values and we should value what our major motives
seek” (Stocker, “Schizophrenia,” p. 454).
67
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directed at intrinsically valuable persons and the higher-order virtuous motives are directed
at all intrinsic goods which include first-order loving emotions and the beloved persons to
which they are directed. There is an essential and intrinsic connection between one’s motives
and reasons, even though they operate at different levels, because one’s reasons and motives
(at all levels) are all directly oriented towards at least some of the intrinsic goods contained in
the list of all possible intrinsic goods, all of which ought to be included in some way in the
best possible quantity and combination in the ideal state of affairs. Since one’s reasons and
motives (at any level) are directed at and arise out of concern for promoting intrinsic goods,
and one’s motivational structure as a whole is directed at what is intrinsically good (and so at
those elements we have reason to believe will generally contribute to the best state of affairs
overall) McTaggart’s version of ideal utilitarianism is therefore able to meet the second
requirement necessary to avoid the love based objection.
In summary, McTaggart’s version of Ideal Utilitarianism – supplemented, extended,
and completed where appropriate – is able to meet both the LBAT and HIR and so is able
to overcome LBO. It does this because it supports a multi-level and sophisticated version of
Ideal Utilitarianism that allows one to embody commitments to both the consequentialist
criterion of rightness and to love in a way that ensures the unique motives and aims of each
do not interfere with or impede each other. The version of Ideal Utilitarianism considered
here has formal features of ‘sophisticated consequentialism’ that are identified by Railton as
offering a way to overcome the LBO. Railton, however, only offers a structural sketch of
what such an ethical theory would look like without filling in the details. McTaggart, on the
other hand, offers a much more detailed and substantive moral philosophy. While his
philosophical system may need considerable improvements and revisions to qualify as a
viable alternative to contemporary ethical theories (and in fact it does need these), it at least
shows that it is possible to start filling in the details of the kind of theory proposed by
Railton in a way that is meaningful and at least prima facie plausible. I have not attempted to
engage in any detailed application of McTaggart’s theory to practical matters, but it is clear
that regardless of what problems might arise concerning the intuitive status of its practical
conclusions, it will be no worse off in terms of being applicable to practical questions than
any other consequentialist system that has been proposed: one would have to estimate and
compare the various values involved and one would have to assess the reliability of various
proposed methods of moral choice according to their ability to reliably produce objectively
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right actions. Ultimately one would have to assess and adjust McTaggart’s theory based on
the kinds of directives and guidance it produced, but this is a project that goes beyond the
scope of this dissertation. If, however, it turns out that his theory can recognize the
importance we intuitively assign to love and loving relationships, and recognize the unique
perspective that loved ones have in major moral decisions, then this would be an advantage
to his ethical theory and it might provide insight on how to develop other kinds of ethical
theory. Hopefully, the fact that McTaggart’s version of Ideal Utilitarianism is able, at least
structurally, to overcome the LBO will give ethicists a reason to consider it more carefully
and potentially develop it further.
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